Research Article Published 29 January 2024

Tax Enforcement Strategy: The Antidote to Non-Tax Compliance in North-West Nigeria

How to Cite

How to Cite

Abdulrasaq , M., & Babatunde, A. A. (2024). Tax Enforcement Strategy: The Antidote to Non-Tax Compliance in North-West Nigeria. Journal of Business Management and Accounting, 14(1), 67-89. https://doi.org/10.32890/jbma2024.14.1.3
Mustapha Abdulrasaq
Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Business and Governance, Kwara State University, Malete, Nigeria
Abdullahi Adio Babatunde
Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Business and Governance, Kwara State University, Malete, Nigeria
Full text
PDF View full text 1013 KB · 23 pages XML JATS full text 100 KB · machine readable HTML Read online 54 KB
DOI 10.32890/jbma2024.14.1.3 Cite this article
Share this article
Citations
8 +3 · 2026
Crossref, highest of the sources checked
Reads
500 +4
Abstract + full text
Downloads
647 +5
PDF and XML
Percentile
90th
By citations, works of the same year

Article

Abstract

Voluntary SME tax compliance has been of great interest to governments all over the world, given their unimpressive contribution to total tax revenue. This is even more so in Nigeria where the culture of tax compliance among SMEs can be described as poor, requiring innovative enforcement strategies. This study examined the extent to which tax enforcement strategies served as antidote to non-tax compliance in the North-West Nigeria. The study collected quantitative data from 345 randomly and purposively selected SMEs owners duly registered in North-west, Nigeria. The data was subjected to both descriptive and inferential analysis through techniques of central tendency and multiple regressions. Results revealed that three tax enforcement strategies: Use of tax clearance certificate (β=0.024 < 0.003), grant of tax amnesty (β=0.025< 0.020), and imposition of tax penalty (β = 0.013 < 0.014) have significant positive influence on degree of tax compliance among SMEs in the North-West Nigeria. Given the significant statistical evidence, this research inferred and concluded that deployment of both punitive (tax penalty) and persuasive measures (tax clearance certificate and tax amnesty) serve as antidote to non-tax compliance among the SMEs in the North-West, Nigeria. The study shows that tax compliance across informal sectors can be enhanced beyond the use of legal means. In essence, governments have the leverage of achieving increase in tax revenue in the informal sector through multiple strategies of motivation and punishment as implicitly emphasized in the theory of tax morale and deterrence theory.

Keywords
Tax clearance certificate tax penalty tax amnesty tax compliance tax enforcement

Metrics & impact

Citations by source

Harvested 08-09-2026

Counts differ by index because each source crawls a different corpus. Crossref counts only registered reference lists; Google Scholar includes theses, preprints and grey literature.

Crossref
8
Deposited reference lists only View →
Semantic Scholar
7
S2AG corpus View →
OpenAlex
6
Open corpus, updated daily View →
OpenCitations
4
Open references only View →
Scopus
0 Not indexed
Indexed titles only View →
Google Scholar
Publishes no citation count that can be read automatically.
Includes theses and preprints Search →
Dimensions
Publishes no citation count that can be read automatically.
Includes policy documents Search →

Citations over time

New citations recorded in each year, as reported by OpenAlex.

1
2
3
2024 2025 2026

Reads & downloads

Abstract views 500
PDF downloads 647
XML downloads 0
Full-text HTML 0
Counted under COUNTER Release 5 rules; known robots excluded.

Attention beyond citation

Citation percentile 90th
Field-weighted citation impact 3.94
Works this article cites 62

From OpenAlex. A field-weighted impact of 1.00 is the world average for work of the same field, type and year. No Altmetric key is configured, so news, policy and social attention are not shown.

Identifiers
DOI · 10.32890/jbma2024.14.1.3
OpenAlex · W4391354234
Semantic Scholar · CorpusID 267434278

References

References 89
Deposited to Crossref with the article DOI
  1. Adhiambo, D. (2017). The factors affecting tax compliance among the small scale traders Nakuru town. International Journal of Finance, Banking and Insurance, 2(4), 716-751.
  2. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., & McKee, M. (1993). Institutional uncertainty and taxpayer compliance. The American Economic Review, 83(4), 1011-1026.
  3. Alm, J. (2012). Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: Lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies. International Tax and Public Finance, 19(1), 54-77.
  4. Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., & McKee, M. (2010). Audit selection and firm compliance with a broad-based sales tax. National Tax Journal, 63(4), 807-830.
  5. Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2011). Do ethics matter? Tax compliance and morality. Journal of Business Ethics, 101(4), 635-651.
  6. Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2006). Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(2), 224-246.
  7. Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(2), 818-860.
  8. Ayuolu, M. (2019). Effect of tax compliance economic growth: Evidence from Bangladesh. Strategic Management Journal, 2(3), 969–988.
  9. Ayoade, G. (2020). The effects of monitoring firms on tax compliance in Nigeria. American Economic Journal, 1(2), 121-142.
  10. Alabede, K., Zaimah, U., & Kamil, Q. (2018). Social networks and tax avoidance: Evidence from a Well-Defined Norwegian tax shelter. Working Paper, University of Oslo.
  11. Ayuba, H. Saad, T., & Ariffin, O. (2016). Tax evasion and inequality in Nigeria. University of Michigan Press.
  12. Andreoni, J., & Jonathan F. (2016). Impact of tax knowledge and awareness on tax compliance. Journal of Enterprise Information Management, 1(1), 13-29.
  13. Afeez, L., Chukwumeka, O., & Christian, K. (2016). The credibility revolution in empirical economics: How better research design is taking the con out of econometrics. Journal of Economic Development, 2(2), 103-130.
  14. Adhiambo, C. (2017). The role of firms in workers earnings responses to taxes: Evidence from Pakistan. American Economic Journal, 1(3), 34-59.
  15. Adegboye, Q., Alao-Owunna, L., & Egharba, M. (2014). Psychological frictions and incomplete take-up of social benefits: Evidence from an IRS field experiment. American Economic Review, 15(11), 3489-3529.
  16. Bedada, K. (2020). Criminal deterrence: A review of the Literature. Journal of Economic Literature, 1(1), 5-48.
  17. Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.
  18. Boll, K., & Heufer, J. (2017). Tax evasion and social information: An experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. Journal of Public Economics, 1(2), 35-48. Blevins (Eds.), Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory (pp. 367-396). Transaction Publishers.
  19. Braithwaite, V., Reinhart, M., & Braithwaite, J. (2013). The regulatory craft: Controlling risks, solving problems, and managing compliance. ANU Press.
  20. Braithwaite, V., Ahmed, E., & Braithwaite, J. (2017). An end to tax exceptionalism? Psychological barriers to tax compliance. British Journal of Criminology, 57(4), 886-903.
  21. Braithwaite, V. (2003). Dancing with tax authorities: Motivational postures and non-compliant actions. In A. Levi (Ed.), Tax compliance and non-compliance (pp. 1-16). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.
  22. Cerutti, E., Parisi, L., & Rablen, M. D. (2020). The impact of third-party reporting and tax enforcement: Evidence from Argentina. Journal of Public Economics, 184, 104150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104150.
  23. Cobham, Y. (2005). Compliance behavior in networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper 9443.
  24. Churchill, Y. (2011). Adoption of internet tax practices: A note on the extent of adoption and the influence on the revenue generation. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 15(4), 383-399.
  25. Cullis, J., Jones, P., & Lewis, A. (2007). Tax framing, instrumentality, and individual differences in taxpayers’ responses to tax. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(2), 206-218.
  26. Cuccia, A. D., & Niedermeier, M. J. (2019). The lasting effects of tax amnesties: A comparative study. Public Finance Review, 47(2), 287-319.
  27. Cullen, F. T., & Gilbert, M. J. (1982). Reaffirming Deterrence: A Rejoinder to the Critics. Justice Quarterly, 1(4), 535-552
  28. Desta, K. (2010). Third-party reporting, tax collections, and the size of government: Revenue evidence from withholding tax. International Journal of Information Technology, 1(1), 203-232.
  29. De Juan, A., Lacomba, J. A., Lagos, F., & Perote, J. (2019). The effect of deterrence mechanisms on tax compliance: A laboratory experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 73, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.102185.
  30. Feld, L. P., & Frey, B. S. (2002). Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated. Economics of Governance, 3(2), 87-99.
  31. Feld, L. P., & Frey, B. S. (2007). Tax compliance as the result of a psychological tax contract: The role of incentives and responsive regulation. Law & Policy, 29(1), 102-120.
  32. Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007). Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 3(1), 136-159.
  33. Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., & Kirchler, E. (2015). Tax authorities’ interaction with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust. New Ideas in Psychology, 3(7), 13-23.
  34. Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I. (2017). The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance. Journal of Public Economics, 1(4), 14-31.
  35. Hofmann, E., Hoelzl, E., & Kirchler, E. (2008). Preconditions of voluntary tax compliance: Knowledge and evaluation of taxation, norms, fairness, and motivation to cooperate. Zeitschrift Für Psychologie/Journal of Psychology, 216(4), 209-217.
  36. James, S., Alley, C., & Rickard, J. (2014). The impact of tax knowledge and budgeting on tax compliance and financial satisfaction in a self-assessment tax system. Journal of Business Ethics, 124(1), 151-165.
  37. Jackson, B. R., & Milliron, V. C. (1986). Tax compliance research: Findings, problems, and prospects. Journal of Accounting Literature, 5(1), 125-165.
  38. Jametti, M., & Rossi, M. A. (2018). Voters elect politicians who closely match their preferences, but it does not make them happier. Journal of Public Economics, 2(4), 157, 174.
  39. Jametti, M., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2020). Tax compliance, audit perceptions, and information on tax evasion: Evidence from an incentivized experiment. European Economic Review, 129, 103589. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103589.
  40. Kathleem, P. (2019). Professionals’ perspective of tax evasion: Some evidence from Nigeria, Universal Journal of Accounting and Finance, 1(2), 35-51.
  41. Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., & Wahl, I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The “slippery slope” framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(2), 210-225.
  42. Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B., & Schneider, F. (2003). Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: Do legal differences matter? Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(4), 535-553.
  43. Kleven, H. J., & Kreiner, C. T. (2010). The role of moral sentiments and audit perceptions in tax compliance. Journal of International Tax and Public Finance, 17(3), 361-380.
  44. Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2011). Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark. Journal of Econometric, 7(9), 651-692.
  45. Kleven, H. J., Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2011). Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in Denmark. Econometric, 79(3), 651-692. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8245.
  46. Krejcie, N., & Morgan, D. C. (1970). Basic Statistics in Management, New York: Mac Graw-Hill/Irvin.
  47. Kirchler, T. (2018). Formal and informal institutions lending policies and access to credit by small-scale enterprises in Kenya: An empirical assessment. International Journal of Finance and Accounting, 1(2), 109–128.
  48. Kumar, A., & Pandey, M. (2018). Tax amnesty and government revenues: Evidence from India. Journal of Economic Studies, 45(1), 45-60.
  49. Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., & Wahl, I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The ‘slippery slope’ framework. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(2), 210-225.
  50. Lustig, N., & Jaramillo, L. (2018). The impact of tax and expenditure policies on income redistribution and poverty reduction in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 8(6), 1-15.
  51. Luttmer, E. F., Singhal, M., & Yang, S. (2017). Tax morale. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(4), 149-170. doi: 10.1257/ jep.31.4.149
  52. Mascagni, G., & Sanguinetti, P. (2016). The impact of tax amnesties on collection and compliance: Evidence from Colombia. Public Finance Review, 44(1), 104-131.
  53. Mascagni, G., Moore, M., & Sharma, S. (2021). Compliance in the shadows: Exploring the relationship between tax enforcement and taxpayer behavior. World Development, 137, 105178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105178.
  54. Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Torgler, B. (2009). The evolution of tax morale in modern Spain. Journal of Economic Issues, 43(1), 1-28.
  55. Mohammed, H. (2019). Does tax-collection invariance hold? Evasion and the pass-through of State Diesel Taxes. American Economic Journal, 2(3), 251-286.
  56. Mutasa, T. (2021). Finance for small and medium scale enterprises: Nigeria’s agricultural credit guarantee scheme fund. Journal of International Farm Management, 3(2), 1816–2495.
  57. Muslichaha, Y. (2019). Effect of compliance costs on the revenue generation of the relevant tax authority, Journal of Australian Taxation, 2(4), 173-197.
  58. Mwandiambira, O. (2020). Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: Evidence from a controlled experiment in Macedonia. International Journal of Public Economics, 2(3), 429-453.
  59. Nagin, D. S. (2013). Deterrence: A review of the evidence by a criminologist for economists. Annual Review of Economics, 5(1), 83-105.
  60. Nivakan, O., & Sahari, Q. (2018). Effect of tax aggressiveness on tax revenue: Evidence from Sweden. Journal of Public Economics, 3(1), 126-141.
  61. Oghuma, T. (2018). Economic and behavioral determinants of tax compliance: Evidence from Arkansas tax penalty amnesty programme in Nigeria, International Journal of Marketing, 6(9), 1160 –1181.
  62. Olufemi, V. (2018). Determinants of tax compliance in Nigeria. International Journal of Accounting Literature, 1(1), 1-46.
  63. Owusu, C., Ofori, B., Isaac, J., & Yeboah, G. (2016). Impact of tax rates on tax revenue: Evidence from SMEs in China. Journal of Political Economy, 1(2), 471-496.
  64. Paternoster, R. (1987). The deterrent effect of the perceived certainty and severity of punishment: A review of the evidence and issues. Justice Quarterly, 4(2), 173-217.
  65. Pallant, M. (2020). Statistical Package for Social Science. Cambridge University Press.
  66. Pratt, T. C., Cullen, F. T., Blevins, K. R., Daigle, L. E., & Madensen, T. D. (2006). The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis. In F. T. Cullen, J. P. Wright, & K. R. Blevins (Eds.).
  67. Pricewater Coopers (2008). Effect of tax compliance on economic growth and development in Nigeria. China Finance Review International, 2(3), 127-149.
  68. Piquero, A. R., & Paternoster, R. (1998). An application of Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization of deterrence to drinking and driving. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 35(2), 126-156.
  69. Rabiu, E., & Mustafa, O. (2020). Determinants of gift tax compliance among formal sector employees in Kumasi metropolis, Ghana Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 7(2), 220-239.
  70. Reckers, P. M., Sanders, D. L., & Roark, S. J. (1994). The influence of ethical attitudes on taxpayer compliance. National Tax Journal, 47(4), 825-836.
  71. Roth, J., Scholz, C., & Schmid, B. (2008). The determinants of tax morale: Evidence from a cross-country analysis. Public Choice, 3(4), 285-305.
  72. Sherman, L. W. (1993). Defiance, deterrence, and irrelevance: A theory of the criminal sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30(4), 445-473.
  73. Slemrod, J. (2017). The economics of tax compliance. Public Economics Handbook, 1(5), 1423-1470). Elsevier.
  74. Slemrod, Joel. (2019). Does it matter who writes the check to the government? The economics of tax remittance. National Tax Journal, 6(6), 251-275.
  75. Stafford, M. C., & Warr, M. (1993). A reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30(2), 123-135.
  76. Svennson, L. (2000). Taxation and Economic Growth: A Comment. In: Economic Growth and Taxation: Planning Under Inefficiency and Overload, edited by Vito Tanzi and Ke-young Chu. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, pp. 67-74.
  77. Tabachnick, B., & Fidell, Z. (2017). Problems and prospects of small and medium scale industries in Nigeria. Paper presented at the Central Bank of Nigeria seminar on small and medium industries equity investment scheme (SMIEIS). Retrieved from www.cenbank.org/out/Publications/guidelines/dfd/2004/ smieis.pdf.
  78. Tanzi, V., & Shome, P. (Eds.). (2018). Tax amnesties: Theory, trends, and some alternatives. Routledge.
  79. Tilahun, K. (2021). Effect of tax enforcement strategies on revenue generation in South Africa. International Journal of Business Management, 8(9), 9901–1010.
  80. Tittle, C. R. (1995). Control Balance: Toward a General Theory of Deviance. Westview Press.
  81. Tijjani, H., Ibrahim A. S., Ardo, A. M., & Yusuf, A. U. (2023). The impact of forensic accounting on tax payer attitude and compliance towards tax evasion within SMEs in the North East Nigeria. Journal of Business Management and Accounting, 13(1), 79-105. https://doi.org/10.32890/ jbma2023.13.1.4
  82. Torgler, B. (2007). Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Cheltenham, K: Edward Elgar Publishing.
  83. Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2007). Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and institutional quality: A panel analysis. International Review of Law and Economics, 27(3), 284-296.
  84. Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2009). The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(2), 228-245.
  85. Torgler, B. (2003). Tax morale, rule-governed behavior and trust. Constitutional Political Economy, 14(2), 119-140.
  86. Wenzel, M. (2002). The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on tax compliance: The role of taxpayers’ identity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 629-645.
  87. Wenzel, M. (2004). An analysis of norm processes in tax compliance. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25(2), 213-228.
  88. Wright, R., Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., & Paternoster, R. (2004). Does the perceived risk of punishment deter criminally prone individuals? Rational choice, self-control, and crime. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 41(2), 180-213.
  89. Zhang, L., Hasseldine, J., & Evans, C. (2020). Tax avoidance and risk-taking: An experimental study. Journal of Business Ethics, 162(1), 93-116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04182-3

Most read articles by the same author(s)