



JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

<https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/jis>

How to cite this article:

Tahiluddin, M. S., E. & Kaya, A., S. (2026). Impact and analysis of third-party intervention in the Mindanao conflict. *Journal of International Studies*, 22(2), 159-177. <https://doi.org/10.32890/jis2026.22.2.9>

IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE MINDANAO CONFLICT

¹Mur-hamida S. Eldani-Tahiluddin & ²Asligul Sarikamis Kaya

¹Social Science Department, College of Arts and Sciences, Mindanao State University Tawi-Tawi College of Technology and Oceanography, Mindanao, Philippines

²International Relations Department, Social Science Institute,
Selcuk University, Konya, Turkiye

¹Corresponding author: mur-hamidaeldani@msutawi-tawi.edu.ph

Received: 6/5/2024

Revised: 19/1/2026

Accepted: 7/4/2026

Published: 31/8/2026

ABSTRACT

The Mindanao conflict, one of Asia's most protracted conflicts, is rooted in the Bangsamoro people's pursuit of self-determination and lasting peace. To address this longstanding conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro groups, international actors have played a crucial role in conflict resolution through various forms of third-party intervention. This study employs thematic analysis to examine the nature of the Mindanao conflict and the impact of third-party intervention by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Malaysia, Japan, and the International Contact Group (ICG). Using a qualitative research approach based on academic articles, books, and relevant literature, the study explores the dynamics of the conflict and evaluates the effectiveness of these international efforts in supporting its resolution. The study argues that the mediation and peacebuilding efforts of these regional and international actors advanced the Mindanao peace process and contributed positively to conflict resolution by mitigating the devastating effects of the conflict. The involvement of the OIC, Malaysia, and Japan encouraged the conflicting parties to pursue peaceful approaches to conflict resolution through dialogue, international leverage, and third-party mediation. Japan and the ICG also played crucial roles during the post-conflict period by providing humanitarian, financial, and development assistance that supported the recovery and reconstruction in the region. Nevertheless, insufficient monitoring and follow-up efforts by the OIC and Malaysia affected the sustainability of the peace process and contributed to delays in achieving a lasting settlement. Accordingly, this study recommends that third-party place greater emphasis on monitoring, implementation and assessment during the post-conflict phase. Drawing on Galtung's Conflict Triangle Theory, the study finds that the Mindanao conflict is asymmetrical, with the GRP occupying a dominant

position relative to the Moro groups. It further identifies the conflict as a power asymmetry arising from unequal distribution of power between the two parties, with the Philippine government possessing significantly greater political and military power than the Moro groups.

Keywords: Japan, OIC, ICG, Malaysia, Mindanao conflict.

INTRODUCTION

The Mindanao conflict in the southern Philippines stands as one of the nation's most significant sources of instability. Primarily concentrated in Muslim-dominated areas (Schiavo-Campo & Judd, 2005), the conflict has its roots in the late 1970s, when widespread rebellion and uprisings erupted among the Moro people, or Muslim Filipinos, across the southwestern region (Engineer, 1984). These areas encompass Cotabato City, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. Analysts often frame the conflict in the southern Philippines within the context of religious and ethnic struggles (Franco, 2016). The Christian population in Mindanao originated from earlier waves of migration. However, its present-day majority is largely the result of natural population growth. The Moro people perceived the influx of Christians as an encroachment on their ancestral lands, further fueling resentment (Rodell, 2002). Additionally, they believed that the national government neglected the island's specific needs, further contributing to tensions. Consequently, the conflict existed as a manifestation of the fight for self-determination and independence from the Philippines. Clashes between Muslim rebels and government forces resulted in significant casualties, widespread violence, and population displacement (Reilly, 2002). Spanning more than three decades, the conflict caused immense destruction and loss of life.


Despite numerous negotiations and agreements between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Moro groups, achieving a lasting resolution to the Mindanao conflict proved challenging. International mediation by multiple states and organizations played an important role, and various rounds of dialogues were necessary to promote stability and peace in Mindanao (Gutierrez & Borrás, 2004). The complex nature of the conflict in the Sulu and Mindanao regions has been the subject of extensive scholarly analysis, including its causes, management, and potential resolutions to the separatist movements (Islam, 2003).

In its efforts to resolve the Moro conflict, the Philippine government sought international assistance from various states and organizations (Vatikiotis, 2006). Notably, Malaysia's participation was crucial in shaping the Moro struggle in the southern Philippines. This external support strengthened the Moro cause (Che Man, 1987). Japan's involvement, however, differed in its approach. Its focus centered on peacebuilding initiatives within the Mindanao peace process (Ferrer, 2007). This highlights the multifaceted nature of international involvement, encompassing both direct support for the parties to the conflict and efforts aimed at fostering long-term peace. While the roots of the conflict lie primarily in local actors and longstanding grievances (Ferrer, 2007), its complexities drew in international actors who played a significant role in seeking a resolution.

Mindanao Conflict

Figure 1

Map of Mindanao



Source. <http://www.worldeasyguides.com/asia/philippines/mindanao-island/map-of-mindanao-island/>

Mindanao, the second-largest island in the Philippines, boasts a diverse ethnolinguistic landscape. Its majority population groups include the Muslim community, the Lumads (indigenous peoples), and Christian settlers (Ragandang, 2018). This island is also a major agricultural producer, contributing approximately half of the Philippines' coconut production (Dayag-Laylo, 2004). Mindanao's mountainous terrain is characterized by extensive rainforests that support the cultivation of timber and abaca. Historically, Mindanao was home to the Moro people, or Muslim Filipinos, who fiercely resisted both Spanish and American colonial rule (Morison, 2002). The island has played a complex role in Philippine history. Some viewed it as a potential solution to population pressures and rural unrest in Luzon, the country's largest island (Concepcion et al., 2003). Mindanao's abundant natural resources, particularly its raw materials for trade and export, have also fueled internal conflicts, with some actors exploiting these resources for political gain.

Bangsamoro People

The Moro, also referred to as the Bangsamoro (Moro Nation), are Muslim Filipinos (Franco, 2016). Their ancestral domain encompasses the Sulu archipelago, the island of Mindanao, and parts of Palawan and Basilan (adapted from Franco, 2016). Historically, the Moro people have been recognized for their fierce resistance to colonial rule, captivating the imagination of the Americans, who viewed them as a distinct population of Islamic warriors (Arnold, 2011). Notably, the Moro identity transcends ethnic divisions, uniting 13 distinct ethnolinguistic groups that share Islam as their common faith (Byler, 2005). This shared religious identity likely predates the American colonial period and has been a crucial factor in fostering a sense of Moro unity despite ethnic differences. It is important to clarify a common misconception. The Bangsamoro do not constitute a single ethnolinguistic group but rather an umbrella

term encompassing 13 distinct ethnolinguistic groups. These include the Maguindanaon, Tausug, Maranao, Iranun, Kalagan, Sama, Badjao, Jama Mapun, Kalibugan, Yakan, Sangil, Molbog, and Palawani (Kamlan, 2003; East, 2006). Despite their ethnic diversity, these groups share many cultural traditions and practices.

Mindanao is not inhabited solely by the Bangsamoro. The island is also home to the Lumad, the indigenous peoples, and Christian settlers who migrated from other parts of the Philippines. Although the Bangsamoro account for approximately 20% of the Philippine Muslim population, they are not confined to a few central provinces (Kamlan, 2003; East, 2006). Instead, they are distributed across a wider region, with significant populations residing in Maguindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Lanao del Norte, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and Palawan.

Causes of the Conflict

The roots of the Mindanao conflict lie in a complex web of historical grievances, social and economic injustices, and persistent ethnic tensions. The annexation of Mindanao and Sulu by the United States in the early 20th century was a pivotal event, fostering a deep sense of betrayal and loss of sovereignty among the Moro people (adapted from Buendia, 2006). Furthermore, the World Bank's assessment (Jubair, 2007) highlights the role of widespread injustices in fueling the conflict. These injustices were manifested in ineffective law enforcement, social marginalization, and economic exploitation, which disproportionately affected the Moro population. Historically, the Moro people fiercely resisted colonial land encroachment and subjugation (adapted from Quimpo, 2001). This struggle continued after Philippine independence, as Moro communities faced challenges in adapting to new state laws and regulations that were perceived as favoring Christian Filipinos. The large-scale migration and settlement of Christians in Mindanao during the 1970s further complicated the situation. This influx, perceived as a threat to ancestral lands, contributed to inter-ethnic tensions and violence (Russell et al., 2004). The marginalization of the Lumad and Moro indigenous populations further exacerbated the conflict (Gulane, 2014).

Relentless economic exploitation of Mindanao's resources throughout the 20th century left many Moros, Lumads, and even Christian settlers struggling with poverty (Tadem, 2012). The perceived failure of the government to address the socio-economic needs of Muslim communities relative to those of the Christian population fueled further resentment (Quimpo, 2001; Lara & Champain, 2009). These social and economic inequalities contributed to a climate of instability in which crimes such as kidnapping and banditry flourished (Boonpunth & Saheem, 2020). Hence, providing economic opportunities and reaching a socio-political settlement could help alleviate the grievances of the parties involved in the Bangsamoro conflict (Taya, 2020)


Theory of the Conflict Triangle by Johan Galtung

Johan Galtung's theory of the conflict life cycle posits that conflicts originate and progress through distinct stages (Galtung, 2000). According to Galtung, conflicts begin with underlying tensions that become articulated, eventually leading to the formulation of potential solutions (Galtung, 2009). When these solutions are implemented, the conflict may be resolved, signifying the conclusion of that particular conflict. However, Galtung emphasizes that humanity faces a constant struggle against contradictions, incompatible goals, and the resulting conflicts (Galtung, 2015). It is therefore crucial to distinguish these underlying issues from the attitudinal and behavioral consequences that arise from conflict.

Galtung's model highlights the dynamic nature of conflict. He identifies three distinct stages: pre-violence, violence, and post-violence (Galtung, 2000). The intensity of a conflict fluctuates throughout these stages, demonstrating that conflict is not a static phenomenon. A thorough understanding of this conflict life cycle is essential for devising effective conflict management strategies. Such an understanding enables targeted interventions at critical junctures, potentially preventing violence or facilitating a transition to a more peaceful state (Galtung, 2000).

Figure 2

Conflict Analysis Model by Johan Galtung 2009



In 1969, Johan Galtung introduced a conflict analysis model, commonly visualized as a triangle, with each side representing a key aspect of conflict (Galtung, 2009). These three aspects are attitudes (A), behaviors (B), and contradictions (C). According to Galtung, the apex of the triangle represents contradictions (Staleno, 2014). Contradictions refer to the incompatibility of goals, whether actual or perceived, between the conflicting parties. In symmetrical conflicts, contradictions are primarily defined by the parties and their competing interests.

Asymmetrical conflicts, on the other hand, affect not only the parties themselves but also their relationships and the internal dynamics of the conflict. Symmetrical conflicts involve parties with relatively equal or balanced attitudes and behaviors. Conversely, asymmetrical conflicts arise when the parties' attitudes (A) and behaviors (B) are unequal, with one party occupying a position of superiority over the other. Examples of asymmetrical conflicts include those between master and servant, government and rebel groups, majority and minority groups, and employer and employee (Staleno, 2014). The Mindanao conflict is a clear example of an asymmetrical conflict, involving the GRP and the Moro groups, which are often referred to as rebels (Reilly, 2002). It also reflects a conflict between the majority and the minority, represented by the predominantly non-Muslim Filipino majority and the Moro, or Muslim Filipino, minority (Russell et al., 2004; Thalang, 2017).

Galtung further categorizes asymmetrical conflicts into structural, strategic, and power asymmetries. Structural asymmetry occurs when the inherent structural relationship between the parties becomes the primary source of conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exemplifies this type, in which one party seeks change while the other resists it. Strategic symmetry characterizes situations in which the parties' strategies and tactics are relatively balanced or "fair," such as conflicts involving terrorism or guerilla warfare. Finally, power asymmetry arises from an imbalance of power between weak and strong actors. In such cases, the weaker party may initiate conflict or resort to disruptive actions (Staleno, 2014). As illustrated, the Mindanao conflict can be categorized as structurally asymmetrical. The Moro rebels sought change by pursuing their aspiration for self-determination

(Molloy, 1988) and addressing longstanding social injustices (Macasalong, 2014). In addition, the conflict is characterized by power asymmetry, as there is no balance of power between the GRP and the Moro rebels. As the state, the GRP possesses greater power and authority than the Moro groups, making it the stronger actor and the Moro groups the weaker party. Consequently, the government employed both military measures and inclusive political approaches (Brillantes & Tiusongco, 2005). Rather than granting full independence to the Moro rebels, the GRP instead offered autonomy, reflecting its dominant position in the peace negotiations. Consequently, disagreements between the parties contributed to the continuation of the conflict, with renewed hostilities often initiated by the weaker Moro groups (Bacani, 2005).

Actors in the Mindanao Conflict

Government of the Republic of the Philippines

The Philippines operates under a unitary system of government, in which power is centralized within the national government rather than being extensively delegated to local government units (Simbulan, 2005). Although the system incorporates elements of decentralization (Hedman et al., 2000), authority remains concentrated in the presidency, with the president serving as both head of state and chief executive (Simbulan, 2005). The national government is further divided into three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) response to the conflict in Mindanao has encompassed a range of political and administrative approaches. Under the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., for instance, the government's strategy combined military operations with efforts to negotiate peace (Brillantes & Tiusongco, 2005). President Corazon Aquino likewise prioritized peaceful approaches to address the grievances of the Moro people. In contrast, the Ramos administration adopted a more inclusive approach. Subsequent administrations have continued to pursue a variety of policies within political contexts to address the conflict (Brillantes & Tiusongco, 2005).

Diplomatic efforts also played an important role. During the 1980s and 1990s, the GRP engaged in its first formal peace talks with the Moro movement, with the OIC serving as the facilitator. These negotiations culminated in peace agreements between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the GRP (Kumar, 2007). In its efforts to combat terrorism, the Philippines, under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's administration, permitted the deployment of the United States military personnel, including US Special Forces to the Sulu Archipelago to assist in operations against alleged Islamist terrorist groups (Lum, 2011).

Moro National Liberation Front

Nur Misuari, a Muslim Filipino who grew up in a religious household (Macasalong, 2014), founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the 1970s (Molloy, 1988). Motivated by a desire to combat oppression and injustices (Macasalong, 2014), Misuari envisioned the MNLF as a secular and nationalist movement despite his Islamic background. The MNLF emerged as the leading paramilitary organization representing the Moro people (East, 2006). Operating primarily in rural areas with established military bases, the MNLF comprised both intellectual leaders and armed combatants (adapted from East, 2006). However, the group ultimately embraced secessionist ideals, striving for self-determination and an independent Bangsamoro state founded on Islamic principles (Molloy, 1988). The origins of the MNLF can be traced to the broader Moro struggle for self-rule, which intensified during the 1970s (Molloy, 1988). The declaration of martial law by the Philippine government in 1972

further intensified tensions and ultimately led the MNLF to engage in armed conflict (adapted from Molloy, 1988). The MNLF possessed a well-defined structure, with a central committee and regional bureaus overseeing operations across its principal areas of influence, including Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Cotabato, and Zamboanga (Noble, 1976).

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Founded in March 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) emerged as a breakaway faction from the MNLF (Cline, 2000). Sheikh Hashim Salamat, a former student of Cairo's prestigious Al-Azhar University during the 1960s, served as the group's founding leader, while Al-Haj Murad Ibrahim assumed the role of military commander (Cline, 2000). Salamat's vision for the MILF differed significantly from the MNLF's secular and nationalist orientation. Interviews conducted in 1998 highlighted the group's aspirations to establish Islamic law (Sharia) as the supreme legal authority and to create a sovereign state based on Sharia principles (Cline, 2000). This emphasis on an Islamic-oriented struggle and the implementation of Sharia as the foundation of governance distinguished the MILF from the MNLF (Arskal, 2004). Although formally established in 1984, the ideological foundations of the MILF and its secessionist aspirations had begun to take shape around 1978, with the movement advocating for an independent Muslim homeland (Abuza, 2005). Members pledged their commitment to this struggle for self-determination and the establishment of an independent Muslim state within the Bangsamoro region (Abuza, 2005).

Impact of Third-Party Intervention in the Mindanao Conflict

Impact of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) involvement in the Mindanao conflict began in response to the 1971 Manili Massacre, during which a significant number of Moro civilians, including women and children, were killed inside a mosque (Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011). The OIC condemned the violence and, in 1972, adopted a resolution advocating for rights of the Bangsamoro people (Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011).

The OIC acted as a peacemaker by internationalizing the Moro conflict in 1972 through expressing its concern for the Muslim community in Mindanao (Luga, 2002). While acknowledging the conflict as an internal matter within the sovereignty of the Philippines, the OIC urged the GRP to engage in peaceful dialogue with the Moro rebel groups (Luga, 2002; Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011). The OIC reportedly used its diplomatic influence and institutional resources to encourage the Philippine government to pursue negotiations (Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011). Beyond diplomatic pressure, the OIC also provided tangible support. It served as a neutral intermediary while extending financial assistance. Notably, the OIC donated US\$35 million to the MNLF between 1972 and 1975 (Lawrence, 2000).

Additionally, some OIC member states, such as Saudi Arabia, provided sanctuary and financial assistance to the Moro people (Lawrence, 2000). Other members, including Kuwait, Malaysia, and Libya, adopted a more critical stance by accusing the Philippine government of committing human rights abuses against its Muslim population (Lawrence, 2000). Several OIC member states, including Indonesia, also reportedly supplied military assistance to the MNLF. Libya publicly declared its support for the Moro revolutionary movement (Makinano & Lubang, 2001). Following the declaration of martial law in 1972, Libya supplied weapons and financial assistance to Moro fighters in the southern

Philippines (Jubair, 1999). The support network extended to countries such as Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, which reportedly allowed the MNLF to establish training camps within their territories (Makinano & Lubang, 2001).

The OIC's role extended beyond mediation. In 1975, the organization formally recognized the MNLF as the legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people (Mapping Militant Organizations [MMO], 2019). This recognition further strengthened the MNLF's position at the negotiating table. The OIC also actively promoted a political solution by proposing resolutions aimed at resolving the conflict (Quimpo, 2000). These efforts culminated in peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF from 1975 to 1996 (Lingga, 2006). The OIC's involvement also placed pressure on the Marcos administration to address the grievances of the Moro people (Abubakar, 2019). Although the oil embargo during the 1980s temporarily complicated the peace process, the OIC remained committed to facilitating negotiations. The organization subsequently adopted resolutions urging the resumption of peace talks in Tripoli (Luga, 2002). These continued efforts ultimately contributed to the landmark 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which granted autonomy to the Moros in parts of Mindanao (Özerdem, 2012, p. 402). The agreement is widely recognized as one of the most significant outcomes of the OIC's intervention in the Mindanao peace process (Lingga, 2006; Sangsuwan, 2014; Makinano & Lubang, 2001).

While the 1976 Tripoli Agreement established a framework for autonomous governance in Mindanao, it fell short of the Moro people's initial aspirations for a fully independent Bangsamoro Republic encompassing a wider territory (Makinano & Lubang, 2001). Despite this limitation, the agreement stands as a significant achievement of the OIC's intervention, reflecting its influence in facilitating a peaceful settlement between the conflicting parties (Omar et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the incomplete implementation of the Tripoli Agreement ultimately led to renewed conflict in the region (Sangsuwan, 2014). This outcome is viewed by some scholars as a setback to the OIC's mediation efforts (Omar et al., 2020). The breakdown of the agreement also triggered a temporary suspension of Saudi Arabia's oil supply to the Philippines (Lawrence, 2000).

Despite this challenge, the OIC remained a persistent actor in the peace process. The organization continued to advocate for the Moro cause, urging its member states to support the MNLF's pursuit of self-determination (Abubakar, 2019). This sustained commitment encouraged further negotiations between the Moro groups and the GRP under successive Philippine administrations (Abubakar, 2019). The OIC's continued involvement facilitated exploratory talks (Flores et al., 2019) and ultimately contributed to the successful conclusion of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between 1993 and 1996 (Fitrah, 2012). The OIC's role as a mediator was instrumental in facilitating this landmark agreement in 1996 (Omar et al., 2020).

Thus, the OIC's influence extended beyond merely facilitating negotiations. The organization actively encouraged the GRP to sustain the peace process and help reframe the conflict by emphasizing peaceful solutions over armed struggle (Fitrah, 2012). In its role as a mediator, the OIC facilitated separate peace agreements between the MNLF and the GRP, including the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the 1987 Jeddah Accord, and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement signed in Jakarta (Strachan, 2015; Mahinay, 2018).

In international conflict mediation, third parties facilitate change by providing information to the disputing parties and influencing the negotiation process, including its procedural and physical settings (Lazaro, 2003). Mediators also use their influence to encourage the disputing parties to reach mutually acceptable agreements. An intervention is generally considered successful when it results in a partial or full settlement, or at least a ceasefire. Consequently, the mediator's efforts contribute to the

transformation of the conflict (Lazaro, 2003). In this context, the OIC, as an international third-party intervener, successfully persuaded and facilitated the parties in reaching several peace agreements. Although the MNLF initially sought a fully independent Bangsamoro Republic encompassing the Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and Palawan, the OIC played an influential role in encouraging the movement to accept autonomy as a compromise solution (Muslim, 1994).

Impact of Malaysia

Malaysia's intervention in the Mindanao conflict extended beyond diplomatic channels. The country reportedly provided training to Moro secessionists on its territory, including Pulau Pangkor and Sabah (Noble, 1976; Makinano & Lubang, 2001). This support, which included access to communication centers, sanctuaries, and training camps, raised concerns about Malaysia's impartiality as a third party actor (Rupprecht, 2014). Malaysia also facilitated the provision of ammunition, transportation, and weapons to Moro fighters, thereby strengthening their guerilla capabilities against the GRP (Noble, 1976; MMO, 2019).

Beyond military support, Malaysia actively advocated for the Moro cause on the international stage. The country highlighted the Bangsamoro struggle within the OIC and called for an investigation into the alleged oppression of the Moro people by the GRP at the 1973 Islamic Conference (Makinano & Lubang, 2001). This intervention, alongside the OIC's efforts, helped raise international awareness of the conflict. Malaysia's role evolved further during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The country facilitated peace negotiations between the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), focusing on security issues, ancestral domain rights, and post-conflict rehabilitation (Ferrer, 2020; Dida, 2012). These negotiations, held in Malaysia, culminated in a ceasefire agreement in 2001 (Mahinay, 2020; Kalm, 2014). Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, also played a significant role as a third-party facilitator, fostering continued negotiations between the two parties (Okumuş, 2019; Iqbal, 2018).

The Malaysian government's persistent efforts bore fruit during the administration of Benigno Aquino III. Malaysia facilitated the signing of the "Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro" (FAB) in 2012 (Mahinay, 2020; Ferrer, 2020; Anadolu, 2019). This landmark agreement, widely regarded as a major milestone in the Bangsamoro peace process, established the framework for a new political entity in the Bangsamoro region (Ferrer, 2020; Adriano & Parks, 2013). Malaysian facilitator Tengku Datu Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed played a key role in facilitating the agreement and emphasized its significance (Ferrer, 2020). Malaysia's continued involvement also proved crucial in addressing delays in the peace process that emerged in 2016 (Thalang, 2017).

Overall, Malaysia's role in the Mindanao conflict extended beyond mere facilitation. The country provided training and logistical support to Moro rebel groups while simultaneously advocating for their cause on the international stage. As a third-party facilitator, Malaysia played a pivotal role in promoting dialogue and bridging the gap between the GRP and the MILF over a period of 17 years. This sustained commitment ultimately contributed to the signing of the FAB, representing a significant step towards lasting peace in the Bangsamoro region.

Malaysia's active participation in the Mindanao peace process stemmed from multiple motivations. One key concern was the potential for spillover effects that could destabilize peace and security in neighboring areas (Heydarian, 2015). Beyond security considerations, Malaysia also sought to strengthen its international standing by contributing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Franco &

Raymond, 2013). Its role as a third-party facilitator further enhanced Malaysia's standing within ASEAN and the OIC. In addition, its participation in the International Monitoring Team (IMT) provided an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to peacebuilding and its influence as a regional mediator (Okumuş, 2019).

Malaysia's contributions to the IMT proved significant. With Malaysia playing a leading role, the IMT focused on addressing humanitarian and security needs while promoting post-conflict rehabilitation and development (Okumuş, 2019). Malaysian representatives were instrumental in facilitating dialogue and mitigating violence, particularly in areas where their presence was well received (Jubair, 2007). Under Malaysia's leadership, the IMT played a crucial role in monitoring the ceasefire and placed particular emphasis on civilian protection and security throughout the conflict resolution process (Jubair, 2007; Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011).

Despite initial scepticism regarding Malaysia's intentions, the country's consistent engagement ultimately fostered trust among the Moro groups, particularly the MNLF (Mahinay, 2018). Malaysia's commitment remained steadfast even during periods of uncertainty surrounding specific agreements, such as the contested constitutionality of the "Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain" (MOA-AD) (Ampatuan et al., 2010; International Crisis Group, 2016). Although the failure of the MOA-AD raised questions about Malaysia's effectiveness as a facilitator, the country remained committed to the peace process by supporting further negotiations between the GRP and the Moro groups (Kalm, 2014). Monitoring the implementation of peace agreements also remained a significant challenge for Malaysia.

Malaysia's presence had a significant impact on ceasefire monitoring. The country deployed personnel, including military and navy personnel, to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements between the disputing parties (Jubair, 2007). Malaysia also played an important role in monitoring the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement (Dida, 2012). Through its leadership of the IMT, Malaysia contributed to the implementation of key peace agreements, including the 2001 Tripoli Agreement on Peace. Furthermore, the IMT actively fostered a conducive environment for peace negotiations and supported the development of progressive peace initiatives (Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011).

Malaysia's facilitation efforts during the Government of the Philippines (GPH)-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace negotiations made a significant contribution to conflict resolution in Mindanao. These efforts promoted both peacebuilding and peacemaking initiatives in the region (Strachan, 2015). Malaysia demonstrated how sustained third-party facilitation can effectively support the resolution of localized armed conflicts. Its flexibility in engaging with both the GRP and the Moro rebel groups helped prevent potential deadlocks during the negotiation process (Bacani, 2005)

Impact of Japan

Japan emerged as a key development partner in efforts to resolve the protracted Mindanao conflict. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been actively involved in Mindanao since the 1990s, providing crucial support to the Mindanao peace process (JICA, 2015). This engagement stemmed partly from Japan's historical connection to Mindanao, which served as a refuge for approximately 20,000 Japanese nationals during World War II (JICA, 2015).

JICA's contributions significantly supported the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) by providing reconstruction programmes for conflict-affected areas (JICA, 2015). Japan became one of the major donors to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), extending assistance for policy implementation, peacebuilding initiatives, and counter-terrorism efforts (Murotani et al., 2010). These programmes aimed to improve living conditions within the ARMM. Consequently, Japan's contribution to the peace process was reflected in its support for the establishment and development of the Moro autonomous region (Taniguchi, 2023).

JICA's human security approach to development assistance, championed by its former president, Dr. Sadako Ogata, further strengthened the Mindanao peace process (Ishikawa, 2014). Dr. Ogata's commitment was reflected in her meetings with the President of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Chairman, Murad Ibrahim. JICA also actively promoted economic development and human security through various forms of cooperation, including grant aid, concessional loans, and technical assistance (Ishikawa, 2014). Japan's economic and social development programmes helped mitigate the adverse effects of the conflict in Mindanao.

During the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the GRP actively sought Japanese assistance. In response, Japan provided the MNLF with a "Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao." This package included infrastructure development, administrative capacity-building for the ARMM, agricultural support services, and other essential development projects (Tsunekawa & Murotani, 2014). Furthermore, Japan actively supported the rehabilitation efforts in conflict-affected areas under the influence of the MILF, reinforcing its role as a peacebuilder through socio-economic development initiatives (Tsunekawa & Murotani, 2014). Japan's engagement also extended to collaboration with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) (JICA, 2015). JICA's involvement encompassed policy development, institutional capacity-building, and technical assistance programmes focusing on good governance and post-conflict reconstruction (JICA, 2015). Financial assistance supported infrastructure development, livelihood initiatives such as fish farming, and knowledge transfer programmes aimed at improving living standards (JICA, 2015). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan further strengthened the country's contribution by hosting peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF in Narita, Japan. Through these sustained efforts, JICA helped foster trust between the two parties, reinforcing Japan's position as a reliable development partner (Iwami, 2018).

JICA's involvement in Mindanao's peace process extended beyond financial assistance. In 2002, the agency deployed human development specialists to the ARMM to implement a capacity-building project (Fukunaga, 2013). JICA also played an innovative role by pioneering the "Track One-and-a-Half" mediation approach during a critical impasse in the peace negotiations in October 2008 (Ishikawa, 2014). However, during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal (2001-2010), Japan's aid commitments declined. This reduction, coupled with allegations of corruption within the ARMM, slowed project implementation between 2003 and 2008 (Potter & Seminar, 2019).

Despite these challenges, Japan's commitment remained steadfast. The country actively participated in the IMT by contributing socio-economic development experts (Tsunekawa & Murotani, 2014). JICA personnel assigned to the IMT played an important role in monitoring the ceasefire from 2003 onwards and supported the implementation of the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) on the ground (Fukunaga, 2013). Japan's participation in the IMT further demonstrated its long-term commitment to the Mindanao peace process (Iwami, 2018).

J-BIRD, launched in 2006 during the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, reflected Japan's comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and development assistance. The initiative focused on reconstruction support for conflict-affected Moro communities, including capacity-building programs in governance, agricultural extension, and community development (Tsunekawa & Murotani, 2014). It provided much-needed assistance through grant aid, technical cooperation, and concessional loans (Fukunaga, 2013; Democratic Progress Initiative [DPI], 2014). The Embassy of Japan in the Philippines served as the central coordinating body for J-BIRD, overseeing Japan's development initiatives in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao (Ishikawa, 2014).

Japan's unwavering commitment to the Mindanao peace process was further demonstrated through its sustained development assistance programs (Fukunaga, 2013). The country supported peace consolidation, institutional capacity-building, regional infrastructure development, and community development initiatives (Fukunaga, 2013). J-BIRD served as a key instrument in these efforts by targeting conflict-affected communities and demonstrating the "dividends of peace" through Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Fukunaga, 2013). The implementation of ODA formed a cornerstone of Japan's contribution to the Mindanao peace process by fostering collaboration among the parties involved. The BDA served as a key partner in JICA's development initiatives in the region (Murotani et al., 2010). J-BIRD itself was a major undertaking, comprising 12 programs for Mindanao, including concessional loans and infrastructure projects. In 2012, the total budget allocated for these programs reached 12 billion yen (Ishikawa, 2014). Overall, as part of its foreign aid policy, Japan emerged as an effective third-party actor in the Mindanao process through peacebuilding initiatives such as J-BIRD, the country contributed to restoring stability and mitigating the effects of the conflict (Taniguchi, 2023). Japan also demonstrated its ability to exercise constructive influence through its cultural, socio-economic, and political ties with Mindanao (Taniguchi, 2023).

Japan's proactive role also extended to facilitating the initial negotiations between the GRP under President Benigno Aquino III and the MILF in 2011 (Tsunekawa & Murotani, 2014). Even before the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014, JICA initiated the Comprehensive Capacity Development Project in 2013 to strengthen the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) in preparation for Bangsamoro self-governance (JICA, 2020). Japan's commitment to peacebuilding has continued through ongoing technical cooperation programs (JICA, 2020). Following the implementation of the FAB in 2015, the Japanese Foreign Minister reaffirmed Japan's unwavering support for the Mindanao peace process (Fukunaga, 2013).

Impact of the International Contact Group

The International Contact Group (ICG) emerged as a key mechanism for strengthening the Mindanao peace negotiations. Established to support dialogue between the GRP and the MILF, the ICG comprised a diverse group of states and organizations, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Japan (CAB, 2014; DPI, 2014). It also included international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Indonesia's Muhammadiyah, The Asia Foundation (TAF) from the United States, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) based in Switzerland, and Conciliation Resources from the United Kingdom (CAB, 2014; DPI, 2014). The ICG's involvement gained traction following the internationalization of the conflict and the declaration that the MOA-AD was unconstitutional (Oishi, 2016; Kalm, 2014). The MILF's desire for international guarantees regarding future agreements further strengthened the case for the ICG's participation (Oishi, 2016; Kalm, 2014). The ICG played an important role in facilitating dialogue and mobilizing international support for the peace

negotiations, with the aim of overcoming the challenges arising from the failure of the MOA-AD and encouraging greater flexibility in the GRP's negotiating position (Delna, 2018).

Within the ICG, member organizations played distinct roles. Muhammadiyah, an Indonesian social organization, actively supported the peace process by providing educational and healthcare assistance and conducting field visits to Mindanao to assess opportunities for contributing to human development (DPI, 2014). Similarly, the HD Centre provided crucial support to the GRP, the MILF, and the Malaysian facilitators. Its involvement also extended to mediating local clan conflicts in the Philippines, ultimately contributing to the signing of the CAB in 2014 (DPI, 2014). The HD Centre further supported initiatives such as the Mindanao Think Tank (MTT), which aimed to foster harmonious relations among Muslims, Christians, and Lumads (indigenous communities). This initiative aligned with the organization's broader objective of promoting awareness of the peace process among diverse communities. In addition, the HD Centre also collaborated with BTA (DPI, 2014).

The ICG consistently supported Malaysia's role as facilitator while serving as an observer and advisor, helping to foster trust among the parties and supporting the implementation of peace agreements (DPI, 2014). The ICG also contributed to the successful conclusion of the 2009 agreement involving the GRP, the MILF, and Malaysia. Recognizing the ICG's effectiveness as a problem-solving mechanism, the MILF actively sought its continued involvement in the peace process (Kalm, 2014). The ICG's approach to the negotiations was balanced and constructive, earning the confidence of both the GRP and the MILF. It is credited with helping to prevent deadlocks and fostering the trust necessary for both parties to move the peace process forward (Kalm, 2014).

Beyond the state actors directly involved, the ICG incorporated a diverse range of international organizations and supporting countries. The European Union (EU), for instance, deployed human monitors to the IMT led by Malaysia, alongside member countries such as Brunei, Japan, and Libya (Mastura, 2011). Norway and Indonesia also contributed through peacekeeping deployments. In 2010, Saudi Arabia further internationalized the peace process by accepting an invitation to join the ICG. The positive response from ICG members, together with the participation of these additional countries, brought greater international attention to the peace process in the southern Philippines (Mastura, 2011).

Turkey, represented by President Abdullah Gul, reaffirmed its commitment to peace and development in the Philippines by joining the ICG. Similar to Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, Turkey's participation strengthened the representation of Muslim-majority countries within the ICG's peacebuilding efforts (DPI, 2014). The ICG's role extended beyond observation. In 2011, it facilitated a meeting between the GRP and the MILF in Kuala Lumpur, where both parties exchanged proposals. Although the GRP's initial proposal was not accepted, the ICG's intervention helped narrow the differences between the parties. Its facilitation contributed to several important breakthroughs, including recognition of the MILF's identity, acknowledgment that the status quo was no longer acceptable, and a shared commitment to establish a new political entity to replace the ARMM (Ferrer, 2018). The successful meeting in Malaysia reflected the growing trust and confidence between the parties.

The ICG's composition offered a unique combination of state and non-state actors. This multifaceted approach addressed the MILF's desire for international involvement while maintaining a flexible and inclusive framework. The ICG functioned as a mediator, facilitator, and provider of discreet guidance and expert support in addressing specific challenges throughout the peace process (DPI, 2014). The parties involved highly valued the ICG's perspectives, particularly its diplomatic leverage in supporting

the peace negotiations. Furthermore, ICG members such as Japan and the United Kingdom provided crucial humanitarian and financial assistance (DPI, 2014).

Civil society organizations (CSOs) within the ICG brought additional dynamism and flexibility to the peace process. Their ability to communicate effectively with local communities often surpassed that of state actors. These organizations also adopted diverse approaches and exercised varying degrees of influence, depending on their relationships with the GRP and other stakeholders (Kalm, 2014).

The ICG's sustained involvement extended beyond facilitating negotiations. Its presence ensured continued international attention to the Mindanao conflict and placed constructive pressure on the GRP to implement the negotiated agreements (Kalm, 2014). The ICG also played an important advocacy role by mobilizing international support and assistance for the southern Philippines. This included diplomatic engagement with lawmakers and political leaders through the embassies of ICG member states (Oishi, 2016). Furthermore, the ICG worked closely with Malaysia to facilitate the conclusion of the FAB in 2012 and the CAB in 2014 (Oishi, 2016; Mastura, 2011). These agreements represent significant milestones in the Mindanao peace process, made possible through the collective efforts of the Philippine government, the MILF, the ICG, and other third-party actors committed to promoting peace. The close collaboration among ICG members stands as a testament to their sustained commitment to resolving the protracted conflict in Mindanao (Omar et al., 2020).

The ICG's successful facilitation efforts were evident in its consistent support for the disputing parties, particularly during the peace negotiation and post-conflict phases. The organization effectively monitored the implementation of negotiated agreements and addressed the needs of the disputants, thereby helping to mitigate the effects of conflict (Kalm, 2014; DPI, 2014). The ICG also provided valuable guidance and facilitated peace negotiations between the GRP and the Moro groups (DPI, 2014). In addition, the organization helped address issues that could have impeded the peace process, particularly by fostering and maintaining trust between the disputing parties. The success of this hybrid organization can be attributed to the expertise of its member states in conflict transformation, their collective experience and the ICG's ability to internationalize the Mindanao peace process. However, despite these achievements, the organization was less successful in advancing women's empowerment, which had been identified as one of its original objectives in supporting conflict resolution in Mindanao (Conciliation Resources, 2013).

CONCLUSION

Galtung's Conflict Triangle Theory, as outlined by Stalenoi (2014), posits that incompatible goals constitute the core contradiction of a conflict. In the context of the Mindanao conflict, the Moro groups' aspiration for complete independence directly clashed with the Philippine government's (GRP) proposal of autonomy, illustrating this fundamental incompatibility. Furthermore, the conflict exhibits characteristics of asymmetry. The GRP, wielding significantly greater political and military power than the Moro groups (MNLF & MILF), created a pronounced imbalance of power. According to Galtung (2009), such asymmetrical relationships often lead weaker actors to resort to violence in pursuit of their objectives. This unequal distribution of power placed the Moro groups at a disadvantage, as reflected in the protracted nature of the conflict and the substantial loss of life in Mindanao. Recognizing this imbalance, the parties sought mediation and intervention from third parties to facilitate a more balanced and peaceful resolution.

The involvement of regional and international actors through mediation and peacebuilding efforts significantly advanced the Mindanao peace process and its objective of ending the prolonged conflict. Third parties positively influenced the negotiations by encouraging the Moro groups to consider autonomy within the Philippines as a viable alternative to complete independence. Humanitarian, financial and development assistance provided by the OIC, Malaysia, and Japan further supported the peace process and encouraged the parties to engage constructively with the proposed settlement initiatives. However, despite these important contributions, limitations in monitoring and implementation by some third parties also affected the sustainability of the peace process, making it more difficult to maintain momentum towards a lasting settlement. These shortcomings contributed, to some extent, to delays in achieving durable peace in Mindanao. In contrast, the ICG demonstrated notable effectiveness during the post-conflict period. Through active monitoring, facilitation, and sustained international engagement, the ICG played a proactive role in supporting post-conflict recovery and the implementation of peace agreements.

In conclusion, third party intervention played a significant role in advancing conflict resolution in Mindanao. The involvement of the OIC, Malaysia, Japan, and the ICG helped identify common ground between the GRP and the Moro groups, fostering greater mutual understanding and supporting the pursuit of sustainable peace in Mindanao. Collectively, these third-party actors contributed to creating conditions that enabled the transition from armed confrontation towards political dialogue, institutional development, and long-term peacebuilding, particularly for the historically marginalized Moro communities in the southern Philippines.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

REFERENCES

- Abubakar, A. U. (2019). *Peacebuilding and sustainable human development: The pursuit of the Bangsamoro right to self-determination*.
- Abuza, Z. (2005). The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the revolution. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(6), 453-479.
- Adriano, F., & Parks, T. (2013). *The contested corners of Asia: Subnational conflict and international development assistance: The case of Mindanao, Philippines*. Asia Foundation. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358978841_The_Contested_Corners_of_Asia_Subnational_Conflict_and_International_Development_Assistance
- Ampatuan, L., Malang, A., Maglangit, T., Manara, R., Lacson, R., Domingo, J., & Ebrahim, E. (2010). The Mindanao think tank recommendations of prominent observers of the peace process to the new Philippine President, *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123065/2010_10_Monograph%201bis.pdf
- Anadolu Agency. (2019, January 17). *Over a century of struggle for freedom: Bangsamoro*. Anadolu Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/over-a-century-of-struggle-for-freedom-bangsamoro/1367817>
- Arnold, J. R. (2011). *The Moro war: How America battled a Muslim insurgency in the Philippine jungle, 1902-1913*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

- Arskal, S. (2004). *Sharia from below' in Aceh (1930s–1960s): Islamic identity and the right to self-determination with comparative reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Indonesia, and the Malay World*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1363981042000263471>
- Bacani, B. R. (2005). *The Mindanao peace talks: Another opportunity to resolve the Moro conflict in the Philippines*. United States Institute for Peace.
- Boonpunth, K. C., & Saheem, N. (2020). *Roles of civil society in peacebuilding in ASEAN context: The case studies of Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand*. Prince of Songkla University.
- Brillantes, A., & Tiusongco, J. (2005). Institutional and politico-administrative responses to armed conflicts. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 49(1-2), 1-39.
- Buendia, R. G. (2006). The Mindanao conflict in the Philippines: Ethnoreligious war or economic conflict? *The politics of death: Political violence in South East Asia*.
- Byler, C. (2005). Pacifying the Moros: American military government in the southern Philippines, 1899-1913. *Military Review*, 85(3), 41.
- Che Man, W. K. (1987). *Muslim separatism: The Moros in Southern Philippines and the Malays in Southern Thailand* [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. The Austrian National University, Austria.
- Cline, L. (2000). The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 11(3), 115-138.
- Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB). (2014). https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Comprehensive%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Bangsamoro_0.pdf
- Concepcion, S., D., L., Guiam, R., De La Rosa, R., & Stankovitch, M. (2003). Breaking the links between economics and conflict in Mindanao. In *Waging peace conference, Manila*.
- Conciliation Resources (2013). *Practice paper: Innovation in mediation support: The International Contract Group in Mindanao*. <https://www.c-r.org/resource/innovation-mediation-support-international-contact-group-mindanao>
- Dayag-Laylo, C. C. (2004). Exploring conflict management in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. In *Asian Regional Conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR)* (Vol. 23, p. 24).
- Delna, M. F. (2018). *Humanitarian diplomacy and mediation: The case of Turkey's diplomatic intervention in the Bangsamoro peace process in the Philippines* [Unpublished master's thesis]. Necmettin Erbakan University, Social Science Institute, Konya.
- Democratic Progress Initiative. (DPI). (2014). *Briefing: International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines peace process*. <https://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Brief-International-Contact-Group-Philippines.pdf>
- Dida, G. R. (2012). *The search for peace in Mindanao: Resolving a wicked problem*. Published by United States Army War College.
- East, B. (2006). Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): A profile of determination. Proceedings of the Social Change in the 21st Century Conference 2006. Queensland University of Technology.
- Engineer, A. A. (1984). Struggle for a Separate Islamic State. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 2154-2156.
- Ferrer, M. C. (2007). The Mindanao peace process and the challenges to Japan peacebuilding assistance. In *HiPeC (Hiroshima University Partnership for Peacebuilding and Social Capacity) International Peace Building Conference*.
- Ferrer, M. C. (2018). Forging peace settlement for the Bangsamoro: Compromise and challenges. *The long journey to peace and prosperity* (pp. 99-132). https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813236370_005
- Ferrer, M. C. (2020). *Region, nation and homeland: Valorization and adaptation in the Moro and Cordillera resistance discourses*. ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Fitrah, D. I. (2012). *Multiparty mediation in the Southern Philippines conflict* [Unpublished master's thesis]. Leiden University. https://openaccess.LeidenUniv.NL/bitstream/handle/1887/19390/Fitrah_Thesis%20Final%20Draft.pdf

- Flores, J. M., Castro, M. K., Lanti, I. G., Natsir, Y., Ismail, T. M., & Marohombsar, J. L. (2019). *Lessons learned from a process of conflict resolution between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), as mediated by Indonesia, from 1993-1996*. ASEAN-Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. <https://asean-aipr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ebook-191120-Lessons-Learned-GRP-MNLF-FPA-1993-1996-1.pdf>
- Franco, J. (2016). The Philippines: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front—A pragmatic power structure? *Impunity: Countering illicit power in war and transition*. Center for Complex Operations.
- Franco, J. R. S. (2013). Malaysia: Unsung hero of the Philippine peace process. *Asian Security*, 9(3), 211–230. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2013.832210>
- Fukunaga, K. (2013). Japan's contribution to the Mindanao peace and development: Views from the ground. *Asia Peacebuilding Initiative*, 1(5). <http://peacebuilding.asia/japans-contribution-to-the-mindanao-peace-and-development-views-from-the-ground/> Accessed Date: 04.28.2021.
- Galtung, J. (2009). *Theories of conflict definitions, dimensions, negations, formations*. Columbia University.
- Galtung, J. (2000). *Conflict transformation by peaceful means (The transcend method)*.
- Galtung, J. (2015). Peace journalism and reporting on the United States. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 22(321).
- Gulane, J. (2014). *Land governance in the Bangsamoro*. International Alert. https://www.internationalalert.org/sites/default/files/Philippines_PolicyBriefLandGovernance_EN_2014.pdf
- Gutierrez, E. D. U., & Borrás, S. M., Jr. (2004). *The Moro conflict: Landlessness and misdirected state policies*. East-West Center Washington. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/26100/PS008.pdf>
- Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. (2009). *The Maguindanao massacre, critical elections and armed conflict in the Philippines*. IDEAS reports - situation analysis, N. Kitchen, (ed.) (SA006). LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
- Heydarian, R. J. (2015). *The quest for peace: The Aquino administration's peace negotiations with the MILF and CPP-NPA-NDA*.
- Hopmann, P. & Lustenberger, P. (2011). Conflict management in Mindanao. In *IACM 24TH Annual Conference Paper*.
- International Crisis Group. (ICG). (2016). *The Philippines: Renewing prospects for peace in Mindanao*. <https://www.refworld.org/pdfile/577e22114.pdf>.
- Iqbal, M. (2018). *Negotiating peace: An insider's perspective to the Bangsamoros' struggle for self-determination*, (Vol. 1, 2005-2018), <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Negotiating-Peace-An-Insiders-Perspective-on-the-Bangsamoros-Right-to-Self-Determination.pdf> Accessed Date: 10.02.2021
- Ishikawa, S. (2014). The role of a development agency in peacebuilding: Track one-and-a-half mediation in Mindanao. *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 2.
- Islam, S. S. (2003). Ethno-communal conflict in the Philippines: The case of Mindanao-Sulu region. *Ethnic conflict and secessionism in South and Southeast Asia*, 195-224.
- Iwami, T. (2018). Shinzo Abe's security legislation reform and peacebuilding in Mindanao. *The Pacific Review*, 31(5), 617-634.
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). (2020). *Our commitment to peace: JICA's approach to peacebuilding*. https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org/peacebuilding/files/jica_brochure_under_covid19_set.pdf Accessed Date: 12.24.2022.
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). (2015). *Supporting peace and development in Mindanao*. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/j-world/c8h0vm000091cwsc-att/1501_0203.pdf
- Jubair, S. (1999). *Bangsamoro: A nation under endless tyranny*. IQ Marin SDN.

- Jubair, S. (2007). *The long road to peace: Inside the GRP-MILF peace process*. Institute of Bangsamoro Studies.
- Kalm, H. (2014). The role of the International Contact Group in the negotiations, In Y. Anis, A. Raman, L. Evers, O. Russell, J. Geni, C. Sullivan, & R. Wynveen (Eds.), *Mindanao: Understanding conflict 2014*.
- Kamlan, J. A. (2003). *Ethnic and religious conflict in Southern Philippines: A discourse on self-determination, political autonomy, and conflict resolution*. Emory University.
- Kumar, C. (2007). *Track-two initiatives of nationally-led peace processes: The case of the Philippines* (Issue Brief No. 5). Norwegian University of International Affairs, (5).
- Lara, F. J., & Champain, P. (2009). *Inclusive peace in Muslim Mindanao: Revisiting the dynamics of conflict and exclusion*. International Alert.
- Lawrence, C. (2000). The Islamic insurgency in the Philippines. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 11(3), 115-138, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310008423291>
- Lazaro, L. M. C. (2003). The effectiveness of international mediation -The current debate. *International Law: Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional*, 2, 319- 341.
- Lingga, A. S. (2006). Role of third parties in Mindanao peace process. *Autonomy and Peace Review*, 2, 83-104.
- Luga, A. R. (2002). *Muslim insurgency in Mindanao, Philippines* [Unpublished master's thesis]. Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Baguio City, Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth Ks.
- Lum, T. (2011). *The Republic of the Philippines and US interests*. Congressional Research Service.
- Macasalong, M. S. (2014). The liberation movements in Mindanao: Islām as a thrusting force. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 19(4), 1-18.
- Mahinay, K. J. (2018). *Analyzing the Philippine-Moro conflict: Malaysia in the Moro National Liberation Front's discourse* [Unpublished master's thesis]. International Relations Department, Social Science Institute, Sakarya University.
- Mahinay, K. J. (2020). Writing Malaysia and the Moro identity: An analysis of the Moro National Liberation Front's foreign policy. *Insight Turkey*, 22(1), 189-211.
- Makinano, M., & Lubang, A. (2001). *Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration: The Mindanao experience*. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
- Mapping Militant Organizations (MMO). (2019). *Moro National Liberation Front*. Stanford University. <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/moro-national-liberation-front>
- Mastura, I. (2011). Geopolitical games and Malaysian mediation in the Philippines. *Jindal Journal of International Affairs*, 1(1), 3-16.
- Molloy, I. (1988). The decline of the Moro national liberation front in the Southern Philippines. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 18(1), 59-76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472338880000051>
- Morison, S. E. (2002). *History of United States naval operations in World War II: Vol. 13. The liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945* (Reprint ed.)
- Murotani, R., Wakamatsu, E., Kikuchi, T., Nagaishi, M., & Ochiai, N. (2010). *State building in fragile situations: Japanese aid experiences in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Mindanao*. (JICA-RI Working Paper, 5).
- Muslim, M. (1994). *The Moro armed struggle in the Philippines: The nonviolent autonomy alternative*. Marawi.
- Noble, L. (1976). The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. *Pacific Affairs*, 49(3), 405-424.
- Oishi, M. (2016). *Contemporary conflicts in Southeast Asia*. Springer.
- Okumuş, M. Y. (2019). *The role of Muslim actors in peacebuilding in the Philippines: Turkey, Malaysia and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation* [Unpublished master's thesis]. Political Science and International Relations Department, İstanbul Şehir University.

- Omar, R., Islam, R., Aziz Yaacob, C. M., & Taya, S. L. (2020). Relevance of Fisher's model of third party intervention: The case of Malaysia's mediation to the Bangsamoro conflicts. *International Journal of Advanced Research in Engineering and Technology*, 11(6).
- Özerdem, A. (2012). The contribution of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the peace process in Mindanao. *Civil Wars*, 14(3), 393-413.
- Potter, D. M., & Seminar, P. (2019). Japan's official development assistance to Thailand and the Philippines, 1995—2015. *アカデミア. 社会科学編= Academia. Social Sciences*, (17), 97-118.
- Quimpo, N. G. (2001). Options in the pursuit of a just, comprehensive, and stable peace in the southern Philippines. *Asian Survey*, 41(2), 271-289.
- Ragandang III, P. C. (2018). Philippines: Factors of century-old conflict and current violent extremism in the south. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, (22).
- Reilly, B. (2002). Internal conflict and regional security in Asia and the Pacific. *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change*, 14(1), 7-21.
- Rodell, P. (2002). *Culture and customs of the Philippines*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Rupprecht, K. (2014). Separatist conflicts in the ASEAN region: Comparing Southern Thailand and Mindanao. *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 7(1), 21-40.
- Russell, S. D., Davide-Ong, L., Gonzalez, A. R., Ty, R., Madale, N. T., & Medina, N. A. (2004). The Mindanao conflict and prospects for peace in the southern Philippines. *Excerpt from A Perspective on Youth, Inter-ethnic Dialogue and Conflict Resolution in the Southern Philippines*.
- Sangsuwan, S. (2014). Ethnic conflict and peace process: A comparative study in Aceh and Mindanao. *Political Science and Public Administration Journal*, 5(1), 54-65.
- Schiavo-Campo, S., & Judd, M., P. (2005). *The Mindanao conflict in the Philippines: Roots, costs, and potential peace dividend* (Vol. 24). Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, World Bank.
- Simbulan, D. C. (2005). *The modern principalia: The historical evolution of the Philippine ruling oligarchy*. UP Press.
- Stalenoi, I. (2014). The people's war and Johan Galtung's conflict models. *The Public Administration and Social Policies Review* 6, 1(12).
- Strachan, A. L. (2015). *Conflict analysis of Muslim Mindanao*. (Rapid Literature Review). GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Tadem, E. C. (2012). Development and distress in Mindanao, a political economy overview. *Asian Studies*, 48, 29-44.
- Taniguchi, M. (2023). The role of adaptive peacebuilding in Japan's assistance of the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines. In Cedric de Coning & Rui Saraiva Ako Muto (Eds.), *Adaptive peace building: A new approach to sustaining peace in 21st century*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Taya, S. (2020). Conflict and conflict-resolution in the southern Philippines. *Journal of International Studies*, 3, 63–77. <https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/jis/article/view/7871>
- Thalang, C. (2017). Malaysia: Southeast Asian peacemaker? *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, 71(4), 389-404.
- Tsunekawa, K. & Murotani, R. (2014). Working for human security: JICA's experience. In B. Howe (Ed.), *Post-conflict development in East Asia*.
- United Nations (2012). *Guidance for effective mediation*. United Nations New York.
- Vatikiotis, M. (2006). Resolving internal conflicts in Southeast Asia: Domestic challenges and regional perspectives. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 27-47.
- Wale, S. (1998). The Philippine experience in conflict management and peacebuilding. *Community Development Journal*, 33(2), 170-173.