A Study of Perception of International Students on Quality of Malaysian Cars
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32890/mmj2014.18.2Keywords:
Palm oil refining industry, excess capacity, entry deterrenceAbstract
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Dixit (1980) believed that in times of entry, incumbent firms would increase production to bring the price down, but would eventually reduce output production, as the drop in prices would affect them also. He thus concluded that excess capacity does not work as a threat since capacity would remain idle post-entry. As of 2011, the palm oil refining industry in Malaysia was represented by 56 operating refineries. With 38 refineries in Peninsular Malaysia and the remaining 18 refineries in Sabah and Sarawak producing a huge amount of oil production for world consumption.
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