

Mixed Responses from the International Community to Zimbabwe's Post 2000 Fast Track Land Reform: Why?

Joe Muzvidziwa
Midlands State University, Zimbabwe

*Corresponding author: Joemuzvidziwa101@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Zimbabwe's fast track land reform policy of 2000 brought with it conflicting responses from the international community. The first ten years of independence witnessed the failed willing buyer willing seller model a caveat driven from the Lancaster House Constitution. Britain and USA stopped funding the land reform under the compulsory acquisition era 1991 – 2000. The Lancaster House Constitutional debate failed to address the land issue which remained both an emotional trigger and a national security concern. The revolutionary approach adopted by the ZANU PF Government was induced by the British's creation of the opposition MDC Party. The chaotic nature of the reform attracted backlash from the neoliberals who employed smart power to cripple Zimbabwe's economic sector to rally the population against the ZANU PF-led Government. The generality of Africans identified the process in Zimbabwe as critical in redressing the skewed land imbalances engineered by the colonial past. The unresolved road- map to the land redistribution programme, a bilateral issue between Zimbabwe and Britain was internationalised. The competing values in the international community's responses to Zimbabwe's fast track land reform policy were kith and kin driven.

Keywords : *Kith and kin, international community, reactions*

Received: April 2018

Accepted: Jun 2018

Published: Jan 2019

INTRODUCTION

The land issue in Zimbabwe can be traced from early 1880s at the conference for the partition of Africa, where Britain got its land allocation in

the Southern Africa region (MacKenzie, 2005 ; Patrick, 1985). However, the seizures of land and cattle during the 1890s were orchestrated by the Pioneer Column (Becker, 1979 ; Cowie, 1982). The documented crucial driver for the armed struggle that witnessed its first shots at the Chinhoyi Battle in 1966 was the land question. The possession and disposessions continue to play - out as an indication power struggles in the story of Zimbabwe because the one holding land, determines the course the nations takes. The period from September to December 1979 witnessed the negotiated majority rule constitutional document at the Lancaster House Conference. A constitution that had the willing buyer willing seller clause guided the Zimbabwe Governments land issue for the first ten years (The Lancaster House Negotiated Constitution). Two land related amendments to the constitution were effected, one in 1992 and the other in 2000. The 2000 enactment codenamed the fast track land redistribution law empowered the government to repossess the land for redistribution to the landless blacks without compensation for the acquired land. It is viewed that this revolutionary approach to the land issue has remained at the core of Zimbabwe's rough relations with the Western community and other international players for close to two decades.

Land at the Core of the Armed Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe

One of the proponents of land repossession Chitepo at a conference in Australia shared a telling attachment of land to people when he noted the inseparability of the Zimbabweans from their land. Chitepo revealed his capacity to reflect on theories of discrimination in legislation, residency, economic opportunities and education, but, restricted himself to the question of land because he thought that landholding was the very basic endowment for human development (Chitepo, 1973). As Chairman of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) he had noted and clearly articulated that there was to be no talks, negotiations or discussions involving the armed struggle until Ian Douglass Smith had recognised the right to immediate majority rule and that the war was to rage until every acre of the country was liberated, noting that the essence of exploitation and white domination was over land (Chitepo, 1974).

Many other pre and post-independence land concerns across the world note that a man's country did not refer to an area of land, mountains, rivers and woods but, that it was a principle and patriotism and loyalty to the principle (Curtis, 2004). The deep respect for the land and its harvest is the legacy

of generations of farmers who put food on tables, preserve the landscape and inspire many with powerful work ethics (Douglass quotes). When missionaries came to Africa they had the Bible and the African land, and it was at the time when Africans were asked to close their eyes in prayer when Africans woke up holding the Bible without the land (Tutu quotes). Zimbabweans were no longer going to ask for land but take it without negotiation because the liberation struggle was fought for the acquisition of land; Zimbabweans had fought for their sovereignty, small as they were, won independence and were prepared to shed blood (Mugabe, 2002). Zimbabwe does not regret embarking on land reform programme which attracted debilitating economic sanctions from the West because it is a principled nation that knows its destiny (Mnangagwa, 2018).

The outlined observations from across the political divide discuss the attachment of mankind to land and the compelling nature for its continued protection by the one who holds it. Save for the audits noting the discrepancies that arose during the land allocations, the land reform post 2000 is a concluded phase whose effort guides the programme on modernization and mechanization. These elements are important to ensure optimum returns per hectare in all areas of endeavour.

The Genesis of the Land Challenges in Zimbabwe

The land question in Zimbabwe remains a huge national security issue that has attracted very emotive debates across the width and breadth of the nation among and between individuals from the political divide. This debate on the emotive land question was also exported to the international community and created a much polarised society whose cohesion on national issues will take a lot of education to address.

Willems (2004) notes contributions by the media in the polarisation of the Zimbabwean community on its representations of the land occupations and the land question. She draws upon the anti-colonial discourses in which the past often played a dominant role as *The Herald's* stance, that colonialism had led to serious land imbalances which had not been addressed and *The Daily News* on the other hand, being concerned with the present, thereby missing its chance to reflect upon the past; focusing on the negative economic effects of what the paper described as land invasions, it failed to get into a serious debate on the land reform.

The FTLR policy, which remains a bone of contention, reached its climax in early 2000. This process demands an understanding of the founding parameters that have informed its rough trajectory. The revolutionary approach that has attracted varied views from within and without Zimbabwe. A lot of research work has been done to reflect on its unfolding path and the nation continues to grapple with the damning voices mostly from the dispossessed group.

Through a network of foreign funded civil society groups, Zimbabwe's FTLR policy continues to be associated with chaos, radicalism, lack of rule of law, human rights abuses and a yawning democratic gap (Matondi, 2012 ; Muzondidya, 2007). Allies have taken aboard hook, line and sinker an ally's message. On the Americans and Europeans side, there is total condemnation whereas on the SADC and African side, there is solidarity for a delayed programme now properly executed. It was assumed from the standpoints that, there is no consensus within the international community over Zimbabwe's land policy as demonstrated by the schism and controversial issues under investigation. This paper challenges conventional wisdom on this emotive issue by addressing the real reasons behind the contradictory positions taken by the Western world on one hand, and the African states, on the other.

Comparative Responses Botswana and Mozambique

It needs to be highlighted from the onset that whilst Mozambique reacted to the Zimbabwean land policy liberally, Botswana was more forthright. The authorities in Gaborone were critical to Mugabe, while those in Maputo invited the alienated white farmers to settle in their territories. Peters (2002) reflects that, where Zimbabwe alienated its largely white commercial farming sector through land invasions and the government's gazette of farms, Mozambique granted these very Zimbabwean farmers some 50-year lease packages to farm commercially. Botswana on the other hand experienced xenophobic attacks on the Zimbabwean immigrants.

The white farmers kicked off in the Zimbabwean land discourse amidst approving noises from various African capitals, have been offered land in Mozambique, a country that justified the Third Chimurenga, as a campaign to restore land to the Africans. When Botswana criticized Zimbabwe, Mozambique took advantage of the knowledge of foreign

farmers to independently farm in the Niassa and Zambezia Provinces. It took the obtaining development of the farming sector-gap of the country in the sugar and tobacco plantations by allocating such to displaced farmers from Zimbabwe (Ibid, 159-164). Contrary to other Southern African states, Botswana's land utilization profile had not been developed with the primary aim of land redistribution, but rather to increase agricultural productivity, conserve range resources, and improve social equity in the rural areas. It also needs to be highlighted that both Mozambique and Botswana renewed their commitments to land tenure, although it is unclear whether these countries had the capacity to implement such policies.

In Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, where most of the large-scale South African white farmers have established themselves, the future of the customary tenure areas remains an issue in doubt. Botswana was seen amending existing or drafting new policies where necessary, to ensure that the prevailing institutional frameworks to improve tenure security and transparency in the land administration and management was guaranteed. Unlike in Zimbabwe and any other Southern African country, land reform in Mozambique centered on tenure reforms. Several tenure policies were enacted, for example, the Land Law which aimed at protecting both customary rights of existing occupiers on communal land, as well as strengthening the rights of private companies and individuals wishing to acquire access to land and natural resources for commercial purposes (Hanlon, 2002 ; Lahiff, 2003).

In Botswana, Malope and Batisani (2008) argue that land policies had not been developed with the primary aim of land redistribution, but rather to increase agricultural productivity, conserve range resources and improve social equity in the country's rural areas. Thus the government introduced varied agricultural policies such as the Tribal Land Grazing Policy, National Policy on Agricultural Development as well as the Land Boards. In Mozambique, Palmer, says that, the enactment of the Land Law was followed by a comprehensive public awareness campaign, the Land Campaign (*Campanha Terra*) that aimed to help people understand their rights under the new law (Palmer, 2004). The African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and African Development Bank (2010a) define land tenure as the nature of and the manner, in which land rights and interests over various categories of land are created or determined, allocated and enjoyed by the affected people.

In Botswana local Land Boards were established to deal with land issues and these were integrated with the traditional leadership in the new structures (Land Boards) to bring transparency in the customary land administration, while in Mozambique Land laws were enacted to deal with land matters. Although Botswana used local Land Boards to ensure land productivity, it needs to be noted that Mozambique used the Land Law to prevent conflicts and protected investors as a result. Tanner adds that the Land Law in Mozambique was made to ensure that large areas of unused land even where it was in the hands of the private sector were allocated to major investors, for forestry plantations. In this case, the Mozambican government suggested a more direct approach to reform, where it sought to find land for large-scale investors, and reasserts its control over the land owner (Tanner & Baleira, 2006). Small-scale farmers in Mozambique were losing land to well-placed individuals and foreign investors who were acquiring state farm land lawfully. It was more of redistribution as opposed to the land productivity in Botswana with no extensive motives for land distribution. Martins et al. (2003) say that Botswana is believed to have managed the process of reducing the powers of traditional leaders by dealing with it in a measured way, over a long period of time.

It should also be made clear that the outcomes of the land tenure systems of both Mozambique and Botswana received much criticism from various stakeholders in their respective countries. As regular policy reviews have been enacted by the government to identify specific problems and respond to them with specific tenure innovations in Botswana. White (2009) notes that the Land Boards have been criticized for the failure to meet the needs of service users, but rather satisfied their own agendas instead of addressing issues of social equity across the rural areas. Similarly, Lahiff (2003) reflects that the Land Law in Mozambique is seen as not have delivered significant benefits to the rural population as the natural resources remained in the hands of the elite groups. Hanlon (2002) argues that consultations done with the communities and the agreements made did not secure the best deal for the community, as communities ended up losing their valuable lands permanently to the investors. As if that was not enough, the Independent News Letter postulates that the land question in Mozambique continues to be shaped by a history of dispossession, exclusion, and exploitation and so shares much with neighboring Zimbabwe and South Africa. Private investors benefited most and continued to capture best land and valuable resources with little or no returns to the communities who hold nominal rights over the resources.

However, it needs to be highlighted that although both Botswana and Mozambique renewed their commitments to land tenure, they both took different dimensions. Mozambique used the Liberal Approach to the resolution of land crisis, through land nationalism with even more intensive attempts at socialistic transformation of land, through state and cooperative farms. This included the redress of unequal land distribution reforming their dualistic tenure systems and improving administrative and legal capacities to manage land reforms.

Thus, the nationalization of white settler lands and foreign commercial structures of capital was pursued in Mozambique where Botswana adopted a total free trade and free market which resulted in the growth of direct foreign investment and laissez-faire capitalism. Land expropriation was used sparingly in the smaller areas of white settler settlements. Thus, government's strategy had been one of careful change, responding to specific tenure innovations. This strategy remains relevant today. However, while recognizing its relevance and the fact that it has delivered significant success in land administration, it is necessary to come up with new approaches to address contemporary challenges facing the land sector.

The remaining countries in the region experienced less expropriation and occupation, yet they suffered colonial land-related domination. The challenges in land governance in these countries therefore differed from those of countries that were heavily settled by white colonialists. In the latter group, there was a need to redistribute land from minority whites to blacks who were dispossessed of their land during the colonial period. Still, for other countries in the region, such as Mozambique and Angola, post-independence saw internal conflicts in the form of civil wars that displaced many people from their land. These countries also had to deal with land governance issues, as they had to redistribute land to displaced people.

The Lancaster House Constitutional Debate

When the Liberation War Movement nationalist leaders went to the 1979 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, the nationalists' resolve for an immediate land redistribution exercise to the black majority became one of the hotly contested issues to be addressed. The all Africa Parliamentary Group (2009), Ndulo (2010) and Moyo (2000) note that the main objective of the Lancaster House Conference was to achieve a political settlement and in that regard it was important for the negotiators to defuse the

land issue rather than solve it. The financial commitments by both the British and American governments ensured the signing of the Lancaster House negotiated constitution. But, without specific financial figures pledged, one can be tempted to conclude that, there was no agreement on the land reform and it remains unsurprising that the land question remains a contested issue in Britain and Zimbabwe's land discourse over 30 years after the conference.

It should be noted also that Britain, in an effort to protect its kith and kin, included the willing buyer, willing seller clause in the constitution, besides having reserved 20% of seats in the envisaged Parliament of the Republic of Zimbabwe for whites (Ndulo, 2010). In effect for ten years from 1980, the concept restricted the Government of Zimbabwe to acquire land for redistribution from sellers who were willing to offer their land for sell. The willing buyer willing seller land clause remained a major reason that led to the unchanged land situation two decades post- independent Zimbabwe (Moyo, 1995). Plaut (2007) notes that the question of who was to own the land became the toughest of the issues to be addressed because the 5% Whites owned 80% of the arable land against the millions of Blacks scratching a living from the remainder. The draft constitution contained no reference to the land a scenario that brought the conference to a collapse until a secret promise by the US to provide a substantial amount for the process of land redistribution and undertake to encourage the British government to give similar assurances.

Given the fertile and the enriching land the white farmers possessed and the rewarding foreign currency earnings from the agricultural production in tobacco, cotton and beef, very few farmers were willing anywhere to sell their land to the government for resettlement purposes. Where and when they did, the government had no financial resources to buy whatever package of land that was offered for sell (Campbell, 2004).

Nyabeze and Ndulo (2016) note that the 1980 Charter document a derivative of an Act of the British Parliament was not a product of a participatory process by the affected people but, a diplomatic work-in-progress that was surrendered to Zimbabwe, as a starting point for its activities as a newly found nation in the international arena. Even though it envisaged the removal of the autocratic and undemocratic Smith regime rule, it maintained the unequal distribution of land ownership between blacks and whites and ensured the maintenance of white dominance. These two fundamental features drawn from the colonial period became flashpoints for future interactions between

the blacks and whites in Zimbabwe. The intervening scenario gave sufficient room to the black majority ruled Government of Zimbabwe, the energy and compelling reasons to challenge and effect substantial amendments to the 1980 Constitution each time an opportunity arose.

The Land Situation 1980-1990

Carrington noted in December 1979 the centrality of the land issue and the huge resource requirements that were needed to redress the colonial legacy. He acknowledged the need to change the land ownership pattern in Zimbabwe; the envisaged costs beyond any individual donor nation; and the British's preparedness to support the efforts of the Government of Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for the burden that lay ahead (The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group. 2009).

The 1980 land ownership structure reveal that, there were 33, 000, 000 hectares of arable farming land in Zimbabwe. Out of this land, about 6,000 white commercial farmers owned 45%. This constituted about 11, 000, 000 hectares of the most prime land in Zimbabwe. At the blacks' end, 8,000 mainly small scale commercial farmers possessed 5% of the land in the drier regions of the country and some 700, 000 black families occupied the remaining 50% of the poorest unfertile land in the designated Tribal Trust Lands and other communal areas (Khatami, 1981).

At its inception the Zimbabwe Government made a commitment to resettle about 160, 000 farmers by 1990 at the expiration of the "willing buyer, willing seller" Lancaster House Constitutional arrangement. However, the government had not reached 50% of its target for several reasons including among others, limited financial resources, corruption, the general bureaucratic nature of the process, and the willing buyer willing seller concept itself. Britain had provided only \$47 million dollars for resettlement support by 1990. The IMF and the World Bank suspended aid for land reform in 1989 for reasons of corruption. These Bretton Woods institutions went on to impose the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which had very strict budgetary guidelines and where land reform was not part of the supported portfolio (Moyo, 2000).

Agriculture was a thriving foreign currency earner for Zimbabwe from the production of tobacco, cotton, alongside beef and horticulture. Earnings

from these portfolios accounted for 15% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990 and 40% of the foreign currency earnings (Campbell, 2004). Zimbabwe's economy was growing steadily and so were the agricultural returns. Taking stock of the land redistribution profile, where the white minority owned about 50% of the best land available, the majority blacks did not enjoy these returns besides providing the labour force accounting for 25% of the national formal labour force predominantly in the white-owned commercial farms (Khatami, 1981).

Land Reform Policy 1991-2000

The government came up with a revised land reform policy after 1990, passing the Land Acquisition Act in 1992. The compelling objective was the speeding-up of the land reform process through land designation and compulsory acquisition. The Act empowered the government to acquire, with compensation, land that it deemed unproductive. Studies conducted by the World Bank during the 1990/91 period had shown that large-scale commercial farmers were utilizing less than 50% of the 11, 000, 000 hectares of prime land under their possession (Moyo, 1995).

Derelict land or under-utilized land, land owned by absentee or foreign landlords mainly from land owned by farmers with more than one farm and land adjacent to the communal areas was targeted for acquisition. By July 1997 the Government of Zimbabwe had acquired 3,500, 000 hectares resettling 71 000 families against the targeted 162, 000. About 4, 000 white farmers still owned over 50% of land at an average of 2, 000 hectares each (Campbell, 2004). Over 1, 000, 000 black families were still living in overcrowded communal land on an average of 3 hectares per family (Mabaye, 2005).

This land reform phase once again failed to address the land disparities in Zimbabwe for a number of reasons. The compelling one being that Britain, the United States of America Governments and other donor countries had stopped supporting the land reform programme, deeming it corrupt and unfair because they did not agree with the government's concept of compulsory acquisition. The Zimbabwe Government's approach had run contrary to the rights to private property concept, an important anchor in the Neo-liberal Theory set of critical values and norms (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006).

The Government of Zimbabwe, which was also now facing other economic hardships linked to ESAP, was incapacitated to single-handedly fund land reform. The resettled families had not gotten much assistance from the government. With the obtaining pressure from the landless black Zimbabweans who wanted to be settled and those resettled but lacking resources to develop their capacities, the government convened the Land Reform Donor Conference in Harare in 1998 to secure funding to improve its outstanding and overdue land resettlement drive (Masiwa, 2004).

Land Reform Donor Conference September 1998

The government developed a policy framework for the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme which required financial support from the donor community. The budget estimate was about US\$2, 000, 000, 000 for the land reform process and other essential services (Campbell, 2004 ; Moyo, 2004). The government also needed financial support to provide credit facilities for the resettled farmers because the commercial banks in Zimbabwe unlike in the Smith Regime era, were unwilling to get involved. The land acquisition had targeted for compulsory purchase about 5, 000, 000 hectares from the 11, 000, 000 owned by black and white commercial farmers, parastatals, corporations and multi-national companies across the country. About 1, 000, 000 hectares had been projected to be acquired annually for a period of 5 consecutive years commencing in 1998 (Ibid).

The Donor Conference Outcomes

Britain, the United States and donor countries from SADC, the Middle East and Asia as well as other agencies including the UN, African Union (AU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank attended the conference. All the participants at the conference agreed and passed a resolution that, land reform was essential for poverty reduction, economic growth and political stability. They also appreciated the urgency and fast track nature of the programme. However, there was little commitment financially, with the donors only pledging US\$100, 000, 000 against the budgeted figure of about US\$2, 000, 000, 000 (Marongwe, 2002:33).

Besides falling far short of the requirement, the pledges came with conditions. Britain insisted that the land acquisition was not to be compulsory but, that it was to remain a willing buyer and willing seller (Masiwa, 2004). On a positive note, the Commercial Farmers Union offered some land freely,

but, were slow to offer any land a scenario that obtained in the 1990's. This prompted the government to pass in the year 2000 the Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A, giving itself power to compulsorily acquire land without compensation for the land component. This was challenged constitutionally in the Zimbabwean and the Regional Tribunal Courts by the farmers and provided the reason for the donors to cut the promised aid for land reform setting fertile ground for the later fighting (Zim Online, 2008 ; Ndlovu, 2011).

The 3rd Chimurenga Championed by the war veterans of the 2nd Chimurenga, beginning in early 2000, the landless blacks began to invade farms and seized about 1000 white owned farms in a space of about three months (Berry, 2002). The government paid a blind eye on the process but, later enacted a law that authorised the occupations and seizures of white owned farms across the country. Among the 300, 000 farm workers living and working on these farms, about 50% of them lost not only their jobs, but homesteads as well (Freeth, 2011; Howard-Hassmann, 2010). These were the only homes they knew. The invaders drove them off the farms and they became the landless blacks who formed squatter camps wherever they found space. This area became ripe for the human rights abuse writings against the Government of Zimbabwe (Muzondidya, 2007).

Most of these farm workers had been born and worked on the farms all their lives, were the ones who would have had knowledge and know how on how to run the farms and the associated farm equipment (Sachikonye, 2003:3). The new settler had no knowledge or training in commercial farming and did not have the necessary capital required to purchase the necessary inputs required for farming and other expensive inputs necessary to ensure success in the new farming venture. There was no coordination or cooperation whatsoever, the settlers farmed their own little pieces of land, underutilizing the land and made it inefficient. The government in the meantime had not planned or put into motion any programme to assist the new farmers because the government did not have the financial and human resources for the initial intervention that would have an important starting point for the resettlement programme (Masiwa, 2004).

The Kith and Kin Component

The interactions of nations in the international system are governed by the International Relations Theories. This paper argues that the factors used

to inform the contradictory reactions of the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR policy are better explained using the Social Constructivism Theory. Wendt (1999) observes that shared ideas rather than material forces are determinants of human association and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are also constructed by these shared ideas rather than being nature driven. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2011) agree with the above observations by noting that, the social world is constantly being constructed through group interactions and that social reality can be understood through the perceptions of those enmeshed in the interactions. These two concepts underpin the Constructivism Theory and explain sufficiently the reactions by the international community to Zimbabwe's FTLR policy.


The Neo-liberal Theory which has remained the basis for capitalist societies activities in the global village is anchored on the economic base that is propelled by the profit motive and the importance of unfettered respect to private property (Smith 1910). The Neo-colonial Theory employs capitalism, to influence a developing country in lieu of indirect political control (Nkrumah, 1965:234). The Pan-Africanism Theory notes the value of an individual's dependence on the collective as the heart of human meaning (Abdul-Raheem, 1996).

The Constructivists have not been discussed in much detail to explain the interaction of nations in the international system. The Zimbabwe's FTLR policy constitutes some fertile ground to appreciate not only the reactions by the British government and the ease at which it internationalised a bilateral issue through the European Union mechanisms and the United States of America's input as an ally, but also SADC and African nations' reactions in support of the FTLR policy. This study provides another window in the academia and policy makers in governance from where to reflect the huge impact "kith and kin" play in the international relations matrix. If natured, it could become an important tool to utilize for the defences of huge recourses abound in the continent of Africa and other developing nations in the world. The actions and the behaviours by the contenting groups reflect on the power of belonging. In this regard, the regional and institutional outlook determined the activities of the parties to the contested land redistribution programme. These behaviours can be explained better through the Social Constructivism Theory lens.

In Constructivist Theory, International Relations is aligned in the operating parameters of institutions and their activities in the international system. The theory assists us to appreciate how various international actors in

the international organizations act in the community of nations. The theory interrogates the basic assumptions of the other theories like Neo-liberalism and pays attention to the links that the states have with various other structures (Wendt, 1999). The theory outlines different themes like anarchy and the state's identity in the international structure.

Whilst the Neo-liberal Theory encourages countries to look for complete advantage instead of average profits to other countries, the Social Constructivism Theory recognizes that institutions and regimes have a role to assist in governing the international community that is anarchic in nature. This overview proposes that the international community needs more cooperation and multilateralism to secure the interests of all nations in the international system. Competitions breed more completion which at some point is bound to generate conflicts and activities that divert attention to trivial issues which derail national growth. The following diagram illustrates the convergence of the Neo- liberal, Neo-colonialism and the Pan-Africanism.



CONCLUSION

The hide and seek tactics employed by the western community in the management of the land question in Zimbabwe remained the stumbling block in achieving a lasting win-win solution for the contestants of the land redistribution post - 2000. The 1979 Lancaster House Charter failed to direct amicably, land redistribution options for the Zimbabweans black and white alike. The willing buyer willing seller clause included as a temporary conflict resolution option in the constitution became the permanent option the west trusted as it assured the rights of their kith and kin in Zimbabwe's land road-map.

The Constitutional amendment Act of 1992 which allowed and attempted compulsory acquisition failed to meet its targets mainly for the reason of inadequate funding. This was compounded by the general view from the west that any land resettlement should have been market driven and non-compulsory. The 1998 Harare donor conference gave a huge indicator for this perpetuated position which also produced the revolutionary position taken by the Government of Zimbabwe in the 2000 Constitutional Amendment Act Number 16A. The basis for the struggle for the ownership of land has remained that of colour. The Lancaster House Constitution propelled the white versus black outlook and when the black government got into office, it took up the challenge and applied the same concept in reverse. These are the fruits of social constructs as explained by the Social Constructivism Theory. The internal outlook of rights, own rights that pay a blind eye on the opposing views if unresolved will reduce the pace at which nations must benefit from the inherent resources abound across the world.

REFERENCES

- Becker, P. (1979.) *Path of Blood*, London, Penguin Books.
- Berry, S. (2002.) *Debating the Land Question in Africa: Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 44, No. 4; Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, H, (2004.) *Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation*, Amazon; Africa World Press.
- Chitepo's Speech in Australia in (1973.) {Online} <https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/land>. Accessed on 28 July 2018.
- Chitepo's Speech in Lusaka 1974. {Online} <https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/land>. Accessed on 28 July 2018.
- Chitiyo, K, T. (2000.) *Land Violence and Compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe's Land and War Veterans Debate*, Track Two Occasional Papers, Cape Town; Centre for Conflict Resolution.
- Constitutional Amendment Number 16A. 2000.
- Cowie, H, R. (1982.) *Imperialism and Race Relations*. Revised edition, Nelson Publishing.
- Desmond Tutu. {Online} <https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/land>. Accessed on 28 July 2018.
- Fisher, J, L. (2010.) *Zimbabwe Government and Land Reform Crisis: A Postscript to Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles*; ANU Press.
- Freeth, B. (2011.) *Mugabe and the White African*, Oxford, Lion Hudson plc.

- George William Curtis. {Online} <https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/land>. Accessed on 28 July 2018.
- Howard-Hassmann, E, R. (2010.) *Mugabe's Zimbabwe, 2000-2009: Massive Human Rights Violations and the Failure to Protect*; Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- James H. Douglas, Jr. {Online} <https://www.brainyquote.com/topics/land>. Accessed on 28 July 2018.
- Khatami, J. (1981.) *How an Elected Marxist Government is Winning Business Conference*; The International Monitor Vol 2 Number 4, April.
- Laakso, L. (1997.) *Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. Lancaster House Constitution of 1979. Land Reform and Resettlement Programme: Revised Phase II, 2000.
- Mabaye, M, T. (2005.) Ethics of Development in a Global Environment. Marongwe, N. 2003. *Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the New Politics of Land in Zimbabwe*. In Hammar, A., Raftopoulos, B. and Jensen, S. (Eds).
- MacKenzie, M, J. (2005.) *The Partition of Africa 1880 -1890*; London and New York, Methuen.
- Martin, A. F. Kalabamu, K. and R. White, R. 2003. Land tenure policy and practice in Botswana: *Governance lessons for southern Africa*. *Austrian Journal of Development Studies*, 19 (1).
- Masiwa, M. (2004.) Post-Independence Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Controversies and Impact on the Economy.
- Matondi, B, P. (2012.) *Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform*, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, Zed books.
- Mnangagwa, D, E. (2018.) We do not regret land reform. The Sunday Mail 22 July.
- Moyo, S. (1995.) *The Land Question in Southern Africa*. Institute of Development Studies, Harare; SAPES Books.
- Moyo, S. (1994.) The land Question in Zimbabwe. Institute of Development Studies, Harare; SAPES Trust.
- Moyo, S. (2000.) *The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe 1990 - 99*; Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1; Taylor & Francis Ltd.
- Moyo, S. (2004.) The Land and Agrarian Question in Africa: the Case of Zimbabwe, Research Perspectives and Questions, Dakar: CODESRIA Green Book. Forthcoming.
- Mugabe, G, R. (2002.) Wealth Summit. Pretoria.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2006.) *The Nativist Revolution and Development Conundrums in Zimbabwe*: Occasional Paper Series: Vol. 1. ACCORD.
- Ndlovu, N, P. (2011.) *Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC Tribunal*; SADC Law Journal Vol. 1.
- Ndulo, M. (2010.) Zimbabwe's Unfulfilled Struggle for Legitimate Constitutional Order in Miller, E, L and Aucoin, L. Framing the State

- in Times of Transition Chapter 7, United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Nyabeze, H, T. (2015.) *Progressive Reform in the New Constitution of Zimbabwe*. A balance between the preservative and transformative constitution making process, Country Report.
- Patrick, B. (1985.) *Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent*. Critical Inquiry. 12(1).
- Plaut, M. (2007.) US backed Zimbabwe land reform. BBC News. {Online} <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/6958418.stm>. Accessed on 18 July 2018.
- Sachikonye, M, L. (2003.) *Land Reform for Poverty? Social Exclusion and Farm Workers in Zimbabwe*; Paper prepared for a conference on “Staying Poor: Chronic Poverty and Development Policy, IDMP Manchester University.
- Tanner, C. and Baleira, S. (2006.) Mozambique’s legal framework for access to natural resources: The impact of new legal rights and community consultations on local livelihoods.
- The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group. (2009:26.) Land in Zimbabwe: Past Mistakes, Future Prospects Report.
- Zim Online. (2008.) Campbell and seventy others versus Zimbabwe: SADC Tribunal.