Recurring Armed Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: an Insight into the SADC Intervention Problematique
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32890/jis2017.13.10Keywords:
Conflict recurrence, SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity, political security, military securityAbstract
Conflict recurrence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides a litmus test to the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC’s) capacity to sustainably resolve the conflict and build peace. The surrender of the March 23 (M23) rebels, followed by overtures to incorporate the same into the Congolese military and political institutions, seem not to have made much significant impact on the security stability in the eastern part of the country. Armed activities by militia groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and various Mayi Mayi groups are likely to cause a recurrence of a fully fledged armed conflict in eastern Congo. Whilst the UN Mission for the Stabilisation of Congo (MONUSCO), along with its Intervention Brigade continue to make efforts to support the Congolese government to address the security situation in the country, this article presents a critical analysis on the prospects and constraints of SADC to sustainably resolve the conflict and build peace in the context of conflict recurrence. For purposes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the DRC falls within SADC’s area of sub-regional responsibility, which overlaps that of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The paper looks at the political/diplomatic and military/ security initiatives that SADC can take to complement the current efforts of critical role players such as MONUSCO and ICGLR in sustainably resolving the recurring conflict and building peace.It also analyses the prospects of such sub-regional initiatives. Considering the conflict matrix of the eastern Congo conflict with specific reference to its recurrence, an examination of the likely constraints that SADC could encounter in trying to resolve the eastern Congo conflict will be presented. Policy suggestions will be proffered on what can be done to encounter such constraints.The research adopted a qualitative approach premised on interviews. Secondary sources, including key policy documents and statements of the SADC, AU, ICGLR and UN, were utilised. To complement the primary sources, structured opportunity interviews were conducted at seminars and workshops with academics and senior political and security analysts conversant with the SADC conflict and peace dynamics.
References
Allen, T., M. (2011). United Nations led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Unpublished master’s thesis Security Studies, Naval Post-Graduate School), California.
Bajunid, O. F. (2009). The conflict in Thailand’s deep south and its international implications, Journal of International Studies, 5, 40-57.
Baker, D.-P., & Sadiki, M. (2009). SADCBRIG intervention in SADC member states: Reasons to doubt. Africa Security Review, 18(1), 106-110.
Boras, A. H.. (2009). The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – review of Norwegian support to the ICGLR Secretariat, Norad. Retrieved from <http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=131851
De Coning, Cedric H., & Gustavo de Carvalho. (2013). ACCORD Peacebuilding handbook. (1st ed). Umhlanga Rocks, ACCORD. Retrieved from http://www.nupi. no/Publikasjoner/Boeker-Rapporter/2013/ACCORD-Peacebuilding-Handbook
Dizolele, M., P.. (2004). The UN in Congo: The failure of a peacekeeping mission. 10 May. Retrieved from http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/UN-Other/mvemba-dizolele/ The-UN-in-Congo-The-failure-of-a-peacekeeping-mission
Feeley, R., & Colin Thomas-Jensen. (2008). Beyond crisis management in eastern Congo. (Strategy Paper, 11 December). Available from [Accessed 12 May 2013].
Gil, D., & G. (1998).Confronting injustice and oppression: Concepts and strategies for social workers. New York, Columbia University Press.
Hansen, T. (2008). Critical conflict resolution theory and practice.Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 25(4), pp. 403-429. Retrieved from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1002/crq.215/abstract Sadiki Maeresera & Knocks Tapiwa Zengeni
International Crisis Group. (2009). Congo: A comprehensive strategy to disarm the FDLR. Africa Report Number 151, 9 July 2009. Retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/151%20Congo%20-%20A%20 Comprehensive%20Strategy%20to%20Disarm%20the%20FDLR%20 -%20 ENGLISH.pdf
Maeresera, S., & UfoO, U. (2010). Operationalising the SADC mutual defence Pact: Prospects and constraints, African Security Review, 19 (3), 94-107.
Matsiko, Haggai. (2013, January 20). M23 rebels fear war over sanctions. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.ug/news/regional-news/7268-m23-congo-rebels-fearwar-over-un-sanctions
Menondji, M.H.A. (2013). Problematic peacekeeping in the DRC: From MONUC to MONUSCO. Why have large-scale international efforts to end the violence in the DRC failed again and again? 4 February. Retrieved from http://thinkafricapress. com/drc/problematic-peacekeeping-drc-monuc-monusco
Nathan, L. (2004). The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992–2003.Working paper No. 50. Crisis States Programme. Development Research Centre, London School of Economics, London. Retrieved from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28208/1/wp50.pdf
Ngoma, N. (2004). Hawks, doves and penguins: A critical review of SADC military intervention in the DRC. Institute of Security Studies Occasional Paper, 88, 2004. Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria. Retrieved from http://www.issafrica.org/index. php?link_id=3&slink_id=519&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3
Paffenholz, T., & Christoph, S. (2006). Civil society, civil engagement, and peacebuilding. Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconciliation. Working Papers Series No 36, pp. 23-27. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/ Resources/WP36_web.pdf
Perera, S., & Danielle, B. (2013). Security complexes and complexities in the eastern DRC, Paper presented at the 5th European Conference on African Studies: African Dynamics in a multipolar world, 27-29 June, Lisbon. Retrieved from http://www. nomadit.co.uk/ecas/ecas2013/panels.php5?PanelID=2105
Phiri, Gift. (2013, January 18). SADC troops deployed to DRC. Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2013/01/18/sadc-troops-deployed-to-drc
Radebe, H. (2013, July 2). SA to send Monusco troops to UN’s Congo intervention brigade, Business Day. Retrieved from http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2013/07/02/sa-tosend-monusco-troops-to-uns-congo-intervention-brigade
Rugeje, A. B., & Maeresera, S. (2016).The United Nations force intervention brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR synchronised peace support efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo recurring conflict? Journal of International Studies, 12, 65-79.
Shepherd, B. (2013, November 14). DR Congo: Security Council extends UN mission, intervention force for one year. UN News Center. Retrieved from http://www. chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/195557
South African National Defence Force. (2000). Statement by SA National Defence Force (SANDF) headquarters: Participation in UN Mission to DRC (MONUC 2). 14 June. Retrieved from http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/0008071010a1005.htm Intervention Problematique
Southern African Development Community. (2012). Regional early warning centre. Retrieved from http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/services-centres/regional-earlywarning-centre
United Nations News Center. (2014, March 26). DR Congo: Security Council extends UN mission, intervention force for one year. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/ news/story.asp?NewsID=47454&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo#.U3yCJBUaLcu
United Nations Security Council. (2012). United Nations Security Council (UNSC) S/ RES/2076. Retrieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/ democratic-republic-of-the-congo
Zambara, Webster. (2013, January 4). SADC’s peace plan faces challenges. Mail and Guardian. Available from <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-01-04-00-sadcs-peace-planfaces-challenges End Notes In the view of an anonymous Great Lakes regional security analyst, the defections of Congolese troops to rebel militias cannot primarily be a result of strategic intelligence crafting by Rwanda and Uganda. The defections have been and are a result of maladministration of the security sector, particularly the military service, by the Congolese government. The Congolese government has not been able to train and retrain its military as well as effectively and efficiently equip and administer its troops so that the Congolese Armed Forces are not found wanting when it comes to the execution of their constitutional obligation, that is, the defence of DRC’s territorial integrity (Interview with security analyst, 25 May 2013, Kinshasa. All interviews were conducted by Dr Sadiki Maeresera.). Non-attributable comment by security analyst on 28 May 2013, Kinshasa. See also International Crisis Group2009:3-11. Non-attributable comment by security analyst on 28 May 2013, Kinshasa. See also International Crisis Group2009:3-11. At the time of writing this article, Rwanda was reported to have withdrawn all her support for the armed militia fighting the Congolese government. This could have been a result of effective Western diplomacy, particularly the personal direct engagement by the US Secretary of State John Kerry and UK Foreign Minister William Hague. The two diplomats could have played an important role ‘in dissuading the Rwandan leadership from any further cross-border adventures’. Other factors such as the reduction in military aid and development assistance could also have resulted in Kigali changing its strategic military deployments and support to rebel militia operating in the Kivus. The authors are indebted to the valuable analysis made by Ben Shepherd, a research fellow with the Chatham House’s African Programme. See Shepherd 2013. Non-attributable comment by security analyst on 28 May 2013, Kinshasa. Non-attributable comment by security analyst on 28 May 2013, Kinshasa. See also International Crisis Group 2009:3-11.
Interview with G. Ngoya on 25 May 2013, Kinshasa. Interview with G. Ngoya on 25 May 2013, Kinshasa. Sadiki Maeresera & Knocks Tapiwa Zengeni The ICGLR is made up of member states and co-opted states. The ICGLR member states are Angola, DRC, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Congo Republic, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Sudan. The co-opted member states are Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe,
Malawi, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Egypt. See Boras 2009. At the time of writing this article, M23 rebel leader Jean Bosco Ntanganda was facing trial at The Hague for crimes against humanity committed by his rebel group. These crimes included rape, mass murders, torture, and forcible recruitment of child soldiers in eastern Congo. See United Nations Security Council 2012. Interview with A. Mulenga on 25 May 2013, Kinshasa. Interview with A. Mulenga on 25 May 2013, Kinshasa. Interview with J. Didier on 25 May 2013. Kinshasa.
Interview with A. Mulenga on 25 May 2013. Kinshasa. The revision of SIPO was aimed at operationalising the SADC protocol on politics, defence and security cooperation. It also sought to provide a five-year implementation framework of the protocol. The major objective of the plan was to create a SADC sub-regional environment that is peaceful, stable and politically secure. Such an environment would ensure the realisation of the SADC sub-region’s socio-economic objectives (see also Zambara 2013). The organ functions as a ‘troika’ with South Africa and Namibia being the preceding and succeeding chairs respectively. Museveni was playing a key facilitating role in terms of political dialogue between the DRC government and M23 rebels in Kampala, hence his presence at the SADC summit (see also Zambara 2013). Museveni was playing a key facilitating role in terms of political dialogue between the DRC government and M23 rebels in Kampala, hence his presence at the SADC summit (see also Zambara 2013). Non-attributable comment by Great Lakes Regional Political and Military Security Analyst on 28 May 2013, Kinshasa. (see alsoMaeresera and Uzodike 2010:94). Non-attributable comment by Great Lakes Regional Political and Military Security Analyst on 28 May 2013, Kinshasa. The extension of its mandate by one year, the peace, security and cooperation framework of MONUSCO, alongside the FIB, allows it to work with the DRC government and all other governments concerned. The tasks within this framework include: establishment of functional, professional and accountable State institutions; protection of civilians; neutralisation of armed groups through the Intervention Brigade in a ‘robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law’; monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, and provision of support to national and international judicial processes in the DRC. From the authors’ viewpoint, it is against this background that SADC would take relevant initiatives based on this framework in its endeavours to complement the MONUSCO role, rather than take no action perhaps under the impression that the presence of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian troops as part of the FIB is enough contribution to conflict resolution and peace efforts by the sub-regional body. See also UN News Center 2014. See South African National Defence Force 2000.
Interview with S. Badza on 15 June 2013, Addis Ababa.
