The Budgetary Role of the Indonesian Parliament: The Impact of the Law on State Finances

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ABSTRACT

The role of parliament in a budget process in an important issue in the public financial management. The extent of the parliament to exercise control in determining budget appropriations affects the flexibility of spending units in utilizing their budget optimally. This paper looks at the budgetary role of the Indonesian Parliament in implementing the Law on State Finance enacted in 2003. This paper shows that the Law's requirement that the appropriation of annual budget is provided at the detailed activity level is not supportive of the government goal to reduce corruption. On the contrary, it has led to more corruption committed by the parliament members, and to undue disbursement delays. The resulting budget rigidity is also not supportive of the government objective to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the financial management through Performance-Based Budgeting and Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

Keywords*: Role of Parliament, budget process, public financial management, Performance Budgeting, MTEF*

INTRODUCTION

One crucial aspect of the relation between the executive and legislative branches of government is the budgetary role of the parliament. Almost all constitutions of the countries in the world assign their parliament a duty to examine the annual budget bill submitted by the government, before approving it into law. The depth of their scrutiny of budget proposal will depend on the level of aggregation of appropriations in the budget, which in turn is usually determined by laws. Different countries may have different levels of aggregation of appropriation. More detailed appropriations, intended to impose budget discipline, tend to lead to less flexibility to budget users. On the other hand, more global appropriations can bring more discretion, useful to achieve effective performance, but may result in inefficiencies. Therefore finding the right balance between the executive's authority to manage budget without undue restrictions and legislative's budgetary power to impose control is a continuous process until the optimal arrangement is achieved (Santiso, 2005).

Related to this issue, in the effort to increasing efficiency and effectiveness of the public finance management, Indonesia enacted the Law No. 17 on State Finances in 2003. This was followed by the issuance of the Government Regulation no. 21 in 2004 which introduced Performance-Based Budgeting, Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and integration of routine and development budget.

There was deep perception among policy and law makers in the country that the traumatic Asian Financial crisis in 1997 was caused among others by rampant corruption in the public sector. Therefore, to reduce chances of corruption by civil servants, in that Law the parliament is given a strong role in supervising the budget process whereby its approval is required for appropriations to the level of activity or project and kinds of expenditure for each spending unit of organization. As the consequence, the parliament has to be involved in detailed scrutiny of budget bill which is very time-consuming and causing negative consequences.

In this paper, it is argued that the requirement by the Law 17/03 that the parliament (the People's Representative Assembly) approve the appropriation items to such detailed level is not supportive of the efforts to fight corruption and in implementing Performance Budgeting and MTEF.

THE BUDGETARY ROLE OF PARLIAMENT: A BRIEF REVIEW

Budget plays a crucial role in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of a government. As a government's tool to influence the economic activity, budget can be employed to promote growth, stabilize the economy and achieve better equality among the people. As underscored by Diamond (2001): " a modern budget system should be able to achieve three main objectives: first, to ensure control over expenditures so that they are consistent with the budget law; second, to stabilize the economy through timely and efficient adjustment in fiscal aggregates; and third, to promote efficiency in service delivery through procedures that provide incentives for greater productivity".

Thus budget receives significant attention from a parliament. It is the appropriate institution to ensure that the budget would increase the welfare of the people through revenues that will be collected and expenditures spent. To allow this, constitutions give parliament members authority to examine budget proposal from the executive, scrutinize the expenditure details, supervise its execution and ask the accountability from those officials involved. By exercising its authorization, oversight and supervisory roles in the budget implementation, a parliament is expected to generate efficiency, transparency, and accountability in the utilization of the country's resources. Healthy discussions or debates in the budget process would contribute to the concensus of how the nation's resources would be utilized and what objectives achieved (Santiso, 2005).

Control of the Budget: The Scrutiny of Appropriations

Control of the budget can be carried out through ex-ante control of department's budget requirement and ex-post accountability of budget implementation (Auditor-General of Victoria, 2003). The former is usually in the form of scrutiny of budget bill and detailed appropriation estimates to establish financial discipline while the latter through audit of budget implementation and accountability for performance.

An appropriation or supply of public funds is an authorization from the parliament to the government to use public funds to finance expenditures as stated in the Appropriation or Supply Bill, which is the maximum amount that the government can spend (New Zealand Parliament, 2012). The Appropriation Bill gets the approval from the parliament only after it has examined the budget proposal put forward by the government. The parliament members will scrutinize the government's plan to finance its plans or programmes already approved by the parliament. The purpose is to ensure that a government agency gets a sufficient and appropriate funding for its activities and projects based on the approved plans and programs during the relevant budget year and also to control the use of the expenditures in the proposed budget. The examination, usually through questions and discussions, of the proposal is performed at plenary and comittee level of the parliament.

Most of the detailed scrutiny is done by the Appropriation Committees. During the meetings, the ministers or heads of the government department present their budget proposals and answer questions about their plans, programs, policies, and priorities. The parliament members may also ask about their existing programs, their performance, or problems that might surface during their organization's current operations.

After the discussions have been completed, the results of the scrutiny of appropriation bill in committees meetings are reported to and further discussed in the parliament plenary session. Only at this stage, the appropriations bill will get the approval from the house floor. The chief of executive will sign the bill into the Appropriation Acts. These annual appropriation acts allow the Treasury to transfer public money, usually from the Consolidated Funds, to the relevant public agencies to finance their activities or projects as stated in the approved plans and budget.

These annual appropriations represent maximum amounts that an agency can spend to acquire three kinds of things: a) purchase of supplies or services, b) acquisition of fixed assets or capital, and c) payments on behalf of the state to parties not directly related to the purchase of goods and services by the government such as transfer payments and central government financing costs (Auditor General of Victoria, 2003).

Budget Flexibility in Appropriation Framework

In achieving the two principal objectives in public financial management, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness, there is a trade- off between control and flexibility. In this case, more control in the use of appropriated items is supposed to minimize inefficiencies in government spending but can result in less effective achievement of the planned targets or objectives and vice versa.

In Victoria, Australia, the state government adopts global or online appropriations. These are the allocated funds in the budget that can be spent by state agencies to acquire the goods and services to execute their missions. Before the adoption of global appropriations, the Treasury directly funds the department's projects or activities, but now the appropriations represent the maximum amount of fund available for public service delivery. Therefore, if there is some under spending after the service has been fully carried out, departments can use the balance for financing other purposes without formal consent from the parliament (Auditor General of Victoria, 2003).

The Appropriation Act provides considerable flexibility to departments to move between items of the appropriation within the determined ceiling. This flexibility arrangement also covers changes in quantity, quality and mix of goods and services as well as options in fixed asset to be produced or delivered. Thus, we can see that the role of parliament in Victoria is limited in term of direct control of the budget vis-a-vis the executive.

Besides this flexibility mechanism, there are also provisions in the budget management provisions that the government can reallocate the appropriated funds from one expenditure item to another without having to come back to the parliament for permission. However, if there are large reallocations needed, the government is asked to seek approval from the parliament for such a shift, in the form of Supplementary Estimates. If during the budget year there is overspending for one category, but some under spending for another, then the savings will be compensated to balance the whole budget. For such offsets or virements a department needs to seek an approval from the Treasury, which is usually granted (Auditor General of Victoria, 2003).

The extent of budget flexibility in various countries can be seen in Table 1. which provides appropriation frameworks for Victoria, Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand. There are some differences in the level of the appropriation aggregate among them. In the state of Victoria, global appropriations are provided at a departmental level, while for the Australian federal government, they are provided at public agency level within portfolios. In the United Kingdom, global appropriations are based on input for departments, while in New Zealand appropriations are provided at the output group level (Auditor General of Victoria, 2003).

Table 1

Appropriation Frameworks of A Number of Australian and Overseas Jurisdictions – An Overview

	Victoria	**Commonwealth of Australia**	**New Zealand**	**The United Kingdom**
Basis of Appropriations	Global accrual Output-based departmental appropriations for ouput provision, additions to net assets, and payments on behalf of State	Accrual-based Output/outcome appropriations to departments and public sector agencies. All appropriations are global and made for outputs, equity injections and loans	Accrual Output-based departmental appropriations for individual output classes capital contributions, non-departmental operating costs and loan and interest costs	Global input based Departmental appropriations with appropriation referenced to the key departmental aims and parliamentary authority provided on both on accruals and net-cash basis

Source: Auditor-General of Victoria (2003). Parliamentary Control and Management of Appropriations, No. 13 - Session 2003.

In the Philippines, the constitution limits the budgetary role of the Congress in order to promote fiscal discipline. The President is provided with a strong power vis-à-vis the Congress not only in the budget preparation process but also in the budget management once the budget bill has been enacted. In scrutinizing the government budget proposal which is usually in term of sectoral allocation, the Congress members give the attention more on how the proposed budget items can affect their own districts or constituencies rather than the nation as a whole (Blöndal, 2010).

The Executive is given a good deal of flexibility in managing the public funds. When the budget bill has been approved by the congress and enacted, the government can reallocate funds to priority programmes in budget implementation without having to ask for approval from the congress. Besides, the Department of Budget and Management allows government agencies for fund reallocation without having to ask their permission for some types of budgeted items such as within maintenance expenditure (Blöndal, 2010).

In Thailand, as in the Philippines, the National Assembly (Parliament) has a limited budgetary role due specific constraints placed by the constitution which provides a strong authority to the executive in budget process vis-à-vis the parliament. Despite these restrictions, the parliament is very active in scrutinizing the submitted budget details which often results in some changes in the proposal. The extensive and open scrutiny by the parliament in the budget process brings some positive effects especially in term of transparency, although the focus is generally still on inputs not outcomes or performance (Blöndal & Kim, 2006)

It can seen that in the countries discussed above, the role of parliament in budget process, including in determining the scope of appropriation bill is rather limited often as mandated by constitutions.

THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY UNDER PERFORMANCE BUDGETING AND MTEF: MOVING FOCUS FROM INPUTS TO OUTCOMES

Since the last few decades, governments have been increasingly moving from traditional budgeting which is based on line item to performance budgeting based on results or outcomes (Diamond, 2001). Thus, the budget process has also been changing from emphasizing input control whereby the spending units need to observe the approved appropriation details to performance targets of public programs which should be achieved by them. Performance budgeting aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure by linking the funding of public sector organizations to the results they deliver, making systematic use of performance information (Browne, 2010).

The new performance management model can be described as following three basic tracks. First, to allow government and department managers substantial flexibility in using funds allocated in their budget to achieve the government objectives more effectively and effectively. Second, greater managerial discretion will assure the managers of more certainty in needed resources. Third, the Performance Budgeting also allows the appreciation for performance and penalty for underperformance within the budget constraints (Diamond, 2006). Therefore, the focus on discussion moves from how much input is needed and at what cost to what will be achieved by the appropriations provided in term of public service.

Thus increased flexibility is given to managers in return for stronger accountability for the results. This will strengthen the managers' discipline and commitment since they are aware that they are directly accountable in their delivery of results. Therefore, through appropriate and balanced incentives Performance Budgeting can increase cost effectiveness in the implementation of public programs. Failure or unsatisfactory performance would generate healthy discussions about the reasons or the problems faced and thus can lead to better planning and execution in future activities or projects (Browne, 2010).

Therefore, the crucial aspect in Performance Budgeting is the need to have a balance between control and flexibility. Control of inputs should be maintained without reducing managers' discretion in getting optimal outcomes through the ability to reallocate line item's allocated funds while respecting the budget ceilings.

Besides introducing Performance Budgeting which is annually oriented, developed countries' reform efforts in public financial management are also initiating a new approach which is planning resources in a few years time horizon consistent with government fiscal constraints, known as Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

This scheme allocates funding resources to finance more strategic activities or projects based on the nation's priorities as planned by a government usually in three years time period. By knowing several years in advance the amount of funds that will be available, the government agencies, with the flexibility provided by MTEF, are expected to manage the resources more cost effectively.

In term of process, MTEF is built on top down-bottom up basis. The costs of activities and projects that have been planned to be implemented during the next three years period will be estimated and resources allocated in each annual budget in the corresponding time period. Thus, successful implementation of MTEF is very much dependent on the ability of managers to utilize the resources allocated in the budget during the relevant period in the most optimal and effective way. Consequently, governments pursuing reforms in public financial management are more and more opting to provide more discretion and thus, less restriction to government managers in reallocation of funds (virement) in their budget. This development also has an impact on the nature of audit of public finance, moving from ex-ante to ex-post audit, especially in the European countries. Australia, New Zealand and Canada also have followed the same approach (Diamond, 2001).

Consequently, there is a tendency for governments in the OECD countries to simplify budget documents focusing more on results and less on inputs so that the parliament members and the general public can review them and know what they can expect from the government during the budget year. However, if more detailed information is needed, this can be found in the financial reports of the individual ministries or departments as well as in the consolidated government reports. This document simplification generally follows the adoption of Performance Budgeting and MTEF as parts of the public financial management reform. However, there are some advanced countries that still withhold flexibility to public managers for fund reallocation due to concerns that this will result in lack of fiscal discipline and overspending. For example, in the United States, the Congress still exercises significant control on the Executive's budget proposal while France has lifted constraints on reallocation of operating expenditures, but not on personnel (Diamond, 2001).

INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE IN IMPLEMENTING THE STATE FINANCE LAW

Before the promulgation of the Law No. 17/2003 in Indonesia there was no effective legal framework in the public financial management system. After the independence in 1945, the government continued to use the Dutch Colonial budgeting system which lacked transparency and accountability. The parliament did not play a significant role in the deliberations of the submitted budget, prepared by the executive government ministries (Sherlock, 2007). When the Asian crisis broke out in 1997 which revealed serious weaknesses in the public financial management especially corruption in the public sector, strong efforts were made to reform the budgeting system. The crisis has brought substantial reform in political and financial conditions in the country including the balance between the executive viz a viz the legislative body. The parliament perceived that the corruption was made possible due to strong power held by the government in the budget preparation process. Therefore, they demanded to have higher authority in the budget process and supervision. After a number of failed attempts, only in 2003, the Law no.17/2003, which regulates the State Finances, was passed, then followed in 2004 by the passing of the State Treasury Law No. 1/2004 and the State Planning Law no. 25/2004. The new state finance law provides, among others, general principles and authorities of the public finance management and arrangements on the budget process including the budgetary role of Parliament.

The new Finance Law emphasizes fiscal accountability to minimize corruption and other form of public money leakages by requiring, among others, that budget appropriations are detailed into activities and kinds of expenditure (goods and services, capital goods, and transfers) for each spending unit. With the strict input control during the examination of budget proposal and detailed appropriation bill, it is expected that government agencies will have greater discipline and less discretion in utilising the budgeted funds, thus reducing possible inefficiencies.

To further improve the management of state finances, in 2004 a Government Regulation No.21 was issued which introduced three new financial schemes: a) Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), b) Integration of routine and development budgets, and c)

Performance-Based Budgeting. The adoption of performance budget and MTEF is expected to further strengthen expenditure control besides improving efficiency and performance of the public agencies. At this time, the government is still implementing a pilot project for a number of ministries, including the Ministry of Finance.

The Role of Parliamentary Committees

As underlined above, the Law 17/03 stresses the importance of input control in the budget documentation as required in article 15 (5): "the state annual budget which is approved by the Parliament is appropriated to the details of unit of organization, function, program, activity and kinds of expenditure". This in turn serves as the basis of deliberations on the proposed budget by the parliamentary committees, which consist of eleven standing committees and are sectorally defined. Each individual committee will scrutinize their counterpart ministry's or government body's work plan and budget (RKA/KL) in great details (Sherlock, 2007; Blöndal, Hawkesworth & Choi, 2009).

Therefore, the main focus of the parliament in the whole budget process is to ensure that each spending unit has a certain amount of expenditure for a specific activity or project for each type of expenditure as proposed in their work plans and budget. In this regard, the members of parliament frequently make changes in the proposed expenditure at specific line items at the activity or project level only at the margin without significant effect in efficiency or effectiveness.

Because the discussions focus more on small and detailed expenditure items rather than a general overview, changes in the ministries' budget generally only occur in the composition not in the aggregate ceilings. In other words, the parliament members are more interested in "particular trees rather than the whole forest." Accordingly, the end result of the parliament committee in the budget scrutiny is an appropriation document as an annex to the Budget Bill detailed into organizational unit, program, activity and type of expenditure for each unit of organization.

After the parliament approves the Budget Bill in a plenary session, usually at the end of October, the President will sign it into law. Although the appropriation document is only an attachment to the Budget Bill, the appropriated line items cannot be changed by the government without a written approval from the parliament. After the signature of president, it will be followed by the final preparation of the budget implementation documents (DIPA) by the ministries and other government bodies. This covers around 130 programs and over 20,000 individual spending units all over Indonesia which will be ratified by the Director General of Treasury, as disbursement warrants (Sherlock, 2007, Blöndal, Hawkesworth & Choi, 2009). Each warrant contains detailed expenditure plans classified into organization, function, sub-function, activity or project and types of expenditure. In this case, changes can only be made within a type of expenditure, not between the expenditure types for each spending unit, though in practice, the organization unit must have an approval from the Director General of Budget for such a budget virement or re-allocation.

It can seen that Indonesian budget is very detailed following the requirement of the Law 17/03 on State Finances. Consequently, the parliament is involved in very detailed scrutiny and discussion of the budget proposal put forward by the government. In this regard, the Indonesian parliament has a much greater and deeper involvement in budget specific details than its counterparts in Victoria, Australia, Thailand, the Philippines as described above, and also the OECD countries (Blöndal, Hawkesworth & Choi, 2009). Much of the time is spent on deliberating micro rather than macro and strategic issues which are much more crucial to attainment of the government programs.

Therefore, the parliament heavy involvement in the budget process is not very productive and contributing little to the budget quality both in terms of overall efficiency and effectiveness (Sherlock, 2005). Due to the rigidities in the budget, the government has little flexibility to optimize the appropriated expenditures in order to achieve the most from the ordinarily minimally available financial resources.

Furthermore, as shown previously, both Performance Budgeting and MTEF require more flexible arrangement on fund reallocation and simple appropriation documentation. The parliament scrutiny which is too heavy in details will make it difficult for the government to implement Performance Budgeting successfully (Blöndal, Hawkesworth & Choi, 2009).

Impact on Corruption

As the consequence of the Law 17/03, the parliament members of the committees are given the duty of detailed scrutiny of the budget and they do it very eagerly. Some observers question their true motive. As several corruption cases involving a number of MPs recently show that in the meetings with their counterpart ministry's officials they have the opportunity to seek personal financial gains by becoming brokers for businessmen interested in government projects. In this regard, they may ask for privileges or special concessions from government officials in contract tenders of government projects for the benefit of their own, not their constituents which they are supposed to represent (Sherlock, 2007; Fitra, 2012).

Therefore, the objective of fighting corruption in the effort to minimize inefficiencies or leakages in public funds will likely to fail. Lately, following the end of the committees' deliberations, the discussion of the budget details is even continued in the Budget Committee (*Badan Anggaran*), considered the most powerful committee. Formerly, one of the regular parliamentary committees, the Budget Committee was made a permanent one in 2009 whereby its members are appointed for 5-year term representing all eleven sectoral committees. However, instead of focusing on more strategic priorities and macro issues, the Budget Committee is involved in discussion of detailed line items which has led to an increasing number of questionable practices. Here decision making is often reached by consensus rather by voting and in closed doors harming transparency and accountability (Sherlock, 2005).

This tendency has led to a number of Anti-Corruption NGOs to bring the case to the Constitution Court to request for dissolvement of the permanent Budget Committee and abolishment of the parliament's authority to scrutinize budget details. They are of the opinion that the parliament's authority in this regard is vulnerable to conflict of interest and has created potentials for corruption. Detailed appropriation items should be determined by the government which will be then ratified as a part of the Budget Act (Beritasatu.com, 14 April 2013, Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2013).

The duration of 2.5 months for deliberation of appropriation bill although may be long enough for other countries, but for Indonesia this period is insufficient due to the great amount of items that the parliament needs to consider. If during the scrutiny, there are some problems with details of certain line items then the individual sectoral committees can ask the Minister of Finance to hold up their disbursement.

As a result, a large part of the appropriation items have to be blocked by the Ministry of Finance because of lack of supportive documents (such as Term of References) or disagreements over some other issues in the proposed activities or projects. This means the budget cannot be liquidated until the required documents are supplied by the concerned ministry's officials and the delayed budget item approved by the parliament. In 2007, for example, the disbursement of about 45% of the total expenditures was delayed. In 2012, 78.5 trillion rupiah of the budget was barred due unfinished deliberation of budget appropriation. For 2011 budget, 6,101 l expenditure line items were blocked amounting to 63.4 trillion rupiah.

Even for the Supplementary Budget the parliament could not finish the appropriation deliberation in time. For example, in 2010 deliberations on the supplementary budget amounting to 1.1 trillion rupiah was behind schedule (Fitra, 2012). The delays in fund disbursement can potentially result in under spending of the governmental ministries and agencies because they tend to spend heavily in the last months of the budget year, especially capital expenditures and purchase of goods and services from the third parties. These 'disbursement holds' open opportunities for some people to lobby parliament members to allow liquidation of the barred funds for certain projects of interest (Fitra, 2012). The concern over the low budget absorption was even expressed by the deputy chief of the Commission XI of the parliament who also proposed for the revision of the Law 17/03 (http://hharryazharazis.com /detail /1044/.cnet).

The new finance law which gives parliament members significant authority in the budget process makes many of them very creative and involved in corruption. Since the period of 2004-2013, 65 MPs have been under investigation by Anti Corruption Commission (KPK) (www.suarapembaharuan.com, 03/10/2013).

The involvement of parliament members in corruption is indicated by the corruption perception index in Indonesia which shows corruption is dominated by them. This perception has persisted continuously for the last 4 years. No other countries show similar indication, according to Deputy Chief of Anti Corruption Commission (www.suarapembaharuan.com, 15/05/13).

To see the development of anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia before after and after the introduction of the Law of State Finances,

Chart 1 below shows the indicator of Control of Corruption of Indonesia for the period of 1998-2011 from three different sources namely, Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide, and World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey.



Source: World Bank Governance Indicators Data Base.

Chart 1. *Indicator of Control of Corruption*

As can be gleaned from the Chart, anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia were seen by all of the three observers to have not improved significantly since 2003 as the result of the enactment of the Law on State Finances.On the contrary, there is a tendency for corruption to increase. This shows the objective of reducing corruption that is the purpose of the Law has not been achieved.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

The Law No. 17/2003 on Indonesian State Finance accords a significant role for the parliament in budget oversight and control. It sets the appropriation bill at a very detailed level which causes significant inflexibility on the part of budget users to manage the available funds in the most effective way. The tight rules for virements or reallocation make them difficult to adjust their budget in accordance with unforeseen problems or developments.

The parliament scrutiny of budget bill leads to prolonged deliberation on appropriation line items. This results in the disbursement blocking of considerable amount of funds for activities or projects for which the discussions cannot be finished in time and therefore not yet approved by the parliament.

The detailed budget scrutiny and blocking of the appropriated funds has open new opportunities for some of parliament members to gain private financial benefits from corruption practices. Therefore, the government objective to reduce leakages in public moneys is not supported.

The focus on controlling the inputs by the parliament also means less attention to performance or outcomes expected from the implementation of the plans or programs financed by the budget. This is not consistent with the government's agenda to fully implement Performance Budgeting and MTEF in the near future.

Recommendation

Due to the negative consequences of the Law No. 17/2003 on State Finances on the Indonesian public financial management , it is recommended that the Law be revised especially the article that requires appropriation items be detailed to the level of activity or project for each unit of organization for each category of spending. The appropriation aggregate should be increased to a higher level such as program level. This will give budget users more flexibility to make fund reallocation or virement within a program. With this revision, it is expected that government plans and programs can be executed more cost effectively while promoting successful implementation of Performance Budget and MTEF systems.

However, on the other hand, the move from ex-ante input control to ex-post accountability should be accompanied by an increase in the parliament's capacity for monitoring of performance and accountability of government ministries and agencies. The change in focus from control to performance or outcome will enable the parliament to free itself from time-consuming budget detail scrutiny and pay more attention to more strategic issues in budget policy at the sectoral level such as poverty reduction program. To make this possible, the capacity of parliament (both People's Representative Assembly and Regional Representative Assembly) should be enhanced to allow them have sufficient knowledge and analysis ability of Performance Budgeting and MTEF by providing the members with appropriate training, expert staff and facility.

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