



**JOURNAL OF  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
<https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/jis>

How to cite this article:

Anuar, A. R., & Raharjo, S. N. I. (2022). Indonesia-Malaysia cross-border governance during the Covid-19 pandemic: Challenges and adaptation in the integration of the Tebedu-Entikong border region. *Journal of International Studies*, 18, 89-123. <https://doi.org/10.32890/jis2022.18.4>

## **INDONESIA-MALAYSIA CROSS-BORDER GOVERNANCE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION IN THE INTEGRATION OF THE TEBEDU-ENTIKONG BORDER REGION**

**<sup>1</sup>Abdul Rahim Anuar & <sup>2</sup>Sandy Nur Ikfal Raharjo**

<sup>1</sup>Institute for Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore,  
Universiti Utara Malaysia

<sup>2</sup>Research Center for Politics,  
National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Indonesia

<sup>1</sup>*Corresponding author: [abdulrahim5796206@gmail.com](mailto:abdulrahim5796206@gmail.com)*

Received: 3/2/2022   Revised: 12/4/2022   Accepted: 18/5/2022   Published: 17/10/2022

### **ABSTRACT**

Malaysia and Indonesia have taken a soft border approach to govern their Tebedu-Entikong border regions. Both governments have open but controlled customs, immigration, and quarantine facilities to manage cross-border movement of people, goods, and capital. Unfortunately, the ongoing cross-border governance was challenged by a non-traditional security threat, i.e., the COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020. The pandemic has the potential to impede the implementation of bilateral border policies which could jeopardize the efforts of the Socio-economy of Malaysia-Indonesia Committee

(Sosek Malindo) to effectively integrate both economies in the border region since its inception in 1985. In relation to this context, this paper aims to: (i) evaluate the challenges/impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and outstanding border issues on trade and development in the Entikong-Tebedu border region; and (ii) assess the role of Sosek Malindo in promoting greater integration and seamless connectivity in the Entikong-Tebedu border region. This paper presents a case-study on the Entikong-Tebedu border region and draws its observations and findings from inferences and interpretation of data collected from officials and other credible sources. Desk research was conducted on reports of Sosek Malindo meetings and research materials. Fieldwork was also conducted to observe the socioeconomic development status at the location of interest. The evaluation and assessment can be a reference point to reformulate cross-border governance policies that are characteristically a win-win solution for both parties by guaranteeing national security without compromising the socioeconomic development of the border region.

**Keywords:** Cross-border integration, Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia, Malaysia, border governance.

## INTRODUCTION

Indonesia and Malaysia are two neighbouring countries that share a 2,040-km land border in Kalimantan and Borneo (Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan, 2015). West Kalimantan (Kalbar), East Kalimantan (Kaltim), North Kalimantan (Kaltara), Sabah, and Sarawak are the border regions between Kalimantan and Borneo (Malaysia) (Figure 1). Recognizing the interdependence of cross-border activities, Indonesia and Malaysia govern their border areas more collaboratively, potentially improving the socio-economic development of their shared border region.

**Figure 1**

*Kalimantan and Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak)*



*Source: OnTheWorldMap (n.d.)*

The Malaysian and Indonesian governments have introduced various initiatives, such as the opening of designated border checkpoints and the development of connectivity through overland border crossing. Presently, there are three (3) designated customs, immigration, and quarantine (CIQ) border checkpoints along the land border of Kalimantan-Sarawak, namely Entikong-Tebedu, Aruk-Biawak, and Badau-Lubok Antu. To govern the cross-border flow of people, products, and resources, both governments have adopted a soft border paradigm to administer their respective border regions. Under the Sosek Malindo platform, all border issues and non-traditional security threats are managed jointly without compromising either government's sovereignty.

Unfortunately, the ongoing cross-border governance practice was challenged by a non-traditional security threat, i.e., the COVID-19

pandemic that hit both countries in early 2020. The pandemic had impeded Sosek Malindo's efforts to further improve the Malaysia-Indonesia border region through economic and political cooperation following the implementation of various unilateral policies to control the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective regions. In relation to this issue, this paper points out two objectives: (i) to evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trade and development in the Entikong-Tebedu border region; and (ii) to assess the role of Sosek Malindo in promoting greater integration and better connectivity in the Entikong-Tebedu border region.

## **METHOD**

This study applied a qualitative and longitudinal approach by exploring and assessing the situation at the Entikong-Tebedu border region as a case study. This research applied three methods to collect primary and secondary data. First, observation at the Entikong-Tebedu CIQ Complex in April 2013, March 2019 and September 2021. Cross-border trade, individual mobility, and the livelihood of local people were the main units of observation during the fieldwork. Second, in-depth interview with government officials, local traders, and other related local informants. The selection of informants was based on the snowballing method. Third, literature review and desk research of official documents, books, journal articles, and other related references. The BPS-Statistics of Indonesia provided secondary statistics on Indonesia-Malaysia export and import activities, while data on cross-border people movement was obtained from the Immigration Office in Entikong. The Royal Malaysian Customs Department and the Malaysian Immigration Department provided data on cross-border trade and individual movements in Malaysia, while the Tebedu District Office provided the socio-economic background of Tebedu.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

There has been no study so far on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic at the subnational level, notably in the border hinterland regions. However, there are several studies at the national level, such as by Chin (2020), Khor et al. (2020), Muhamad et al. (2020), Hairuddin et al. (2020), and Hamid et al. (2021) that examined the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the supply chain of various economic sectors in Malaysia. From the Indonesian perspective, Abao

(2020), Musa et al. (2021), and Rohani and Yaniza (2021) studied the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the socio-economic conditions of the border community in Entikong and its surrounding areas. Even though Entikong was their research locus, none of them focused on the concept of cross-border governance.

As noted by Chin (2020), Malaysia's food supply is secured through a combination of local food production and imported food supply. The COVID-19 pandemic had disrupted the food supply chain with the imposition of restrictions known as the Movement Control Order (MCO) to break the transmission of COVID-19. Khor et al. (2020) argued that despite the enforcement of the MCO in Malaysia being commendable in curbing the spread of this pandemic, its effects on the country's economy and the response of main trade partners had impacted Malaysia's seafood supply chains. Hairuddin's (2020) study further showed that the imposition of the MCO to break the COVID-19 transmission chain had a negative impact on the agricultural supply chain in Malaysia.

Muhamad et al. (2020) analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak on Malaysia's exports. The pandemic had a positive impact on the following products: oil and gas, sanitary, specialized machinery for particular industries, plumbing, heating and lighting, and furniture. However, non-essential products, such as tobacco, hides, skins, fur skins, and leather products, saw a drop in exports during the COVID-19 epidemic.

Hamid et al. (2021) examined the effect of COVID-19 on the tourism industry and hospitality services in Malaysia. Tourism was one of the most directly affected sectors, and as such needs immediate and long-term recovery responses. The pandemic had also affected the behaviour of tourists, which had in turn impacted the recovery of domestic and international tourism.

Abao (2020) highlighted the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on cross-border migration and socio-economic status of border residents in Entikong and Jagoi Babang. He found that the COVID-19 pandemic had decreased the volume of cross-border migration, forced border residents to switch their jobs with some of them engaging in drug trafficking, decreased people's income drastically, and changed learning methods in schools. Unfortunately, he did not justify his qualitative findings with statistical data, especially on cross-border migration.


Musa et al. (2021) revealed the social and economic vulnerabilities in the border area of Sambas Regency, Kalbar. Their study showed that during the pandemic, the Sambas border community did not suffer serious economic impact from the pandemic due to good counter-measures by the local government. Meanwhile, Rohani and Yaniza (2021) evaluated the role of economic rules and regulations in assisting micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Entikong District. They found that the MSMEs in Entikong had not benefited due to lack of information of the law and its mandated programs.

## **Border Governance**

Newman and Paasi (1998) noted that a border serves two basic purposes: protection from external and internal threats and territorial determination. A border also defines a territory's internal and external identities. Two types of border concepts dominate the contemporary literature on border governance: soft and hard borders. Soft borders include open, regulated and controlled frontiers (Figure 2). Hard borders are fortified borders that include wire fencing, walled and militarized borders (Chavez, 2012; Espejo, 2013). Ullah and Kumpoh (2018) argued that border types determine the level of relationship between neighbouring countries and security outcomes, trade, and population mobility. In this regard, both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments, through Sosek Malindo, which is a first-track diplomacy, have adopted a soft-border policy.

**Figure 2**

### *Soft and Hard Border Approach*



*Source:* Adapted from Ullah and Kumpoh (2018).


The collaborative approach of Sosek Malindo to manage its border area is an example of cross-border governance and integration. Governance is the act of governing a political decision-making process in which actors organise themselves through relationship structures, shaping a set of principles, rules, and so on, in order to implement processes (deliberation, negotiation, and decision-making) for better use of power to ensure enhanced performance and/or to obtain better outcomes (Jose et al. 2020).

Zumbusch and Scherer (2015) defined cross-border governance as a set of differently organized institutions of cross-border cooperation between various actors, mainly at the subnational level with the objective to overcome challenges due to a shared national border. Tandia (2010) highlighted cross-border governance as a collective regime by which interlocal problems of border areas are managed and borderlands are regulated within national frameworks. Thus, cross-border governance consists of at least three (3) elements: i) actors from both neighbouring countries; ii) collaboration in the form of cooperation or collective regime/policy; and iii) objective to manage or overcome shared problems.

Cross-border governance is not a solution for all cross-border problems, but an operating system to develop interventions for cross-border integration (Gualini, 2003; Young, 2017). Cross-border integration refers to the socio-spatial dynamics that connects and brings populations closer on both sides of the border (Durand & Perrin, 2017). It can be seen as a multidimensional process characterized by the dynamics of inter-linkage (Figure 3): (i) functional; (ii) institutional; (iii) structural; and (iv) ideational.

**Figure 3**

*A Multidimensional Process of Cross-Border Integration*



*Source:* Adapted from Durand and Perrin (2017).

The functional dimension is linked to cross-border flows whatever their nature (for working, studying, shopping, or tourism). The institutional dimension is characterized by the networking between actors (public or private) and by the policies and strategies implemented towards cooperation. The structural dimension concerns the structure or the organization of a border territory: socio-economic and spatial characteristics, business and fiscal environments. Focusing on the dynamics of convergence on either side of the border, this dimension also defines in a way the attractiveness or unattractiveness of border territories, thus fostering or hindering cross-border flows. Lastly, the ideational dimension designates a variety of more subjective elements linked to individual and collective representations, such as the sharing of common values or references. There are positive correlations between cross-border governance and integration for improving border territorial assets (Medeiros, 2015). In this context, Sosek Malindo emphasizes the institutional and ideational aspects of developing the Malaysia-Indonesia border region.

### **The Role of Socio-Economy of Malaysia-Indonesia Committee (Sosek Malindo)**

The concept of socio-economic cooperation for border development between Malaysia and Indonesia was mooted in November 1983. As a result, Sosek Malindo was formed in 1985 with the goal of developing border areas jointly for the benefit of both countries. Sosek Malindo's mission is to improve socio-economic cooperation and achieve well-being and harmony of people in border areas. To manage the border region more efficiently and fulfil its mission, Sosek Malindo's border governance is divided into three regions: (i) Sarawak-Kalbar-Kaltim; (ii) Sabah-Kaltara; and (iii) Johor-Melaka-Riau-Riau Islands (Anuar, 2019).

The border regions of Malaysia and Indonesia have been widely studied by Indonesian researchers as compared to Malaysian researchers. Khairil (2013) and Anuar et al. (2018) reviewed Sosek Malindo's role from the Malaysian perspective at the national and sub-national levels in terms of security, economic, and social aspects. Both studies have argued that Sosek Malindo is a proven platform for managing the Malaysia-Indonesia territorial boundaries. It strikes a balance between security management, economic activity, community livelihood, and most importantly, facilitating close collaboration



between the two neighbouring countries within a broader framework. Sudiar and Irawan (2019) argued that Sosek Malindo, from an Indonesian perspective, has been successful in producing many agreements. However, not all of these agreements have been implemented. The limited authority of the actors (especially at the subnational/local level) and lack of political will are among the factors contributing to the weak implementation of Sosek Malindo agreements. Similarly, Satyawati (2018) found that Sosek Malindo cooperation projects has benefited the border community, but it has not been enjoyed by all the people in the border area, which is marked by the existence of dependent rather than interdependent relationships. There are at least four (4) factors that have contributed to this issue, namely: (i) the long chain of bureaucracy; (ii) coordination meeting which is only held once a year and therefore quick and responsive decisions cannot be made; (iii) overlapping policies among authoritative agencies at the border; and (iv) limited capabilities in terms of human resources to implement Sosek Malindo's projects. Nonetheless, Fahrozi et al. (2019) concluded that Sosek Malindo has contributed positively to the creation of confidence building measures (CBMs) between Kalbar and Sarawak.

All of the aforementioned studies showed that Sosek Malindo has brought benefits and drawbacks for the development of the Indonesia-Malaysia border area. Regardless, Sosek Malindo has the capability to become an important platform for Malaysia-Indonesia cross-border governance.

## **RESULTS**

This section discusses the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on economic growth, border trade, border mobility, and poverty.

### **Economic Growth**

The COVID-19 pandemic, apart from causing sickness and death among the global population, had also affected the global supply network as each country is interdependent to obtain the supply of goods to meet the demands of consumers and industries. Data provided by the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solutions showed that Malaysia's manufacturing sector is deeply embedded within the

international supply system, contributing 28 % of the country's output to the global value chain in 2019 (Cheryl, 2021).


Various COVID-19 pandemic control measures implemented by each country, such as national lockdowns, the MCO, and shutdown of non-essential economic activities, had affected the supply chain network, thus negatively impacting the economic growth of each country. In the context of Malaysia and Indonesia, economic growth fell from 4% to -5% (in 2020) and from 5% to -2% for the 2019–2020 period (World Bank, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic control measures at the national level had also impacted the sub-national supply chain, such as in the state of Sarawak and the province of Kalbar, which share a border, including the border areas of Entikong and Tebedu.

Following the increase of COVID-19 cases in Kalbar and Sarawak, the Governor of Kalbar issued a letter No. 193/0868/BPPD-A, instructing the closure of cross-border posts in the province, including in Entikong. The letter contained a ban on residents of Kalbar from going to Sarawak starting March 18, 2020 (Pemerintah Provinsi Kalimantan Barat, 2020). However, the Indonesian government allowed the return of its citizens who were still in Sarawak to Indonesia only via the Entikong CIQ complex. In practice, the return of Indonesian citizens from Malaysia turned out to be problematic; for example, 69 of the 108 Indonesian migrants deported from Sarawak in March 2021 were confirmed COVID-19 positive. The Kalbar Provincial Government then formed the COVID-19 Task Force at the state border through the Governor's Decree (SK) on March 19, 2021 (Cipta, 2021).

As a result of the pandemic, the Sanggau Regency, which includes Entikong, experienced a significant contraction of economic growth. Sanggau's gross regional domestic product declined from 4% in 2019 to 0.7% in 2020. The decline was attributed to the 'wholesale and retail trade-repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles' industry which experienced the most drastic decline to -13% in 2020, followed by construction to -7% and manufacturing to -2%. However, during the pandemic, the agricultural and mining sectors actually experienced an increase compared to the previous year. The agricultural sector increased from 5% in 2019 to 6% in 2020, as did the manufacturing sector from 5% to 14% (Figure 4). These sectors, which experienced positive growth rates, were critical economic activities in terms of maintaining the supply chain and providing employment to the local population (Setiawan et al., 2021).

**Figure 4**


*Sanggau Regency Growth Rate (at constant 2010 prices) by Economic Sector, 2018-2020*



Source: BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency (2021).

**Figure 5**

*Sarawak: GDP by Economic Sectors, 2018–2020 (Annual Percentage Change)*



Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia (2021a).

The COVID-19 pandemic in Sarawak was detected in March 2020. The Sarawak government closed all border gates, except Kalimantan and Brunei, to control the pandemic. As of October 2021, there were 238,522 COVID-19 cases in Sarawak with a case ratio of 8.5 per 100 people, which was the 6th highest in the country, exceeding the national average of 7.5 for every 100 people (Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2021). Sarawak's economic growth declined from 3% in 2019 to -7% in 2020 as a result of MCO measures and the closure of non-essential sectors implemented by the Sarawak government to control the COVID-19 pandemic (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2021a). Practically, every economic sector experienced a negative growth rate in 2020. The downward trend also occurred at the district level, including Tebedu.

The Sarawak government had provided financial assistance under the Sarawakku *Sayang* Special Assistance (BKSS) program to the industrial and business sectors as well as consumers affected by the COVID-19 pandemic control measures. By the end of October 2021, Sarawak had implemented seven BKSS (1 to 7) with financial assistance totalling RM5.3 billion (Mohd Roji, 2021; Sulok, 2021).

## Border Trade

The COVID-19 pandemic had affected Sarawak's foreign trade. Sarawak's total trade with Indonesia declined from US\$0.8 billion (in 2019) to US\$0.6 billion (in 2020), with a negative growth rate for the period of 2019–2020 at -32% (Table 1).

**Table 1**

*Sarawak's Bilateral Trade with Indonesia, 2013–2020, (US\$ million)*

Sarawak Trade	US\$ million							
Destination/Origin	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
- Export to Indonesia	225	142	131	260	370	466	430	340
- Import from Indonesia	205	267	216	187	195	408	407	240
- Total Trade	430	409	347	448	565	873	837	580
- Trade Balance	20	125	85	73	175	58	24	100
Annual Change, %								
- Export to Indonesia	—	(37)	(8)	99	42	26	(8)	(21)
- Import from Indonesia	—	30	(19)	(13)	4	109	(0.3)	(41)
- Total Trade	—	(5)	(15)	29	26	55	(4)	(31)

— = not applicable. ( ) = negative

Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia (2021c).

In terms of cross-border trade between Sarawak and Kalimantan, the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ accounted for almost 20% of Sarawak's total trade with Indonesia (Table 2). In comparison to the Biawak CIQ and Lubok Antu CIQ, the Entikong CIQ represents a key cross-border commerce route. The average annual trade volume was about US\$67 million prior to the Indonesian government's trade embargo via the Entikong CIQ in 2014, with bilateral trade favouring Sarawak with an annual trade surplus of US\$30 million over the period between 2009 and 2013.

**Table 2**

*Sarawak's Bilateral Trade with Indonesia via the Tebedu CIQ, 2009–2013, (US\$ million)*

Sarawak-Indonesia Trade	2009	2010	2011	2012	2103	Average 2009-2013	Average Share to Total with Indonesia (2009-2013), %
<i>Trade via Tebedu-Entikong CIQ</i>							
– Import	21	25	13	21	12	18	13
– Export	10	40	69	66	53	48	24
– Total trade	31	64	82	87	65	66	20
– Trade Balance	(11)	15	56	46	40	30	
<i>Bilateral trade with Indonesia</i>							
– Import	124	135	124	160	156	140	—
– Export	102	190	204	255	225	195	—
– Total trade	225	325	329	415	381	335	—
– Trade Balance	(22)	56	80	95	69	56	—

— = not applicable. ( ) = negative

*Sources:*


Customs Department of Malaysia, Sarawak (2013).

Department of Statistics Malaysia (2021c).

The Sarawak government's MCO measures and the closure of non-essential sectors had an impact on cross-border trade between Sarawak and Kalimantan. From an Indonesian perspective, the amount of trade between Kalimantan and Sarawak through the Entikong CIQ fell from US\$11 million in 2019 to US\$2 million in 2020, with a negative growth rate of -81 % in 2020 (Figure 6).

**Figure 6**

*Kalimantan trade with Sarawak via Entikong CIQ, 2014-2020 ('000 US\$)*



Source: BPS-Indonesia (n.d.).

Despite the implementation of the MCO by the Sarawak government, essential goods from Kalimantan were still allowed in to meet industry and consumer demands. Nonetheless, its export volume fell from US\$10 million to US\$2 million during the period. Agricultural products accounted for nearly 80% of Kalimantan's exports to Sarawak. However, due to MCO measures, there were no imports from Sarawak in 2020. About two-thirds of the products imported by Kalimantan from Sarawak were grocery (*sembako*) items, such as granulated sugar, soft drinks, snacks, frozen fish, and condensed milk.

### Individual Mobility

The Sarawak government's implementation of border controls between Sarawak and Kalimantan had impacted the number of people who entered and exited through the Entikong-Tebedu CIQ. Travellers intending to visit Sarawak had to obtain permission from the Sarawak State Disaster Management Committee (SDMC).

**Table 3**

*Individual Cross Border Movement via the Entikong CIQ, January 2020 – August 2021*

Cross-Border Movement through Entikong CIQ via International Passport and Border Pass										Cross-Border Movement via CIQ in Sanggau Regency (Entikong) via Cross Border Pass (PLB)*			
Month-Year	Indonesian				Foreigner			All		Share of Indonesians to All Citizens, %		Indonesian	
	Departure	Arrival	Sub-Total	Departure	Arrival	Sub-Total	Citizens	Citizens		Citizens, %		Departure	Arrival
Jan-20	16414	19129	35543	1181	1125	2306	37849	94		94		1341	724
Feb-20	12586	8899	21485	858	891	1749	23234	92		92		1267	700
Mar-20	6170	6644	12814	626	460	1086	13900	92		92		740	506
Apr-20	3	2661	2664	60	2	62	2726	98		98		0	4
May-20	6	885	891	13	0	13	904	99		99		0	8
Jun-20	18	1259	1277	11	4	15	1292	99		99		0	3
Jul-20	155	2068	2223	29	2	31	2254	99		99		0	1
Aug-20	82	1474	1556	15	1	16	1572	99		99		0	0
Sep-20	75	1476	1551	11	9	20	1571	99		99		0	0
Oct-20	19	1558	1577	1	3	4	1581	100		100		0	2
Nov-20	0	1707	1707	11	3	14	1721	99		99		0	0
Dec-20	4	2150	2154	6	0	6	2160	100		100		0	4
Jan-21	7	1874	1881	2	2	4	1885	100		100		0	0

Cross-Border Movement through Entikong CIQ via International Passport and Border Pass										Cross-Border Movement via CIQ in Sanggau Regency (Entikong) via Cross Border Pass (PLB)* Indonesian			
Month-Year	Indonesian			Foreigner			Share of Indonesians to All Citizens, %						
	Departure	Arrival	Sub-Total	Departure	Arrival	Sub-Total	All Citizens	Indonesians to All Citizens, %	Departure	Arrival	Sub-Total	Departure	Arrival
Feb-21	2	2222	2224	5	2	7	2231	100	0	3	3	0	3
Mar-21	5	2707	2712	6	4	10	2722	100	0	2	2	0	2
Apr-21	23	3578	3601	7	4	11	3612	100	0	0	0	0	0
May-21	1	1251	1252	0	1	1	1253	100	0	0	0	0	0
Jun-21	8	1232	1240	6	0	6	1246	100	0	0	0	0	0
Jul-21	5	1730	1735	5	2	7	1742	100	0	0	0	0	0
Aug-21	5	1724	1729	6	2	8	1737	100	0	3	3	0	3

*Notes:* \* Cross border pass (PLB) is facilitated by the Indonesia-Malaysia Border Crossing Agreement (1967) and (1984).

*Source:* Pos Lintas Batas Negara Entikong (2021).



Table 3 shows the number of individuals entering and leaving through the Entikong CIQ using international passports and cross-border passes (*Pas Lintas Batas* – PLB), which dropped from almost 38,000 people (January 2020) to nearly 2,000 people (August 2021). More than 90% of individuals who travelled through the Entikong CIQ were Indonesians. The same was true for those who crossed the border using PLB, where the traffic flow dropped dramatically from about 2,100 to three people from January to August 2020. During the COVID-19 pandemic, only Indonesian migrants were allowed to pass through the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ. Some of them were deported by the Malaysian authorities and repatriated by the Indonesian Consulate General, while the rest were Indonesian citizens who returned home voluntarily because they had lost their jobs due to the pandemic.

### **Poverty**

Poverty in this paper refers to the inability to meet basic food and non-food needs as measured from the expenditure side (basic needs approach). The poor are people who have an average monthly per capita expenditure below the poverty line (PL). The PL consists of two components, namely: (i) the Food Poverty Line, which is the value of expenditure on minimum food needs, equivalent to 2,100 kilo calories per capita per day; and (ii) Non-Food PL, namely the minimum need for housing, clothing, education, health, and other basic needs. The number of poor people in the Sanggau Regency, which includes Entikong, actually decreased from 21,410 people in 2019 to 21,160 people in 2020. Likewise, the percentage of poor people to the population decreased from 4.57 % in 2019 to 4.46% in 2020 (BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency, 2021). This shows that the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 did not significantly affect the poverty rate in Sanggau and Entikong.

However, a closer examination of the poverty gap and severity index revealed a pattern that differed from the mentioned trend. The poverty gap index in Sanggau increased from 0.48 to 0.82 between 2019 and 2020 (BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency, 2021a). The increase in the value of the poverty gap index indicated that the average expenditure of the poor tended to move further away from the poverty line and the expenditure gap of the poor was also widening. The same condition also occurred in the poverty severity index, which increased from 0.09 in 2019 to 0.21 in 2020. The higher the poverty severity index, the

higher the disparity in spending among the poor. This indicated that there was an increase in inequality among the residents of Sanggau, including Entikong, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Poverty data at the district level is generally not officially published except at the state level. Based on Household Income Estimates and Incidence of Poverty Report 2020 released by the Department of Statistics Malaysia, Sarawak's monthly gross income had decreased during the pandemic. The median value of monthly household gross income decreased from US\$1,110.00 in 2019 to US\$955.00 in 2020 (Table 4) (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2021b). Sarawak was ranked 9th out of 13 states in terms of household gross income, with the highest decline of 16% as compared to other states. This implies that the COVID-19 pandemic measures had a significantly negative impact on Sarawak's population, including Tebedu.

**Table 4**

*Poverty and Median of Monthly Household Gross Income of Sarawak and Malaysia, 2012–2020*

Indicators	2012	2014	2016	2019	2020	Growth rate, %, (2019–2020)
<b>Median of monthly household gross income (US\$)</b>						
Malaysia	1,186	1,312	1,165	1,277	1,463	12
Sarawak	996	1,081	928	1,110	955	(16)
<b>Absolute poverty %</b>						
Malaysia	1.7	0.6	7.6	5.6	8.4	—
Sarawak	2.4	0.9	11.9	9.0	12.9	—

- = not applicable. ( ) = negative

*Note:* Absolute poverty is a situation in which household income is insufficient to meet basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing. Absolute poverty is measured by defining the poverty line.

*Source:* Department of Statistics Malaysia (2021b).

The incidence of absolute poverty in Sarawak also increased from 9% in 2019 to 13% in 2020 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2021d). The condition was likely to be even worse in Tebedu because it is the district in Sarawak with the second highest poverty rate in 2019, with a median income of US\$639.00, far behind Sarawak's median income of US\$1,110.00 and Malaysia's median income of US\$1,277.00 (Goh, 2021). Sarawak's poverty rate rose by four percentage points between 2019 and 2020.

## **Trade Normalization**


The 1967 Border Crossing Agreement (BCA) and the 1970 Border Trade Agreement (BTA) are two important agreements between the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia on cross-border governance. Since its establishment in 1985, Sosek Malindo has become a platform for the central and sub-national governments of the two countries to discuss common issues concerning the border, including trade. Regarding border trade, a cross-border trade dispute arose between the Malaysian and Indonesian governments in May 2014, following the latter's unilateral decision to prohibit the import of goods from Sarawak worth more than RM600 via the Entikong CIQ on the grounds that it was not an official international trading route between Sarawak and Kalimantan. The Indonesian government had imposed trade restrictions based on the enforcement of the 1970 BTA in which the official international trade route had to be between the ports of Kuching and Pontianak or air cargo from Kuching airport to Pontianak. A cargo shipment between Pontianak Port and Kuching Port takes at least 24 hours, while the journey via the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ, could be shortened to only five hours.

Besides the enforcement of the 1970 BTA by Indonesia, according to Nurul and Evan (2019), the decision to restrict trade by the Indonesian government was also based on security reasons following various crimes, such as smuggling and trafficking. This was proven by the regulation issued by Indonesia's Trade Minister in 2008, followed by a 2010 regulation that excluded Entikong from being identified as an international port. The said regulation was enforced even further in 2014, due to legal violations committed by customs officers who manipulated border trade activities.

Hence, trading on the border became inactive due to new trade regulations imposed by the Indonesian government that restricted the types of goods that could be brought in through the border into the country. This also affected cross-border trade managed by Tebedu Inland Port (TIP) between 2014 and 2017, prior to Malaysia's trade normalization initiative to discuss with Indonesia under the Sosek Malindo platform, and subsequently at the Malaysia-Indonesia Joint Trade and Investment Committee (JTIC) in July 2017. Exports from Sarawak to Kalimantan via the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ fell from US\$39 million in 2014 to US\$3 million in 2017 (January–May) (Figure 7).

**Figure 7**

*Export and Import through Tebedu CIQ (US\$ million)*



*Source:* Sarawak State Planning Unit (2018).

At the JTIC meeting in July 2017, Indonesia agreed to remove the import trade restrictions through the Entikong CIQ. Consequently, in 2018, the Indonesian government upgraded the Entikong CIQ to an international goods terminal and eventually trade between Sarawak and Kalimantan resumed in 2019 (Rinadi, 2019).

### **Establishment of a Special Economic Zone**

During the 12th Malaysia-Indonesia Annual Consultation in Kuching (Sarawak) in November 2017, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments agreed to develop Tebedu-Entikong as a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) (Tan, 2017). The proposed Tebedu-Entikong FTZ as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project is integrated into the BIMP-EAGA Vision 2025 (BIMP-EAGA, 2017). This suggests that the Tebedu-Entikong SEZ takes the form of an FTZ. The following parameters were evaluated to determine the feasibility of establishing the SEZ: (i) comparative advantage of the border regions; (ii) existing growth nodes; (iii) transboundary connectivity; (iv) trade intensity; and (v) population density.

#### *Comparative Advantage and Population Density*


Entikong and Tebedu are two areas that have become icons of the Indonesia-Malaysia land border on the island of Borneo because they

are the oldest and largest border gates. Entikong is one of the districts in the border area in the Sanggau Regency, Kalbar. Of the five villages that are included in the district administration, four of them are directly adjacent to Malaysia, namely Entikong, Pala Pasang, Suruh Tembawang, and Semanget.

Entikong District has an area of 507 km<sup>2</sup>. In 2020, its population reached about 17,697 people. Thus, the population density in Entikong is 35 people/km<sup>2</sup>. In 2019, Entikong had 4,505 households, with an average of four members per household (BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency, 2020). As a transit area at the border, the dynamics of the migration population entering and leaving Entikong is greater than the number of births and deaths, which was 274:202 in 2020 (BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency, 2021). Geographically, the distance from Entikong to the capital city of Sanggau Regency is 111 km, which takes 2.5 hours by road, while the distance to the capital city of Kalbar Province in Pontianak is 167 km, which takes about five hours by car. Entikong's distance to economic centres in Sarawak, namely Serian, is 31 km, which can be reached by land vehicles in 42 minutes, or 63 km to Kuching, with an estimated travel time of 1 hour 45 minutes.

**Figure 8**

*Sarawak-West Kalimantan Border Crossing Point*



Source: Google (n.d.-a).

Tebedu is a twin border town with Entikong and the main gateway to Kalbar via the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ. Tebedu and Kalbar, which are adjacent to each other, are separated by a 44-kilometer boundary. The town of Tebedu, which covers an area of 277 km<sup>2</sup>, is in the Serian sub-district and under the Samarahan administrative district. The distance between Tebedu town and Kuching is 98 km, between Tebedu and Serian is 38 km, and between Tebedu and the capital of Kalbar, Pontianak in Indonesia, is 248 km away, which passes through the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ. Overall, road connectivity is good between Tebedu, Kuching, Serian, and Pontianak.

The total population of Tebedu in 2020 was 27,600 people with a population density of 100 people/km<sup>2</sup>. The majority of the population of Tebedu consists of the Bidayuh ethnic group (96% of the population) (Tebedu District Office, 2021). Economic activities in Tebedu is based on agriculture. Among the main commercialized crops are paddy (rice), black pepper, rubber, and oil palm. Approximately 90% of the locals in Tebedu work as small-scale farmers and the rest work in government and private sectors (Tebedu District Office, 2013).

### *Growth Nodes*


TIP and Tebedu Industrial Estate are important growth nodes in Tebedu, while Entikong Dry Port is an important growth node in Entikong. TIP is a dry port. By definition, a dry port is more inland and connected to a seaport by either a road or railway network. A dry port is a terminal where cargo brought over on ships is transhipped. The inland port often includes storage facilities for a massive quantity of goods and is used for customs clearance of those goods. The port can also improve the movement of imports and exports, moving the time-consuming sorting and processing of containers inland, away from congested seaports.

TIP, which commenced operations in 2011, is the first and only inland port in Sarawak operated and managed by SM Inland Port Sdn. Bhd, linking the hinterland to the international market. The port, TIP is located about 1km from the Entikong-Tebedu CIQ and about 370 km from Pontianak and 100 km from Senari Container Terminal, Kuching. Its strategic location acts as a transshipment hub

for exporters and importers of Sarawak and Kalbar. This inland port facility serves as the gateway for transportation of goods between Pontianak and Kuching. A well-connected road network links TIP to the Senari Container Terminal. Indonesian traders can use TIP as their transshipment hub for the international market. The Senari Container Terminal is linked via feeder vessel connectivity to Port Klang, Singapore, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and other major ports of the world. Traders can also perform value-added activities, such as rebranding and repackaging of their goods at TIP (SM Inland Port, n.d.-a).

**Figure 9**

*Location of Tebedu Inland Port, Tebedu Industrial Estate and Tebedu CIQS*



*Source:* Adapted from SM Inland Port (n.d.)

There is a one-stop service at TIP to support cross-border trade. The relevant government departments and agencies involved in the one-stop service to support TIP trading operations are the Royal Malaysian Customs Department, the Immigration Department of Malaysia Sarawak, the Sarawak State Health Department, Department of Fisheries Malaysia, Sarawak Timber Industry Development Corporation, and freight forwarders (SM Inland Port, n.d.). A trade

office has been proposed at the Tebedu CIQ to facilitate trade between Borneo and Kalimantan (“Sarawak government to spur development,” 2020).

Tebedu Industrial Estate, which was built in 2005 and covering 133 hectares, provides light industrial infrastructure for foreign and domestic investors to produce manufactured goods for export and domestic markets. Tebedu Industrial Estate was set up to take advantage of the Tebedu/Serian and Entikong/Sanggau economic complementarities and to create job opportunities for locals in the border region. Thus, the state government welcomes private sector entities from Sarawak and Kalbar in particular, to take advantage of business opportunities in Sarawak, especially in food, halal products, e-commerce and small and medium-enterprise (SME) sectors (“Trade normalisation in Tebedu,” 2017).

In April 2019, the Indonesian government launched the Dry Port of Entikong to facilitate export-import activities as well as to support the existence of TIP on the Malaysian side (Chornelius, 2019). Entikong Dry Port will complement TIP’s trading operations and enhance cross-border trade once it is operational. The cross-border trade will be further facilitated by the Entikong CIQ, which was upgraded to an international goods terminal by the Indonesian government in 2018.

The identified growth nodes have the ability to drive development in border regions by providing locals with economic opportunities and employment.

### *Transboundary Connectivity*

The Tebedu-Entikong CIQ is the main gateway for goods and services between Sarawak and Kalbar since there is good connectivity from Kuching to Pontianak via the Pan-Borneo Highway and Trans-Kalimantan Highway. TIP also has good road connectivity with Senari Container Terminal in Kuching. This well-connected transport chain and traffic flow facilitate the movement of goods and strengthen the supply chain between industries in Sarawak and Kalbar. Both regions have traditionally had strong commercial and trade ties, and there is plenty of opportunities for those ties to be strengthened and expanded.



**Table 5**

*Economic Nodes between Sarawak and Kalbar*

From	To	Distance (km)*	Road Category
Pontianak Port, Kalbar	Entikong CIQ, Sanggau	249	Trans-Kalimantan Highway
Entikong CIQ, Sanggau	Tebedu CIQ, Tebedu	5	Trans-Kalimantan Highway/Federal roads
	Serian, Sarawak	42	Federal roads (dual lane)
Tebedu CIQ, Tebedu	Kuching, Sarawak	108	Federal road (Kuching Serian Highway)
	Senari Container Terminal (Kuching Port), Sarawak	112	Federal and state road

km = kilometre

*Note:* \* Based on the distance measurement through maps.google.com

*Source:* Google (n.d.-b)

The high volume of vehicles entering and exiting the Entikong CIQ indicates good road connectivity between Sarawak and Kalbar. The number of vehicles entering Kalbar from Sarawak averaged 65,404 per year from 2015 to 2019, compared to 62,491 vehicles entering Sarawak from Kalbar (Table 6). Following the Sarawak government's March 2020 ban on cross-border vehicle movement to prevent the transmission of COVID-19, there was no vehicle mobility at the Entikong CIQ from April to December 2020.

**Table 6**

*Number of Public Vehicles via the Entikong CIQ, 2015–2020 (Number of Vehicles)*

Year/Month	Malaysian Vehicles Entering Kalbar	Indonesian Vehicles Entering Sarawak
2015	84,490	81,390
2016	80,256	78,913
2017	63,529	60,690
2018	47,691	43,214

(continued)

Year/Month	Malaysian Vehicles Entering Kalbar	Indonesian Vehicles Entering Sarawak
2019	51,054	48,248
2020	8,462	10,013
<i>Jan</i>	4,463	6,093
<i>Feb</i>	2,757	2,599
<i>Mar</i>	1,242	1,321
<i>Apr-Dec</i>	0	0
<b>Average (2015- 2019)</b>	<b>65,404</b>	<b>62,491</b>

*Source:* BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency (2020)

For traders, improved connection in this border region, supported by inland ports, will reduce logistical costs and increase competitiveness in marketing their products in Borneo and Kalimantan, as well as the international market.


### *Trade Intensity*

Kalimantan-Sarawak trade through the Entikong CIQ has existed since the cross-border post commenced in 1989. Despite fluctuations in bilateral trade, Kalimantan-Sarawak trade relations were generally strong from 2001 to 2021 (Figure 10). The trend of trade between the two regions had been increasing since 2001. However, trade barriers imposed by the Indonesian government on Sarawak imports in 2014 resulted in a dramatic drop in imports between 2015 and 2018. Subsequently, trade between Sarawak and Kalimantan resumed in 2019 following the lifting of import restrictions from Sarawak by the Indonesian government in 2018. Nonetheless, overall trade value plummeted drastically between 2019 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, from about USD11 million to USD0.1 million.

This trade trend reflects the existence of the supply chain between the two regions. Entikong and Kalbar, which have abundant natural resources, are the areas of origin for upstream industries in various commodities, such as agricultural products. As the number of processing industries in Entikong and Kalbar are relatively small, these commodities are transported to the Tebedu and Sarawak areas as raw materials for downstream industries in the area. In other words, the Malaysian side could enjoy greater value-added benefits than Indonesia. To accommodate this issue, the development of a joint downstream industry in border areas could be an alternative solution.

**Figure 10**

*Indonesia's Trade with Malaysia through the Entikong CIQ, 2001–2021*



Sources: BPS-Statistics Indonesia (n.d.), BPS-West Kalimantan Province (n.d.)

### **Special Border Economic Zone with Free Trade Zone**

A special border economic zone (SBEZ) refers to a geographical region located along an international border crossing that is designated as a bilateral project area targeting a range of activities, like infrastructure development, construction of transport and logistics hubs, and the overall facilitation of cross-border trade and investment. In some cases, it can include cross-border ‘sister city’ pairing; Tebedu and Entikong (Lord & Tangtrongjita, 2014).

Tebedu-Entikong has been proposed as a SEZ under BIMP EAGA Vision 2025, and both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments have agreed that it will take the form of a FTZ. By definition, a SEZ is an area in a country that is subject to different economic regulations than other regions within the same country; while a FTZ (also known as commercial free zone) is a fenced-in duty-free area, offering warehousing, storage, and distribution facilities for trade, trans-shipment, and re-export operations (FIAS, 2008).


Alternatively, the Tebedu-Entikong SEZ could be reconfigured into a (SBEZ) with FTZ status based on the parameters of the border region and geographical location of Tebedu and Entikong CIQ, which are

adjacent to each other and easily accessible by road connectivity from Kuching and Pontianak. Furthermore, the Indonesian government has upgraded the Entikong CIQ to an international goods terminal, while Malaysia is upgrading the Tebedu CIQ to complement Entikong CIQ's facilities (Sibon, 2020). The SEZ concept used on the Malaysia-Thailand border in Rantau Panjang (Kelantan) and Sg. Golok (Narathiwat) can be applied to the Tebedu-Entikong SEZ. The complementary comparative advantages and the availability of modern infrastructure and communications at Sg. Kolok SEZ and Rantau Panjang (Pasir Mas) will lead to a feasible implementation of the Rantau Panjang-Sg. Kolok SBEZ (Anuar & Harun, 2018).

The objectives of SBEZ and SEZ are similar, namely to boost a region's economic development by attracting foreign direct investment and encouraging exports for industrialization. In terms of location, the SEZ is located within the respective border regions, as opposed to the SBEZ, which spans the border region of the two countries (Figure 11).

**Figure 11**

*Location of SEZ and SBEZ in the Tebedu-Entikong Border Region*



Kalbar = West Kalimantan. SEZ = Special Economic Zone. SBEZ = Special Border Economic Zone.

Source: Google. (n.d.-c).

Thus, a unified set of policies and incentives in finance, taxation, investment, trade, and customs regulations need to be enacted for Tebedu-Entikong SBEZ. This means that close institutional collaboration between the Malaysian and Indonesian governments, especially under the Sosek Malindo platform, is crucial for the establishment of the Tebedu-Entikong SBEZ. In order for SBEZ to succeed, both governments must develop infrastructure components (soft and hard) in the SBEZ, such as industrial parks, CIQ, transportation and logistics, governance, public utilities, border townships, financial and health-care institutions, and learning centres. The hard and soft infrastructure components in the Tebedu-Entikong SBEZ will promote transboundary economic activities and facilitate the movement of resources, goods, and labour.

## **CONCLUSION**

The COVID-19 pandemic had undoubtedly affected development and trade in the border region since Indonesia and Malaysia undertook unilateral measures to restrict cross-border mobility between Sarawak and Kalimantan, particularly at the Tebedu-Entikong CIQ. However, the detrimental impact has been mitigated by the respective governments' socio-economic aid to the business sector and the local population. Although border mobility is restricted, the Sarawak government is providing cross-border humanitarian relief to residents in West Kalimantan who have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Sosek Malindo was instrumental in resolving trade disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia in 2014, resulting in a win-win situation for both parties, and trade resumed in 2019. The Committee also proposed the Tebedu-Entikong SEZ with FTZ status, which is currently one of the projects under the BIMP EAGA Vision 2025. This study, however, suggests that the Tebedu-Entikong SEZ be reconfigured into a SBEZ without affecting its FTZ status. This reconfiguration is based on the border regions' existing comparative advantages and endowment factors, and that the SBEZ be focused on agro-based industries and downstream activities. In summary, despite criticisms about the effectiveness of its policy implementation, Sosek Malindo has strived for more integration and connectivity in the Tebedu-Entikong region.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The authors would like to thank the Indonesian National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) and BPS-Statistics of Indonesia for facilitating fieldwork in Entikong in September 2021 for the project, “2020 Population Census and the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Social Demographic Perspective”.

## REFERENCES

- Abao, A. S. (2020, December 11-12). Implications of COVID-19 pandemic on cross-border migration and sosioeconomic status of border residents: A case study in the border of Entikong and Jagoi Babang, West Kalimantan, Indonesia with Sarawak, East Malaysia. *11th Global Conference on Business and Social Sciences, Proceedings* 11(158). [https://doi.org/ 10.35609/gcbssproceeding.2020.11\(158\)](https://doi.org/10.35609/gcbssproceeding.2020.11(158))
- Anuar, A. R., & Harun, A. (2018). Malaysia-Thailand cross border trade and cross border special economic zone potential: A case study of Rantau Panjang-Sungai Kolok cross border town. *Journal of International Studies*, 14, 119–139.
- Anuar, A. R., Mohd Kamarulnizam, A., Abubakar, E. H., & Mohammad, S. A. (2018). Little brother-big brother relationship through Malaysia-Indonesia Sosek-Malindo initiatives: A case study of Entikong-Tebedu border. *Man in India*, 97(24), 55–67.
- Anuar, A. R. (2019, November 14). *Malaysia Indonesia border governance* [Seminar presentation]. Seminar Internasional Riset Kolaborasi, Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri, Pontianak.
- BIMP EAGA (2017). *BIMP EAGA Vision 2025*. BIMP EAGA.
- Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan. (2015). *Peraturan Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan nomor 1 tahun 2015 tentang rencana induk pengelolaan perbatasan negara tahun 2015–2019*. <https://jdihn.go.id/files/671/PERBAN%20NOMOR%201%20TAHUN%202015.pdf>.
- BPS-Statistics Indonesia. (n.d.). *Indonesian foreign trade statistics 2007–2020*. <https://www.bps.go.id>.
- BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency. (2020). *Sanggau regency in figures, 2016-2020*. BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency. <https://sanggaukab.bps.go.id/publication/2020/04/27/43cb5be0373dce4a0c33cb8/kabupaten-sanggau-dalam-angka-2020.html>

- BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency. (2021). *Kecamatan Entikong dalam angka 2021*. BPS-Statistics of Sanggau Regency.
- BPS-West Kalimantan Province (n.d). *West Kalimantan in figures 2002-2006*. <https://kalbar.bps.go.id/>
- Chavez, M. (2012). Border theories and the realities of daily public exchanges in North America. *Eurasia Border Review*, 3(1), 101–117.
- Cheryl, P. (2021, June 21). The State of the Nation: Supply chain disruption impedes economic rebound. *The Edge Malaysia*. <https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/state-nation-supply-chain-disruption-impedes-economic-rebound>
- Chin, C. F. (2020). The impact of food supply chain disruptions amidst COVID-19 in Malaysia. *Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development*, 9(4), 161–163. <https://doi.org/10.5304/jafscd.2020.094.031>
- Chornelius, H. (2019, April 29). Terminal barang internasional Entikong diresmikan, Setiyadi: Percepat pembangunan wilayah perbatasan. *Tribun Sanggau*. <https://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2019/04/29/terminal-barang-internasional-entikong-diresmikan-setiyadi-percepat-pembangunan-wilayah-perbatasan>
- Cipta, H. (2021, March 20). Buntut 69 deportan positif Covid-19, Pemprov Kalbar bentuk satgas di perbatasan. *Kompas*. <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2021/03/20/171001378/buntut-69-deportan-positif-covid-19-pemprov-kalbar-bentuk-satgas-di?page=1>
- Customs Department of Malaysia, Sarawak. (2013). Export and import via Tebedu CIQ. Customs Department of Malaysia, Kuching, Sarawak.
- Department of Statistics Malaysia. (2021a). *Gross domestic product by state 2020*. Department of Statistic Malaysia.
- Department of Statistics Malaysia (2021c). *Malaysia external trade statistics*. METS Online. <https://metsonline.stats.gov.my>
- Department of Statistics Malaysia. (2021b). *Household income estimates and incidence of poverty: Malaysia 2020*. Department of Statistic Malaysia.
- Department of Statistics Malaysia. (2021d, August 6). *Press release household income estimates and incidence of poverty report, Malaysia*. <https://islamicmarkets.com/publications/household-income-estimates-and-incidence-of-poverty-report-malaysia-2020>

- Durand, F., & Perrin, T. (2017). Cross-border integration with or without border? *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776417704688>
- Espejo, P. O. (2013). *What is wrong with border fences?* Yale University Department of Political Science.
- Fahrozi, F., Sumarlan, S., & Joostensz, T. G. (2019). Indonesia – Malaysia social economic working group in West Kalimantan viewed by perspective of Indonesia defense diplomacy. *Jurnal Diplomasi Pertahanan*, 5(1), 69–84.
- Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) (2008). *Special economic zones: performance, lessons learned, and implications for zone development*. World Bank. [https://documents1.worldbank.org › curated › pd](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/pd)
- Goh, P. P. (2021, October 11). Skills development crucial to reduce poverty in Sarawak. *New Straits Times*. <https://api.nst.com.my/news/nation/2021/10/735397/skills-development-crucial-reduce-poverty-sarawak>
- Google. (n.d-a). [Border Crossing Points in Sarawak and West Kalimantan and Sarawak]. <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Tebedu>
- Google. (n.d-b). [Google Maps driving directions from Pontianak to Kuching]. <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Tebedu>
- Google. (n.d-c). [Location of Tebedu and Entikong]. <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Tebedu>
- Gualini, E. (2003). Cross-border governance: Inventing regions in a trans-national multi-level polity. *The Planning Review*, 39(152), 43–52.
- Hairuddin, M. A., Ahmad Zairy, Z. A., Khairul Fithri, A. R., & Syahrin, S. (2020). Agriculture food supply chain scenario during the COVID-19 pandemic in Malaysia. *FFTC Agricultural Policy Platform*.
- Hamid, R., Hashim, N. H. M., Shukur, S. A. M., & Marmaya, N. H. (2021). The impact of Covid-19 on Malaysia tourism industry supply chain. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 11(16), 27–41.
- Jose L. Wong Villanueva, Tetsuo Kidokoro, & Fumihiko Seta. (2020). Cross-border integration, cooperation and governance: A systems approach for evaluating good governance in cross-border regions. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2020.1855227>



- Khairil, H. M. (2013, May 23). *Sosek Malindo: Malaysian perspectives* [Seminar presentation]. Malindo Workshop, Universiti Utara Malaysia.
- Khor, W., Hanafiah, F., Sairatul, D. I., Nor Azman, K., Hon, J. L., Mohd Husin, N., & Mohd, I. (2020). Potential impacts of COVID-19 on the aquaculture sector of Malaysia and its coping strategies. *Aquaculture Reports*, 18.
- Lord, M. J., & Tangtrongjita, P. (2014). Scoping study for the special border economic zone (SBEZ) in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). *MPRA Paper* 66417.
- Medeiros, E. (2015). Territorial impact assessment and cross-border cooperation. *Regional Science*, 2(1), 97–115. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21681376.2014.999108>
- Ministry of Health Malaysia (2021). COVID-19 Cases in Sarawak. <https://covidnow.moh.gov.my/cases/swk/>
- Mohd Roji, K. (October 12, 2021). Bantuan Khas Sarawakku Sayang diteruskan [MySarawak special assistance]. *MyMetro*. <https://www.hmetro.com.my/mutakhir/2021/10/765476/bantuan-khas-sarawakku-sayang-diteruskan>
- Muhamad, R. K. V. Z., Md Shafiin, S., Muhamad, S. Z., & Amirul, H. A. (2020). Dynamics of Malaysia's bilateral export post Covid-19: A gravity model analysis. *Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia*, 55(1), 51–69.
- Musa, P., Suryadi, A., & Paramitha, R. R. (2021). Kerentanan sosial dan ekonomi masyarakat di perbatasan Kabupaten Sambas menghadapi pandemi Covid-19. *Jurnal Muara Ilmu Sosial, Humaniora, dan Seni*, 5(1), 180–188.
- Newman, D., & Paasi, A. (1998). Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: Boundary narratives in political geography. *Progress in Human Geography*, 22(2), 186–20.
- Nurul, B., & Evan, L. (2019). West Kalimantan-Sarawak border trade: Gravity model. *Kasetsart Journal of Social Sciences*, 40, 703–710.
- OnTheWorldMap. (n.d). [Map of Kalimantan and Borneo]. <https://ontheworldmap.com/malaysia/>
- Pemerintah Provinsi Kalimantan Barat. (2020, July 20). *Laporan harian gugus tugas percepatan penanganan Corona virus disease 2019 (covid-19) di provinsi Kalimantan Barat tahun 2020*. <http://data.kalbarprov.go.id/dataset/d499b589-d89a-4453-a9d2-63965300fca7/resource/27b35f96-2c6d-4d45-846e-3f5dd49e3ca7/download/laphar-20-juli-2020-gugus-tugas-percepatan-penanganan.pdf>

- Pos Lintas Batas Negara Entikong. (2021). *Data pelintas batas negara melalui pos lintas batas negara (PLBN) terpadu kabupaten Sanggau provinsi Kalimantan Barat tahun 2019–2021*. Pos Lintas Batas Negara (CIQ) Entikong.
- Rinadi, M. A. (2019, April 29). Dimulai dari Entikong, terminal barang internasional dibangun di 4 wilayah. *Bisnis.com*. <https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20190429/98/916733/dimulai-dari-entikong-terminal-barang-internasional-dibangun-di-4-wilayah>
- Rohani, S., & Yaniza, T. (2021). Efektivitas POJK stimulus dampak Covid-19 untuk melindungi UMKM: Studi di kecamatan Entikong, Kabupaten Sanggau, Kalimantan Barat. *Jurnal Komunikasi Hukum*, 7(2), 706–716.
- Sarawak government to spur development in Serian division, says CM. (2020, September 23). *Malay Mail*. <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/09/23/sarawak-govt-to-spur-development-in-serian-division-says-cm/1905975>
- Sarawak State Planning Unit. (2018). *Sarawak Development: Opportunities and Challenges in BIMP-EAGA*. Chief Minister's Department, Sarawak.
- Satyawan, I. A. (2018). The benefit of joint border cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia through Sosek-Malindo cooperation in North Kalimantan province. *Proceedings of the Asian Academic Society International Conference*, 6, 434–440.
- Setiawan, B., Soekarni, M. Raharjo, S. N. I., Muslim, F., Sahara, I., & Jatmoko, Y. A. (2021). *Kondisi ekonomi dan demografi masyarakat perbatasan di era pandemi Covid-19: Kasus Entikong, Kabupaten Sanggau, Provinsi Kalimantan Barat*. BRIN-BPS.
- Sibon, P. (2020, December 15). Tebedu CIQ complex needs urgent upgrade to cope with present, future need. *Dayak Daily*. <https://dayakdaily.com/tebedu-ciq-complex-needs-urgent-upgrade-to-cope-with-present-future-needs/>
- SM Inland Port Sdn Bhd. (n.d.). *Tebedu Inland Port*. <https://www.smip.my/>
- Sudiar, S., & Irawan, B. (2019). Compliance problem within Sosek-Malindo cooperation regime between East Kalimantan and Sabah. *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research*, 349, 495–497.
- Sulok, T. (2021, August 4). Sarawak introduces three measures to help business sector hit hard by Covid-19, *Malay Mail*. <https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/sarawak-introduces-three-measures-help-083201392.html>

- Tan, C. K. (2017, November 22). Malaysia and Indonesia mull free trade zone in Borneo at annual summit. *Nikkei Asia*. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Malaysia-and-Indonesia-mull-free-trade-zone-in-Borneo-at-annual-summit2>
- Tandia, A. (2010). Borders and borderlands identities: A comparative perspective of cross-border governance in the neighbourhoods of Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau. *African Nebula*, 2, 18–42.
- Tebedu District Office. (2021). *Population Statistics 2020*. Tebedu District Office. Serian, Sarawak.
- Tebedu District Office. (2013). *Socioeconomic Profile of Tebedu*. Tebedu District Office. Serian, Sarawak
- Trade normalisation in Tebedu to yield greater benefits for locals. (2017, July 14). *Borneo Post Online*, <https://www.theborneopost.com/2017/07/14/trade-normalisation-in-tebedu-to-yield-greater-benefits-for-locals/?amp>
- Ullah, A. K. M., & Kumpoh, A. A. A. (2018). Are borders the reflection of international relations? Southeast Asian borders in perspective. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 5(3), 1–23.
- World Bank. (2021). Long COVID. *East Asia and Pacific Economic Update* (October). <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/36295/9781464817991.pdf>.
- Young, O. R. (2017). *Governing complex systems: Social capital for the anthropocene*. The MIT Press.
- Zumbusch, K., & Scherer, R. (2015). Cross-border governance: Balancing formalized and less formalized co-operations. *Social Sciences*, 4, 499–519.