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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ijbf</journal-id>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>International Journal of Banking and Finance</journal-title>
        <abbrev-journal-title abbrev-type="publisher">IJBF</abbrev-journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
      <issn pub-type="ppub">2811-3799</issn>
      <issn pub-type="epub">2590-423X</issn>
      <publisher><publisher-name>UUM PRESS</publisher-name></publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.32890/ijbf2024.19.1.1</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">15316</article-id>
      <article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A DEA and Tobit Analysis of the Determinants of Cost and Profit Efficiency in the Turkish Banking Sector</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes">
          <name>
            <surname>Diko</surname>
            <given-names>Abdulhakim</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1"/>
          <email>hakim.di@gmail.com</email>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <aff id="aff1"><institution>Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS, Banking Manager</institution>, <country country="TR">Türkiye</country></aff>
      <pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2024-01-31">
        <day>31</day><month>01</month><year>2024</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>19</volume>
      <issue>1</issue>
      <fpage>1</fpage>
      <lpage>38</lpage>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>Copyright &#169; 2024 UUM PRESS</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0">
          <license-p>This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.</license-p>
        </license>
      </permissions>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper aims to determine the factors affecting cost and profit efficiency of commercial banks in Turkey and to examine the ownership effect on cost and profit efficiency in an emerging market. Another aim of the study is to carry out the most recent and longitudinal (2006-2020) analysis of efficiency in the Turkish banking industry. This study uses an intermediation approach with data envelopment analysis (DEA) as its methodology. A total of 23 commercial banks were selected as the study sample and their quarterly data from 2006- 2020 was collected. In addition, an external two-stage DEA model with Tobit regression was applied to examine the determinants of cost and profit efficiency. The results show that Turkish banks currently work with relatively higher cost efficiency than profit efficiency. On the other hand, foreign banks display a lower cost and profit efficiency performance. The downward trend in profit efficiency in the Turkish banking system sends a warning signal on the health and stability of the banking sector. Multivariate Tobit regression analysis reveals how Total Assets, Deposit Share, Asset Growth, Time Deposits, NPL, and Ownership Structure significantly affect cost and profit efficiency. Ratio of liquid assets to total assets is positively correlated with the efficiency values, in contrast to results from previous studies. Previous studies have mostly been limited to scale and technical efficiency and focused on the cost efficiency of Turkish banks. In this study, the gap in the literature is filled by a comparative examination of the cost and profit efficiency at the scale of bank ownership. The study will look at and discussed these issues at the most stable period and the pre-pandemic period in the Turkish economy.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group kwd-group-type="author">
        <kwd>Efficiency</kwd>
        <kwd>data envelopment analysis</kwd>
        <kwd>Tobit regression</kwd>
        <kwd>two-stage DEA</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>As elsewhere in the world, the banking sector is a vital part of the financial system in Turkey. In the Turkish economy, the banking sector’s total assets realized was USD 823 Billion, and the ratio of total assets to GDP was around 115 percent in 2020. In addition, the loan volume of the banking sector was USD 482 billion, and the percentage of loans to GDP was 74 percent in the same year. These figures underscore the significance of the banking sector in the Turkish economy.</p>
      <sec id="sec1-1">
        <title>Structural arrangements in Turkish banking have emerged due</title>
        <p>to the financial liberalization and domestic and foreign financial crises experienced after the 1980s. Among them, the November 2000 and February 2001 crises in Turkey arose directly from the banking system and affected the entire economy. The Weak equity structure of the banking system, faulty asset components, and bad management decisions resulted in the spread of the crisis throughout the economy. To protect the banking system from the occurrence of similar problems, central regulation and supervision activities in the banking system were increased between 2001 and 2005. As a result, the banking system gained a healthy appearance in the following years, profitability and efficiency values ​​increased, and foreign capital inflows increased between 2003 and 2011. Compared to other developed and developing countries, the effect of the 2009 mortgage crisis on Turkish banking was limited, and it did not cause structural problems, except the temporary loan crunch. This situation is a positive result of the 2001 and 2005 banking regulations. Fifty-four banks were in operation in the banking sector as of 2020 (See Table 1). The share of foreign banks in the industry increased from 45 percent to 62 percent between 2006 and 2020 as foreign investment inflows increased with the structural arrangements made after 2002. The share of loans in state banks increased from 23 percent to 45 percent in 2020 compared to 2006. In the same period, the share of total assets in private banks decreased from 57 percent to 33 percent. It is seen that state banks have increased their claims, especially in loans in recent years, while foreign banks have rapidly increased in numbers. As can be seen in Table 1, deposit banks represented almost 90 percent of the total banking system. For this reason, the research is focused only on deposit banks. In recent years, structural and capital-based changes in the banking system have made it necessary to investigate the capital structure and the related technologies and diversification effects in efficiency analysis.</p>
        <table-wrap id="tbl1">
          <label>Table 1</label>
          <caption><title>Structure of Turkish Banking Sector</title></caption>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">Number of</th>
                <th colspan="2">Assets</th>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">Deposits</th>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">Loans</th>
                <th></th>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <th></th>
                <th>Banks</th>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">(Billion TL)</th>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">(Billion TL)</th>
                <th></th>
                <th colspan="2">(Billion TL)</th>
                <th></th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td></td>
                <td>2006</td>
                <td>2020</td>
                <td>2006</td>
                <td>2020</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>2006</td>
                <td>2020</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>2006</td>
                <td>2020</td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Deposit</td>
                <td>33</td>
                <td>34</td>
                <td>470</td>
                <td>5,276</td>
                <td>86%</td>
                <td>313</td>
                <td>3,308</td>
                <td>91%</td>
                <td>208</td>
                <td>3,323</td>
                <td>86%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Banks</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>State-owned</td>
                <td>3</td>
                <td>3</td>
                <td>143</td>
                <td>2,321</td>
                <td>38%</td>
                <td>112</td>
                <td>1,501</td>
                <td>41%</td>
                <td>47</td>
                <td>1,489</td>
                <td>39%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Deposit Banks</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Privately-</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>owned Deposit</td>
                <td>14</td>
                <td>8</td>
                <td>266</td>
                <td>1,732</td>
                <td>28%</td>
                <td>164</td>
                <td>1,051</td>
                <td>29%</td>
                <td>128</td>
                <td>1,056</td>
                <td>27%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Banks</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Foreign Banks</td>
                <td>15</td>
                <td>21</td>
                <td>59</td>
                <td>1,220</td>
                <td>20%</td>
                <td>37</td>
                <td>755</td>
                <td>21%</td>
                <td>33</td>
                <td>776</td>
                <td>20%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Banks Under</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>the Deposit</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>2</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>3</td>
                <td>0%</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>0%</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>2</td>
                <td>0%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Insurance Fund</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Development and</td>
                <td>13</td>
                <td>14</td>
                <td>15</td>
                <td>387</td>
                <td>6%</td>
                <td>-</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>0%</td>
                <td>10</td>
                <td>284</td>
                <td>7%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Investment Banks</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Participation</td>
                <td>4</td>
                <td>6</td>
                <td>14</td>
                <td>437</td>
                <td>8%</td>
                <td>11</td>
                <td>322</td>
                <td>9%</td>
                <td>10</td>
                <td>240</td>
                <td>7%</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Banks</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Total</td>
                <td>50 Source. The Banks Association of Turkey</td>
                <td>54</td>
                <td>499</td>
                <td>6,100</td>
                <td>100%</td>
                <td>324</td>
                <td>3,630</td>
                <td>100%</td>
                <td>228</td>
                <td>3,847</td>
                <td>100%</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
        <p>In recent times, the banking sector has experienced technological developments, intense competition caused by acquisitions and mergers brought about by financial liberalization, consumer rights, and structural regulations of regulatory institutions. These developments have reduced bank revenues, and in turn put the profitability of banks under pressure. As a result, there has been an increase in research on determining efficiency. In the first part of the present study, the efficiency values ​​of 23 commercial banks from the Turkish banking sector were determined using their quarterly financial data between 2006 and 2020. First, the DEA method determines the cost and profit efficiency (CPE) values ​​according to the intermediation approach. Then, R Project, a free mathematical software program, calculates the efficiency values. In the second part of the study, Tobit regression analysis was carried out to detect the determinants of efficiency values.</p>
        <p>Efficiency in the Turkish banking sector, as one of the top 20 economies of the world, is a critical area of research. The present study is unique in that it analyzes both cost and profit efficiency separately, using the Tobit method, which is rarely used in studies of Turkish banking. The effect of bank ownership on cost and profit efficiency has been examined with data that are more recent, making this study relevant to today’s dynamic banking environment.</p>
        <p>The study spans the period of 2006-2020, which is the most recent and comprehensive period examined to date. No other studies thus far have looked at such a wide range of variables together in the Turkish banking sector, making this research a valuable contribution to the literature. The DEA method was used to analyze the cost and profit efficiency of 23 commercial banks in order to provide insights into the structural and capital-based changes in the banking system and their impact on efficiency.</p>
        <p>The present study is also notable for its thorough analysis of the determinants of efficiency, including recent technological developments, intense competition, consumer rights, and structural regulations, which are all crucial factors to consider in determining bank efficiency. Such an analysis is of great importance for policy makers, regulators, and practitioners to enable them to make informed decisions about improving the overall efficiency and stability of the banking sector in Turkey. Overall, this research fills a significant gap in the literature by providing the most recent and comprehensive analysis of the efficiency of the Turkish banking sector, making it a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike.</p>
        <p>The paper on the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of efficiency studies on banking. In section three, the description of a conceptual framework for measuring cost and profit efficiency is introduced. In section four, data and variables are described, and hypotheses on determinants of CPE presented. The empirical findings are discussed in section five. Section six discusses the results, and finally, in the concluding section, policy implications are highlighted.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec2">
      <title>LITERATURE REVIEW</title>
      <p>In studies about the banking sector in developing countries, they have always been attempts about determining the effects of market structure, concentration, competition, financial liberalization, mergers and acquisitions and the internal factors on the efficiency figures. One of the first researches in developing countries is that by Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), study on the Indian banking sector. In that study, the production activities of 70 commercial banks were analyzed during the financial liberalization term. The results showed that state banks had the highest efficiency values (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997). Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002) studied efficiency analysis on the production performance and cost structure of the Singapore banking sector. They showed that there were scale economies in the sector and that the cost inefficiency was caused equally by allocative and technical inefficiency. Another study from India analyzed the effects of liberalization on the CPE in India. The study showed that the decrease in profit efficiency (PE) was due to allocation ineffectiveness. High cost efficiency (CE) and low-PE were indicators of income inefficiency in banking activities. According to the study, bank size, ownership, product variety and positive economic indicators were significant variables that influenced efficiency values (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009).</p>
      <p>The study on banks in Latin America compared foreign and domestic banks in terms of the CPE. These studies, conducted in 16 countries and 427 banks, showed that environmental factors were at the forefront concerning efficiency differences between states, and the most critical ineffectiveness was income-related (Kasman et al., 2005). Another research approach analyzed liberalization effects on bank efficiency values in Southeast Asian countries. The results revealed a positive relationship between a high liquidity ratio and high-efficiency values and that the efficiency of public and family holding banks was lower than private ones (Williams &amp; Nguyen, 2005). The effect of privatization and foreign ownership on efficiency values in Chinese banks has also been determined. It was found that foreign banks had the highest efficiency values in China (Berger et al., 2009). Kocisova (2014) analyzed the cost, income, and profit efficiencies of Czech and Slovak commercial banks between 2009- 2013 by using the DEA method. According to the results, the Czech and Slovak banks were more efficient in terms of income than cost and profit efficiencies. Sufian et al. (2016) found that domestic banks showed higher efficiency values ​​than foreign banks in their studies on the Malaysian banking sector. However, contrary to most of the findings in the literature, their study revealed that capital market movements negatively affected the technical efficiency of the banking system.</p>
      <p>The first significant work on efficiency analysis in the Turkish banking sector was the work of Zaim in 1995. In the study, the technical and allocative efficiencies of banks between 1981 and 1990 were calculated using the DEA method, and the effects of liberalization on efficiency values were examined. The findings showed that the reforms influenced technical and allocative efficiency, and the state banks worked more effectively than private banks (Zaim, 1995). Following Zaim (1995), there were other studies by Yolalan, (1996), Yildirim (1999), Cevdet et al. (2007). Jackson and Fethi (2000), Işik and Hassan (2002), and Demir et al. (2005) on the efficiency of Turkish banks by focusing on financial liberalization, ownership, and scale efficiency. According to the results, the effect of liberalization on the sector was limited, and scale inefficiency existed in the sector (Yildirim, 1999). There was however, a positive relationship between bank size and the CPE (Jackson &amp; Fethi, 2000). Competition in the credit and deposit market was below the optimal competition. The oligopolistic structure of the sector had decreased efficiency (Işik &amp; Hassan, 2002).</p>
      <p>Studies on the Turkish banking industry mainly focused on the cost side of efficiency; however, findings showed that profit efficiency remained limited. One of the few researchers on profit efficiency was the study by Isik and Hassan (2002). They found that Turkish banks were highly profit efficient, and the link between cost and profit efficiency was shallow. This revealed that high-profit efficiency did not require high-cost efficiency in the industry. Gunalp and Celik (2004) investigated the relationship between efficiency and competition in the Turkish banking industry between 1990 and 2000. By using the Stochastic Boundary approach, they found a positive correlation between efficiency values and profitability. Abbasoglu et al. (2007) also analyzed the efficiency values of the Turkish banking industry between 2001 and 2005, using the stochastic boundary approach. According to the study results, it was concluded that the concentration in the sector increased, the level of competition followed a fluctuating course, and the sector displayed a monopolistic competitive market structure. Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) analyzed the changes in the efficiency levels of the banking industry during the two crisis periods which occured in Turkey between 1991 and 2007. Unlike the other studies, the “two-stage network model” was used, and the efficiency values ​​were determined only by the VRS method. Yilmaz (2013) conducted a one stage efficiency analysis of the Turkish banking industry between 2007 and 2010 using the DEA method. According to the results, it was determined that domestic banks were more efficient than foreign banks and that the 2009 global crisis harmed efficiency scores. Gunes and Yildirim (2016) concluded that the Turkish banking industry, which has close relations with European countries, was not adversely affected by the 2010 European banking crisis and 2008 financial global crisis. Furthermore, it was observed that the cost efficiencies of Turkish banks did not decrease during these two crises. In the study by Batir et al. (2017), it was seen that based on the data collected between 2005-2013, participation banks had a higher efficiency value than traditional banks. Partovi and Matausek (2019) analyzed the efficiency values in the Turkish banking system through the effect of the NPL. This study showed results supporting the “bad management” hypothesis and revealed that the efficiency values of banks differ according to the capital structure. One of the most recent Turkish banking system studies has been the work by Ozbey and Akan (2021). The study which covered the 2000-2018 period determined that the most efficient banks were private banks, and the effect of personnel expenses on efficiency values was high (Ozbey &amp; Akan, 2021).</p>
      <p>This study makes important contributions to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it differs from previous researches in the Turkish banking industry by analyzing the profit efficiency, which has been rarely studied in recent years. While previous studies (Günalp &amp; Çelik; 2004, Abbasoglu et al., 2007; Fukuyama &amp; Matousek; 2011, Gunes &amp; Yildirim; 2016, Batir et al., 2017; Partovi &amp; Matausek, 2019; Ozbey &amp; Akan; 2021) mainly focused on cost efficiency, this study calculates both cost and profit efficiency separately for commercial banks operating in the Turkish banking system. This comprehensive analysis provides insights into the structural and capital-based changes in the banking system and their impact on efficiency.</p>
      <p>Secondly, the study uses both variable returns to scale (VRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS) methods to calculate efficiency values. As each method has its strengths, this approach helps to determine which method is more appropriate to calculate efficiency in the Turkish banking system. Thirdly, the study aims to determine the effect of bank ownership on efficiency values. As Turkey is considered one of the developing economies, it is crucial to understand the efficiency differences between private foreign banks and public banks in the country. The study by Ozbey and Akan (2021) filled a gap in the literature by providing recent data on this aspect. Fourthly, the study included the diversification effect of technological developments, which has been much neglected in previous studies (Günalp &amp; Çelik, 2004; Abbasoglu et al., 2007; Gunes &amp; Yildirim, 2016; Partovi &amp; Matausek, 2019; Ozbey &amp; Akan, 2021). The analysis included the types of activities that were becoming increasingly important in providing non-interest incomes in banking, and it had been able to determine the effect of diversification on profit efficiency. Finally, this research provides the most recent and longest-term (2006-2020) analysis of efficiency in the Turkish banking system. The study’s findings offer insights into the impact of recent technological developments, intense competition, consumer rights, and structural regulations on the efficiency of banks. The results could be useful for policymakers, regulators, and practitioners to understand the current state of the banking sector in Turkey and help them make informed decisions to improve its overall efficiency and stability.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec3">
      <title>METHODOLOGY</title>
      <p>The efficiency of a unit is obtained by comparing the realized inputs and outputs of the unit with the optimum inputs and outputs. Efficiency is divided into technical and allocative efficiency (Farrell, 1957). Technical efficiency refers to a unit’s capability to get the most significant number of outputs from inputs. However, allocative efficiency refers to the unit’s ability to use inputs optimally according to their prices. Efficiency measures developed over a period of time are primarily split into two parts, namely non-parametric and parametric methods. The most basic non-parametric method is the DEA. The analysis is widely used in the banking sector to compare the efficiency performances of numerous banks, or to estimate the efficiencies between particular bank units. DEA studies are based on Farell’s linear convex hull approach in estimating the efficiency line. It is developed and applied to multiple inputs and outputs (Charnes et al., 1978).</p>
      <p>In all DEA models, due to the nature of the efficiency measurement, the transformation of inputs (X1, X2, ….XN) to outputs (Y1,Y2,….YN) is defined, and then the economic decision making units (DMUs) are ranked from the most efficient to the most inefficient. For this purpose, the efficiency value is applied to the entire data set through a virtual efficiency frontier. The virtual efficiency value is estimated by the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. When the efficiency frontier is estimated, all data points are folded in a convex hull. The efficiency of the DMU which is above the efficiency frontier is evaluated as efficient, and the one below is evaluated as inefficient. The essential feature that distinguishes the DEA from other methods is that it does not require a mathematical or statistical form of production. Moreover, in contrast to parametric methods, since no production function is predicted in the model, false results are also eliminated due to the incorrect estimation of the production function.</p>
      <sec id="sec3-1">
        <title>Cost and Profit Efficiency</title>
        <p>The CE measures the change in cost variables when compared to the estimated cost to obtain the production output set of the best- performing bank. Considering only the costs in evaluating efficiency is insufficient to get an idea about the entire performance of the bank. Although a bank is cost-efficient in output, it may need to be more efficient in income or profitability. The PE occurs once banks demand higher prices for higher quality serving when costs are controlled. Each k firm in the industry produces n outputs using m inputs. For firm k, the inputs are represented by the vector m and the outputs by the vector n. The set of (x, y) is formed as a result of the production or technology process, which is summarized as obtaining outputs from inputs. Mechanical, technical, and social elements in the production process set the “technology”. The technology or production possibilities XN) to outputs (Y1,Y2,….Y setN)(PPS) is not precisely known in actual practice, but is estimated from a set of observations. The technology or PPS of a firm can be defined as Equation 1 below (Bagetoft &amp; Otto, 2011):</p>
        <preformat> X2, ….XN) to outputs (Y1,YT2,….Y   = { (xNk) , yk ∈ 𝑅𝑅+𝑚𝑚 x 𝑅𝑅+𝑛𝑛 │ x produces y }                                               (1) (1)
….XN) to outputs (Y1,Y2,….YN)
               The first of the assumptions used in estimating the PPS is the free
               disposability assumption. Thek overused                                   input        can be freely disposed
               of if a firm uses 𝐾𝐾 more      T=      { (x than
                                                  input         𝐾𝐾, y ∈
                                                                       k
                                                                             𝑅𝑅+𝑚𝑚 xto
                                                                          usual          𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅get𝑛𝑛
                                                                                               + │a xstandard
                                                                                                           producesnumbery}        of         (1)
                                                  k       k          𝑚𝑚          𝑛𝑛
….XN) to outputs
          𝑇𝑇 =outputs.
                {ሺ𝑥𝑥,(Y
                      𝑦𝑦ሻ: 𝜒𝜒2,….Y
                               ≥෍              (x; 𝑦𝑦, y≤
                                   TN)𝜆𝜆=if{𝑥𝑥fewer
                                               𝑘𝑘            ∈෍   𝑅𝑅+𝜆𝜆 xare 𝑅𝑅 ; ෍
                                                                               𝑘𝑘       │ x𝜆𝜆produces    1; 𝜆𝜆a𝑘𝑘ycertain
                                                                                                                   ≥} 0; number (1)
                        1,YLikewise,     𝑘𝑘               outputs        𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦 +obtained           𝑘𝑘 =with
               of inputs, less𝑘𝑘=1output can be               𝑘𝑘=1  freely disposed    𝑘𝑘=1             of. This assumption
               is called the free-disposable                       hull      (FDH).               The     second assumption
 2, ….XN) to outputs (Y1,Y2,….YN)
                                               𝐾𝐾                              𝐾𝐾                      𝐾𝐾
               regarding the technology
                                    𝐾𝐾 ≥ ෍k𝜆𝜆 𝑥𝑥           set
                                                             𝑘𝑘 is  𝐾𝐾 𝑚𝑚convexity.         𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘 Accordingly,        since the
                   𝑇𝑇 = {ሺ𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦ሻ: 𝜒𝜒                         ∈; 𝑅𝑅
                                                      ,𝑘𝑘ykpoints   𝑦𝑦   ≤x෍   𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘+𝑛𝑛in𝜆𝜆│         ; ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 =y 1;
                                                                                               x produces            } 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘set,
                                                                                                                             ≥ 0;
               PPS is convex, Tif =any      { (x𝑘𝑘two                 + are
                                                                                          𝑘𝑘the      T technology               their (1)
            𝑇𝑇 = {ሺ𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦ሻ: 𝜒𝜒 ≥ ሺ𝑘𝑘
                                  ෍=𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘1,2,   𝑥𝑥 ;. 𝑦𝑦     ≤. . ,෍      𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1
                                                                              𝑦𝑦 ; ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1           = 1; 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0;
               weights or their weighted sums are also in the T technology set (Färe (2)
                                             𝑘𝑘=1      . . .       𝐾𝐾ሻ}
                                  𝑘𝑘=1                           𝑘𝑘=1                     𝑘𝑘=1
               &amp; Primont,1995). T = { (xk , yk ∈ 𝑅𝑅 𝑚𝑚 x 𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛 │ x produces y }                                                           (1)
                                                                          +              +
                                               𝐾𝐾                          𝐾𝐾                    𝐾𝐾
                      The smallest PPS that ሺ𝑘𝑘meets =    the .convexity            and free disposability is as                             (2)
                   𝑇𝑇 expressed
                      = {ሺ𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦ሻ:in
                                   𝜒𝜒 Equation       ; 𝑦𝑦1,2,
                                      ≥ ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥2𝑘𝑘below.≤෍     . . .𝜆𝜆. . 𝑦𝑦
                                                                         𝑘𝑘
                                                                            , 𝐾𝐾ሻ}
                                                                               𝑘𝑘
                                                                                  ; ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 = 1; 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0;
                                        ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ}                                                               (2)
                                              𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾                      𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾             𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾
                                                                𝑘𝑘                          𝑘𝑘
                       𝑇𝑇 = {ሺ𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦ሻ: 𝜒𝜒 ≥ ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 ; 𝑦𝑦 ≤ ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦 ; ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 = 1; 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0;
   y ).                                             𝑘𝑘=1                     𝑘𝑘=1                 𝑘𝑘=1                      (2)
                                 ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ}                                       (2)
  wʹx0 .                        C (w, y0 ) = min wʹx : ( x,y0 ) ∈ T.                               (3)
             Suppose w is the input price vector of a firm with an input-output set
                                    ሺ𝑘𝑘 the
             (x0 , y0). In this case,    = 1,2,  . . . . . cost
                                             current       . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ}is C0 = wʹx0 . The min. cost of     (2)
             producing the targeted output is as follows in Equation 3:
  x (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009).                  C (w, y0 ) = min wʹx : ( x,y0 ) ∈ T.                             (3)
                                            0                             0
                                  C  (w,  y   ) =  min      wʹx   : ( x,y   ) ∈ T.             (3)  (3)
    ).                                𝐾𝐾</preformat>
        <preformat>   0           Based on the estimated
                                    ෍ set𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦of𝑘𝑘 production
                                                     ≥ 𝑦𝑦 0 ;   possibilities T, the minimum
  xmin
     . wʹx (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009).
               cost is obtained as C*  =
                                    𝑘𝑘=1  min       wʹx (Das  &amp; Ghosh,  2009).
 wʹx (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009).                    0                     0
                                   C (w, y ) = min wʹx : ( x,y ) ∈ T.                                                                (3)
                                                        𝐾𝐾           𝐾𝐾
                                                         𝐾𝐾    ෍ 𝑘𝑘 𝜆𝜆 𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑦 0 ;
                                                       ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 0 ≤𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥;               0
                                                        C  (w, y
                                                               𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘) =≥min
                                                        ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1         0 wʹx : ( x,y ) ∈ T.
                                                                        𝑦𝑦
                                                                            ;                                                          (3)
                                                       𝑘𝑘=1
  wʹx (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009).                             𝑘𝑘=1
                                                                     𝐾𝐾
                                                          𝐾𝐾</preformat>
        <p>෍ 𝐾𝐾 𝐾𝐾 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘෍ = 1; 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑥; min wʹx (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009). ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1 𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑥;0 ෍ 𝑘𝑘=1 𝜆𝜆 𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦 ≥ 𝑦𝑦 ; 𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾 𝑘𝑘=1 𝐾𝐾 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0; ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ𝑘𝑘 (4) 10 ෍ 𝐾𝐾 𝜆𝜆෍ 𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦 𝜆𝜆≥ = 𝑦𝑦 01; ; 𝐾𝐾 𝑘𝑘 ෍ ෍ 𝑘𝑘=1𝜆𝜆 = 1; 𝑘𝑘 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥; 𝑘𝑘=1𝐾𝐾 𝑘𝑘=1 𝑘𝑘=1</p>
        <p>𝐾𝐾 𝑘𝑘 Number 1 (January) 2024, pp: 1–38 ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑥; 𝑘𝑘=1</p>
        <p>In this case, the firm’s CE is measured as 𝛾𝛾 = 𝐶𝐶 ∗ /𝐶𝐶 0 ≤ 1. 𝛱𝛱ʹ* = m 𝛱𝛱 = maks p y - w *</p>
        <preformat>     𝛾𝛾 = 𝐶𝐶 ∗ /𝐶𝐶 0 ≤In1.order to measure the CE, outputs are considered exogenous data.
                      Therefore, there is a restraint on the applicability of the chosen set.                                          s.t.
                      In such a case, profitability provides a more appropriate criterion for                                                 𝐾𝐾
                      efficiency measurement. Profit             maximization   ʹ           ʹ
                                                                                                under DEA is obtained      𝐾𝐾
                      as follows in Equation (5) (Ray,  𝛱𝛱 = maks
                                                           *
                                                                    2004).p y - w x                                                         ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘
                                                      𝛱𝛱* = maks pʹ ʹy - wʹ ʹx                                           ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘 ≥𝑘𝑘=1    𝑦𝑦;
                                                     𝛱𝛱* = makss.t.         py - wx                                      𝑘𝑘=1
                                                                                                                                              𝐾𝐾
                                                                       s.t.
                                                                                                                           𝐾𝐾
                                                           𝐾𝐾        s.t.                                                                   ෍ 𝜆𝜆
                                                         𝐾𝐾
                                                         ෍       𝜆𝜆    𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘
                                                                             ≥    𝑦𝑦;                                    ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 𝑘𝑘 ≤𝑘𝑘=1    𝑥𝑥;
                                                        𝐾𝐾          𝑘𝑘
                                                                        𝑘𝑘
                                                       ෍ 𝑘𝑘=1𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑦;
                                                                                                                         𝑘𝑘=1
                                                      ෍𝑘𝑘=1
                                                              𝜆𝜆 𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦     ≥   𝑦𝑦;                                                                𝐾𝐾
                                                                                                                              𝐾𝐾
                                                      𝑘𝑘=1 𝐾𝐾                                                                                  ෍
                                                         𝐾𝐾
                                                         ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑥;  𝑘𝑘                                                ෍      𝜆𝜆 𝑘𝑘 =   1;𝑘𝑘=1
                                                        𝐾𝐾              𝑘𝑘
                                                       ෍ 𝑘𝑘=1𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑥;
                                                                                                                            𝑘𝑘=1
                                                      ෍𝑘𝑘=1 𝑘𝑘
                                                              𝜆𝜆 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑥;                                                         𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0;𝜆𝜆ሺ𝑘𝑘   𝑘𝑘 ≥
                                                      𝑘𝑘=1    𝐾𝐾                                                 𝜆𝜆 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0;   ሺ𝑘𝑘   =    1,2,   . . ..
                                                            𝐾𝐾
                                                            ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 = 1;                                                where,    where,
                                                          ෍
                                                           𝐾𝐾
                                                                  𝜆𝜆     =   1;                         where,
                                                            𝑘𝑘=1 𝑘𝑘
                                                         ෍𝑘𝑘=1 𝑘𝑘
                                                                 𝜆𝜆 = 1;                                                 (5) p = the pve=
                                     where, 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝑘𝑘=1  0; ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ                              p = the vector of(5)          out
                                             𝜆𝜆p𝑘𝑘=≥the     ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2,
                                                       0; vector           of output prices.
                                                                                . . . . . ,  𝐾𝐾ሻ                                             (5)
                                     where,𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0; ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ                                                             (5)
                                                                                              0     ∗
                      A firm’s PE where,                                     0𝛿𝛿   =  ∗ 𝛱𝛱
                                      is measured as 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛱𝛱 /𝛱𝛱 . This measure is limited      /𝛱𝛱   .
                                    where,             0       ∗
                      between 0 and         𝛿𝛿 =pwhen
                                       1, except    𝛱𝛱
                                                     = the        .
                                                          /𝛱𝛱realized
                                                                vector        ofprofit
                                                                                   output     is minus
                                                                                                  prices.and max. profit
                      is greater than zero. In these
                                                 p = the  cases,
                                                               𝛿𝛿 theof𝛿𝛿 output
                                                              vector              value isprices. negative. When max.
                      profit is also minus, 𝛿𝛿 ptranscends
                                                   = the vector      1. of output prices.
                                                                 𝛿𝛿 transcends 𝛿𝛿 transcends 1.         1.
 = 𝛱𝛱 /𝛱𝛱 . ∗         Data   and  Analysis   𝛿𝛿  transcends            1.
= 𝛱𝛱0 /𝛱𝛱∗.
= 𝛱𝛱0 /𝛱𝛱∗.           In the DEA, the data set must be homogeneous so that the efficiency
                      values ​​can be appropriately determined. It can be said that the data                                               𝑦𝑦0∗ =
                      set is homogeneous if the banks in the data have the same inputs                                  𝑦𝑦 ∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 +            𝜀𝜀0
  transcends 1.                                                                                                           0              0
                      and  outputs,  have  similar     goals,        perform           similar        tasks, and  respond
 transcends 1.
                      similarly to external factors (Golany &amp; Roll, 1989). For this 𝑦𝑦                           purpose,         𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗0 ,
 ranscends 1.
                                                                                                                      0= 𝑦𝑦∗ , If0 𝑦𝑦∗ &gt;0 0
                                                                                                                                  0        0
                                                                                                                              11 y = 0, y𝜀𝜀0 =~
                                                                                                                                  0         0
                                                                 𝑦𝑦0∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥0 + 𝜀𝜀0                                 y0 = 0, 𝜀𝜀0 ~𝑁𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎𝜎    2
                                                                𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥0 + 𝜀𝜀0
                                                               𝑦𝑦∗0 = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀</preformat>
        <p>the banks in the study were selected from deposit banks with the same inputs and outputs. At the end of 2020, deposit banks constituted 91 percent of total deposits, 87 percent of total assets, and 86 percent of total loans. Thus, the analysis also reflects the entire banking sector. In the present study, quarterly data between 2006 and 2020 of 23 deposit banks in Turkey were taken as a basis. Of the 23 banks, three were publicly owned, nine were privately owned, and 11 were foreign banks. In this study, banks were analyzed according to their ownership structures. The data were obtained from statistical and financial reports posted in The Banks Association of Turkey (BAT)’s website. All banks included in the survey consisted of commercial and deposit- accepting banks. Before starting the DEA, it is of great importance to note that the inputs and outputs to be selected will depend on which application model that will be used. In selecting inputs and outputs, the intermediary approach is used as it allows bank profitability to be seen more clearly.</p>
        <p>According to the intermediation approach, financial institutions act as intermediaries between depositors who provide funds and investors who demand funds (Sealey &amp; Lindley, 1977). While institutions fulfill this intermediary function, using personnel costs, capital, non-interest expenses, total deposits, and issued securities as inputs, they obtain outputs such as deposits, loans, securities, investments, non-interest incomes, fees, and commissions from other banks. In developing countries, the intermediation approach is mainly used to determine the efficiency of financial institutions (Williams &amp; Nguyen, 2005; Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009; Hermes &amp; Nhung, 2010; Işik &amp; Hassan, 2002; Jackson &amp; Fethi, 2000).</p>
        <p>The analysis uses three inputs, three outputs, three inputs, and three output prices. Inputs are Deposits, Personnel, and Tangible Assets. Non-interest Incomes, Interest bearing assets, and Loans &amp; Receivables are used on the output side. Based on the mediation method in determining the inputs and outputs, the most significant and stable variables were preferred among the variables frequently used in the studies of developing countries, as was the case in Turkey. The following studies by Denizer et al. (2000), Ertugrul and Zaim (1996), Isik and Hassan (2002), Eleren and Ozgur (2006), Das and Ghosh (2009), Matousek et al. (2016), Sufian and Kamarudin (2016), Fukuyama and Matousek (2016), and Batir et al. (2017) used similar input and output variables. The data were adjusted for the effect of inflation by using the Consumer Price Index. Description of inputs, outputs, input prices and output prices and are as presented in Table 2.</p>
        <table-wrap id="tbl2">
          <label>Table 2</label>
          <caption><title>Description of Input and Output Variables in DEA</title></caption>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th colspan="2">Input</th>
                <th>Description</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td></td>
                <td>XD Deposits (Mio TL) XP Personnel XA Tangible Assets (Mio TL) Input Prices WD Price of Deposit WP Price of Personnel WA Price of Tangible Assets Output Y1 Non-Interest Incomes (Mio TL)</td>
                <td>Total Deposits Number of Employees Total Tangible Assets (Net) Average interest expense paid per one unit deposit Personnel expense per one personnel. Share of general administrative expenses (excluding the personnel expenses) for tangible fixed assets. The total of Net Fees and Commissions Income</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Y2</td>
                <td>Interest Bearing Assets (Mio TL) Total of “Banks, Money Market</td>
                <td>Securities, Financial Assets For Sale and Investments Held to Maturity (Net)”</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Y3</td>
                <td>Loans and Receivables (Mio TL) Sum of Loans and Receivables Output Prices</td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P1</td>
                <td>Price of Non-Interest Income</td>
                <td>It is taken as 1 in all periods.</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P2</td>
                <td>Price of Interest-Bearing Assets P3 Price of Loan and Receivabl</td>
                <td>It is one unit interest yield obtained from investments. It is one unit interest income obtained from Loans and Receivables</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
        <p>The summary statistics of inputs, outputs, input prices and output prices are as presented in Table 3. A second issue that needs to be decided before starting the analysis is the variability according to the scale. In CRS models, the efficiency frontier is always below that of the VRS, so the efficiency value according to the CRS is less than or equal to the efficiency value according to the VRS (Hollingsworth &amp; Smith, 2003). Both CRS and VRS models are used for the CE measurement. In the measurement of profit, the VRS model is used. This is because of the very low and high variance values determined by the CRS.</p>
        <table-wrap id="tbl3">
          <label>Table 3</label>
          <caption><title>Summary Statistics of Inputs, Outputs, Input Prices and Output Prices</title></caption>
          <table>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td></td>
                <td>Number of Observations Input</td>
                <td>2006 23</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>2007 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>2008 92</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>2009 92</td>
                <td>Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev</td>
                <td>2010 92</td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XD</td>
                <td>Deposits (Mio TL)</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>9,976 12,454 10,244 12,840 11,526</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>14,163</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>12,510 15,871 13,660</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>17,574</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XP</td>
                <td>Personnel</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>5,803 6,025 6,127 6,135 6,800</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>6,597</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>6,958 6,925 7,201</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>7,246</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XA</td>
                <td>Tangible assets (Mio TL) Input Price</td>
                <td>250</td>
                <td>346</td>
                <td>241</td>
                <td>331</td>
                <td>245</td>
                <td>314</td>
                <td>245</td>
                <td>309</td>
                <td>231</td>
                <td>287</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>WD</td>
                <td>Price of Deposit</td>
                <td>0.08</td>
                <td>0.02</td>
                <td>0.06</td>
                <td>0.03</td>
                <td>0.06</td>
                <td>0.03</td>
                <td>0.04</td>
                <td>0.02 0.03</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>0.02</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>WP</td>
                <td>Price of Personnel</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>36,342 13,511 27,701 33,487 25,274</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>17,366</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>25,203 16,674 24,577</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>16,019</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>WA</td>
                <td>Price of Tangible Assets Price Output 2.28</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>2.26</td>
                <td>1.26</td>
                <td>1.47</td>
                <td>1.14</td>
                <td>1.09</td>
                <td>1.39</td>
                <td>1.81 2.59</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>5.41</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Y1</td>
                <td>Non-Interest Incomes (Mio TL)</td>
                <td>241</td>
                <td>316</td>
                <td>166</td>
                <td>243</td>
                <td>171</td>
                <td>251</td>
                <td>174</td>
                <td>256</td>
                <td>167</td>
                <td>246</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Y2</td>
                <td>Interest Bearing Assets (Mio TL)</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>5,891 8,663 5,803 8,835 5,895</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>8,945</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>7,401 11,265 7,734</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>11,744</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Y3</td>
                <td>Loans And Receivables (Mio TL) Output Price</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>6,597 7,382 7,317 8,121 9,072</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td>10,013</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>9,135 10,183 10,398</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>11,636</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P1</td>
                <td>Price of Non-Interest Income</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P2</td>
                <td>Price of Interest-Bearing Assets</td>
                <td>0.15</td>
                <td>0.10</td>
                <td>0.20</td>
                <td>0.54</td>
                <td>0.11</td>
                <td>0.12</td>
                <td>0.09</td>
                <td>0.14 0.05</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>0.02</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P3</td>
                <td>Price of Loan and Receivables Number of Observations Input</td>
                <td>0.13 2011 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.02</td>
                <td>0.09</td>
                <td>0.04 2012 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.09</td>
                <td>0.05 2013 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.09</td>
                <td>0.04 0.06 2014 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>0.03 (continued) 2015 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XD</td>
                <td>Deposits (Mio TL)</td>
                <td>15,207</td>
                <td>18,548</td>
                <td>15,359</td>
                <td>17,665</td>
                <td>16,725</td>
                <td>15,207</td>
                <td>18,548</td>
                <td>15,359</td>
                <td>17,665</td>
                <td>16,725</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XP</td>
                <td>Personnel</td>
                <td>7,610</td>
                <td>7,535</td>
                <td>7,741</td>
                <td>7,641</td>
                <td>8,125</td>
                <td>7,610</td>
                <td>7,535</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>7,741 7,641</td>
                <td>8,125</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XA</td>
                <td>Tangible assets (Mio TL) Input Price</td>
                <td>220</td>
                <td>266</td>
                <td>205</td>
                <td>243</td>
                <td>201</td>
                <td>220</td>
                <td>266</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>205</td>
                <td>243 201</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>WD</td>
                <td>Price of Deposit WP Price of Personnel WA Price of Tangible Assets Price Output Y1 Non-Interest Incomes (Mio TL) Y2 Interest Bearing Assets (Mio TL)</td>
                <td>0.03 24,824 2.04 187 7,155</td>
                <td>0.02 15,465 3.11 265 10,335</td>
                <td>0.04 25,602 2.32 197 6,609</td>
                <td>0.02 16,200 3.57 267 9,176</td>
                <td>0.03 25,708 2.49 215 6,178</td>
                <td>0.01 16,253 4.06 294 8,267</td>
                <td>0.03 26,805 2.74 234 6,143</td>
                <td>0.02 16,636 4.95 315 7,971</td>
                <td>0.03 27,090 2.81 239 6,120</td>
                <td>0.02 16,084 5.01 319 7,979</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Y3</td>
                <td>Loans and Receivables (Mio TL) 13,468 Output Price</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>14,851</td>
                <td>14,479</td>
                <td>15,893</td>
                <td>16,893</td>
                <td>18,709</td>
                <td>18,864</td>
                <td>20,769</td>
                <td>21,572</td>
                <td>23,961</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P1</td>
                <td>Price of Non-Interest Income</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
                <td>1</td>
                <td>0</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P2</td>
                <td>Price of Interest-Bearing Assets</td>
                <td>0.06</td>
                <td>0.08</td>
                <td>0.15</td>
                <td>0.68</td>
                <td>0.05</td>
                <td>0.05</td>
                <td>0.06</td>
                <td>0.04</td>
                <td>0.08</td>
                <td>0.19</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>P3</td>
                <td>Price of Loan and Receivables Number of Observations Input</td>
                <td>0.06 2016 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.03</td>
                <td>0.07 2017 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.03</td>
                <td>0.06 2018 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.03</td>
                <td>0.06 2019 Mean Std.Dev 92</td>
                <td>0.03</td>
                <td>0.06 2020 Mean 92</td>
                <td>0.03 (continued) Std.Dev</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XD</td>
                <td>Deposits (Mio TL)</td>
                <td>20,511</td>
                <td>23,451 22,081</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>25,280 23,195</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>26,838 23,785</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>28,291 27,822</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>34,807</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XP</td>
                <td>Personnel</td>
                <td>8,281</td>
                <td>8,381 8,172</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>8,349 8,093</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>8,364 7,957</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>8,318 7,842</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>8,268</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>XA</td>
                <td>Tangible assets (Mio TL) Input Price WD Price of Deposit WP Price of Personnel WA Price of Tangible Assets Price Output Y1 Non-Interest Incomes (Mio TL) Y2 Interest Bearing Assets (Mio TL) 5,900 Y3 Loans and Receivables (Mio TL) 22,510 Output Price P1 Price of Non-Interest Income P2 Price of Interest Bearing Assets P3 Price of Loan And Receivables Determinants of the Bank Efficiency The empirical𝛱𝛱methods * = *maksidentifying are divided into𝛱𝛱univariate = maks s.t. method involves thes.t. ownership and scale𝐾𝐾group. satiable to clarify 𝐾𝐾 the ෍ connection 𝐾𝐾 𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘 the financial ෍factors 𝑦𝑦 ≥the 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1of broader determinants 𝑘𝑘=1 ෍ 𝜆𝜆 the DEA are associated 𝑘𝑘=1 𝐾𝐾 stage (Coelli et𝐾𝐾al.,𝐾𝐾 2005). ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1 The second stage ෍ 𝑘𝑘=1 𝐾𝐾 to explain efficiency. 𝐾𝐾 the literature are ownership, 𝐾𝐾 ෍ ෍ 𝜆𝜆 power, financial statement = 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=1 gleaned from the 𝑘𝑘=1literature 2001; Bonin &amp; 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘Hasan, 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 0; ሺ𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ 2006; 2009;𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘DeYoung ≥ 0; ሺ𝑘𝑘 where, Matousek, where, 2019) are hypothesis, where, global structure pperformance = the vector hypothesis, p = the vector and bad management</td>
                <td>366 0.03 28,344 3.07 239 1 0.07 0.06 𝛱𝛱* = maks pʹy - wʹx 𝑘𝑘 𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘of efficiency, ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑥𝑥; 𝑥𝑥 𝑘𝑘 ≤𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥; 𝜆𝜆 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑥; 𝑘𝑘=1 of 𝑘𝑘analysis investigates various factors deemed 1; ෍ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 = composition, ≥𝑘𝑘=10; ሺ𝑘𝑘2005; = 1,2, =&amp; 1,2, Hasan, efficient p = the vector of output prices.</td>
                <td>512 0.02 16,752 28,707 5.89 315 7,647 6,010 22,374 24,662 0 0.11 0.03 pand y-w ≥ 𝑦𝑦; 1; Maudos advantage hypothesis, agency theory hypothesis, of output prices. hypothesis.of output prices.</td>
                <td>381 0.03 3.06 239 1 0.09 0.06 multivariate x empirical analysis of the CPE and depends on s.t. However, this method needs to be more 𝜆𝜆 𝑦𝑦 𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑦; between efficiency measures and The main factors in explaining efficiency in . . . . . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ . . . . 1998; . , 𝐾𝐾ሻ structure</td>
                <td>502 0.02 17,349 28,614 5.97 323 7,627 6,683 28,321 25,469 0 0.15 0.03 pʹy - ʹwʹx ʹ the determinants of bank efficiency 𝑦𝑦;bank. To explain this and to explore the with bank-specific variables in the second 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 = 1;scale, corporate governance, market (Berger &amp; Mester, 2003; Altunbas et al.,</td>
                <td>362 0.04 2.54 225 1 0.09 0.08 the efficiency values obtained by hypothesis, moral hazard theory hypothesis,</td>
                <td>468 0.03 18,826 31,631 4.32 313 8,287 4,919 29,840 24,962 0 0.14 0.05 methods. The univariate etc. The applied hypotheses &amp; Pastor, 2003; Das &amp; Ghosh, (5) Berger et al., 2008; Partovi (5) market</td>
                <td>454 0.05 0.25 216 1 0.12 0.09 (5) discipline</td>
                <td>539 0.03 21,388 31,127 0.77 314 7,114 6,068 30,138 28,284 0 0.12 0.04 &amp;</td>
                <td>438 0.02 0.31 195 1 0.09 0.05</td>
                <td>527 0.01 19,182 0.84 281 8,753 35,227 0 0.08 0.03</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>𝛱𝛱∗.</td>
                <td>et al. (2017), Gardener et al. (2011), and Das and Ghosh (2009)</td>
                <td>Reviewing the efficiency literature found in Batir et al. (2017), Ismail the use of the Tobit Model easily handles the sources of efficiency differentials. The estimated value of the CPE (dependent variable) is</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>nds 1.</td>
                <td></td>
                <td>limited between 0 and 1, and the proper theoretic description is a Tobit model with a two-sided sensor. However, banks with zero efficiencies</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>s 1.</td>
                <td>one or two-sided model. The Tobit model uses CPE values found in 𝑦𝑦0∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥variables the first stage as dependent 𝑦𝑦0∗ =∗ 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥0 + 𝜀𝜀0 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 + 𝜀𝜀 𝑦𝑦0 = 𝑦𝑦0∗ , ∗If 𝑦𝑦∗0 &gt;∗ 0 otherwise otherwise (6) 𝑦𝑦0 = 𝑦𝑦0 , If 𝑦𝑦0 &gt; 0 2otherwise y0 = 0, 𝜀𝜀0 ~𝑁𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎𝜎 ሻ y0 = 0, 𝜀𝜀0 ~𝑁𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎𝜎2 ሻ 2 0, 𝜀𝜀of Where, x0 isy0a =vector 0 ~𝑁𝑁ሺ0, to estimate. x0 𝑦𝑦β0i 𝑦𝑦 𝑦𝑦0 𝜀𝜀0 ~𝑁𝑁ሺ0, 0 . 𝑦𝑦0 𝛩𝛩𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘model regression 𝛩𝛩𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽0 +𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝛽𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝛽𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 +𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝛽𝛽12 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽16 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 (7) Where, 𝛩𝛩 𝛩𝛩𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 k= k =(1,2,…23) (1,2,…23) k = (1,2,…23) k = (1,2,…23) (H0). a(Hbank’s 0).</td>
                <td>should be seen in practice. Hence, the results will not change using a 𝑦𝑦0 0= 𝑦𝑦0∗ , 0If 𝑦𝑦∗0 0&gt; 0 otherwise explanatory = 𝛽𝛽0 is 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽 6𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽15 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽16 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 (7) (H (H0). The present study considers a variety of variables that may impact resulting in a negative relationship with the CPE.</td>
                <td>0 + 𝜀𝜀0 (Das &amp; Ghosh, 2009). + estimated 𝛩𝛩 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 6 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘11+ 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (H00).). the bank’s share of total deposits in the banking sector (DEP) is used as an indicator of market concentration, and a positive relationship with the CPE is hypothesized (H0). Conversely, the ratio of time deposits to total deposits (TERMDEP) is expected to have a negative relationship with the CPE. High deposit shares in total deposits may lead to high costs in an environment where interest rates have decreased. A higher ratio of demand deposits to total deposits (CURRENTDEP) is expected to increase profitability and thus have a positive relationship with the CPE. This ratio is used to investigate the effect of diversification on resources. On the asset side, a higher ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN) may indicate higher risk and greater market share in the credit market, leading to a positive relationship with the CPE. Conversely, a higher level of liquidity (LIQUIDITY) may signify poor cash management and lead to lower interest income, Bank-specific variables, such as the HHI index used to measure between the HHI index and CPE, as banks offering a wider range</td>
                <td>𝜎𝜎 ሻ variables. β is the set of parameters the∗ CPE value found by the DEA in the first stage. The following 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 with + 1313 𝛩𝛩𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗is the CPE value of kt bank obtained with the DEA model in t time. cost and profit efficiency (CPE) ratio. On the source side,(H0). diversification, are also considered. A positive relationship is expected of services are predicted to be more cost-effective. The indicators added to the HHI index are Loan Interest Income, Investment Interest Income, Other Interest Income, Net Fee and Commission Income, and Other Non-Interest Income. The log of total assets (SIZE) is expected to have a positive relationship with the CPE, as larger banks can adjust their costs and profits more effectively. The growth of total assets (ASSTGRW) is also expected to have a positive relationship with the CPE, although its effect on the cost side is unpredictable.</td>
                <td>𝜎𝜎2 ሻ represents the error term.. 𝑦𝑦∗0 is latent variable and 𝑦𝑦0 is + 𝛽𝛽2the 𝛽𝛽 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 2 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷</td>
                <td>(6) (6) 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦00 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 +values. CPE 𝛽𝛽55𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + +𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12 12𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝛩𝛩𝛩𝛩𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 kk==(1,2,…23)</td>
                <td>(6) 𝜀𝜀0 ~𝑁𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎𝜎2 ሻ + 𝛽𝛽 +𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 3𝛽𝛽 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽7 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 +𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽14 𝛽𝛽12 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽13 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽15 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽16 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘(7) 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 (1,2,…23)</td>
                <td>𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 k = (1,2,…23)</td>
                <td>𝛩𝛩𝛩𝛩𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ==𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽00++𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽11𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + +𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘</td>
                <td>x0 βi 𝛽𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + ++7𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽66𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽+14+𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝛽𝛽13</td>
                <td>𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘++𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽22𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘++𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽33𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘++𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽44𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + + 𝛽𝛽 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝛩𝛩𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 4 𝛽𝛽8𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ++𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽77𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽88+ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘++𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+ 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 +𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽910 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 9𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝛽𝛽8 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽 9 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽 10 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽 11 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝛽𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 13𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘++𝛽𝛽+ 𝛽𝛽14 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 14𝛽𝛽15 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘+ 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 +𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽15 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽16 15 +𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝜀𝜀 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽16 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝛽𝛽12(7)𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽13 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝛩𝛩𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
        <p>Risk structure variables are also included. The rate of credit losses to total loans (NPL) is expected to have a negative relationship with the CPE, as it raises costs and reduces profits. Conversely, the ratio of a bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets (CRAR) is expected to have a positive relationship with the CPE, as a higher CRAR is associated with a higher CPE, in line with the postulations of Moral Hazard Theory. Finally, the ratio of a bank’s weighted exposures according to the risk to its total assets (RWA) is expected to have a negative relationship with the CPE, as significant exposures can create higher credit losses.</p>
        <p>Dummy variables are also considered. The dummy variable for public banks (DPUBLIC) is expected to have a positive relationship with the CPE, as public companies are predicted to have a higher efficiency due to the market discipline hypothesis (See Table 4 for References). Dummy of crisis (DCRISIS) is included in the model to determine the impact of the 2008-2009 mortgage crisis on the CPE. A dummy variable for state banks (DSTATE) is expected to have a negative relationship with the CPE, as state banks are predicted to be less efficient than private banks due to the market discipline hypothesis. The dummy variable for private banks (DPRIVATE) is expected to have a positive relationship with the CPE. Finally, the dummy variable for foreign banks (DFOREIGN) is expected to have a positive relationship with the CPE, as foreign banks are predicted to have a higher CPE than domestic banks due to the global advantage hypothesis. Definitions of independent variables, hypotheses and cited studies in the literature are as presented in Table 4.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec4">
      <title>RESULTS</title>
      <p>In the analysis carried out in the present study, the R program is used to measure the cost-efficiency. The program calculates the cost efficiency values with the “cost.opt” method in the Benchmarking package developed by Bogetoft and Otto (2011). The cost efficiencies of banks were calculated separately according to CRS and VRS methods and the results are as presented in Table 5 and Table 6. The CE values ​​according to ownership are as given in Table 7. Table 7 shows that state banks had better CE values than private and foreign banks. Table 5 shows that the banking system experienced a decrease in cost and profitability efficiency after 2009 (See Table 5).</p>
      <table-wrap id="tbl4">
        <label>Table 4</label>
        <caption><title>Description of Tobit Variables</title></caption>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="2">Variables on the source side</th>
              <th>Description</th>
              <th>Hypothesis</th>
              <th>Literature</th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th>DEP</th>
              <th>The share of deposits of the bank</th>
              <th>Market Concentration</th>
              <th>Das and Ghosh (2009), Stiroh and Strahan</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td></td>
              <td>in the total deposits of the banking sector</td>
              <td>H0: Deposits have a positive relation with the CPE.</td>
              <td>(2003)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>TERMDEP</td>
              <td>This is the ratio of the Bank’s time deposits to its total deposits.</td>
              <td>Market Concentration H0: Ratio of time deposits have a negative relation with the CPE</td>
              <td>Das and Ghosh (2009), Stiroh and Strahan, (2003)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>CURRENTDEP</td>
              <td>The ratio of demand deposits to total deposits.</td>
              <td>Diversification effect H0: Ratio of demand deposits have a positive relation to the CPE.</td>
              <td>Das and Ghosh (2009), Berger and Mester (2003)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>Variables on the asset side</td>
              <td></td>
              <td></td>
              <td></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>LOAN</td>
              <td>The ratio of loans to total assets.</td>
              <td>Efficient Structure Hypothesis H0: Ratio of loans have a positive relation to the CPE.</td>
              <td>Berger et al. (2008), Das and Ghosh (2009)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>LIQUIDITY</td>
              <td>It is the ratio of liquid assets to gross assets.</td>
              <td>Bad cash management H0: Level of liquidity have a negative relation to the CPE</td>
              <td>Berger and DeYoung (1997), Beck and Hesse (2006).</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>Bank-specific variables</td>
              <td></td>
              <td></td>
              <td></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>HHI</td>
              <td>HHI index to determine the diversification</td>
              <td>Efficient Structure Hypothesis H0: Diversification value have a positive relation to the CPE.</td>
              <td>Isik and Hassan(2003) (continued)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>Variables on Risk Structure Description</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>Hypothesis</td>
              <td>Literature</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>SIZE</td>
              <td>Log of total assets.</td>
              <td>Efficient Structure Hypothesis H0: Asset size have a positive relation to the CPE.</td>
              <td>Berger and Hannan (1998), Hauner (2005),Kasman (2002), Isik and Hassan (2003), Delis and Papanikolaou (2009), Batir et al. (2017)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>ASSTGRW</td>
              <td>Growth of total assets</td>
              <td>Efficient structure hypothesis H0: Asset growth ratio have a positive relation to PE.</td>
              <td>Das and Ghosh (2009), Jackson and Fethi (2000), Kasman (2002)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>NPL</td>
              <td>It is the rate of credit losses to total Bad Management Hypothesis loans.</td>
              <td>H0: NPL ratio have a negative relation to the CPE.</td>
              <td>Berger and DeYoung (1997), Lall (2014) Lee &amp; Chih (2013), Miller and Noulas (1997), Partovi and Matousek (2019), Berger and Mester (1997), Sufian and Noor (2009), and Ismail et al. (2013), Batir et al (2017).</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>CRAR</td>
              <td>The ratio of bank’s capital to its risk weighted assets.</td>
              <td>Moral Hazard Theory H0: CRAR ratio have a positive relation to the CPE.</td>
              <td>(Berger &amp; Humphrey, 1997), (Casu &amp; Molyneux, 2003). Catalbas and Atan (2005) Isik and Hassan (2003), Belas, Kocisova and Gavurova (2019), Fukuyama and Matousek (2011)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>RWA</td>
              <td>The ratio of bank’s weighted exposures according to the risk to its total assets.</td>
              <td>Bad management hypothesis H0: RWA have a negative relation Ghosh(2009) to the CPE</td>
              <td>Berger and DeYoung (1997), Das and</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>Dummy Variables</td>
              <td></td>
              <td></td>
              <td></td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>DPUBLIC</td>
              <td>Dummy variable to define public offering</td>
              <td>Market Discipline Hypothesis H0: Public banks have a higher CPE.</td>
              <td>Berger and Mester (1997), Isik and Hassan (2002), Das and Ghosh (2009) (continued)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>Variables on Risk Structure Description</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>Hypothesis</td>
              <td>Literature</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>DCRISIS</td>
              <td>Dummy variable for 2009 mortgage crisis.</td>
              <td>H0: 2009 Global Crisis has a negative effect on the CPE.</td>
              <td>Aysan and Darendeli (2010),Yilmaz (2013), Gunes and Yildirim (2016), Ozkan- Gunay et al. (2013)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>DSTATE</td>
              <td>Dummy variable to define state banks</td>
              <td>Market Discipline Hypothesis H0: State banks have a lower CPE.</td>
              <td>Berger et al. (2000), Isik and Hassan (2002), Sturm and Williams (2004); Bonin et al. (2005); Berger et al. (2005; 2009); Delis and Papanikolaou (2009), Altunbas et al. (2001), Aysan and Darendeli (2010), Gunes and Yildirim (2016)</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>DPRIVATE</td>
              <td>Dummy variable to define private banks</td>
              <td>Market Discipline Hypothesis H0: Private banks have a higher CPE</td>
              <td>Same as DSTATE</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>DFOREIGN</td>
              <td>Dummy variable to define foreign banks</td>
              <td>Global advantage hypothesis H0: Foreign banks have a higher CPE.</td>
              <td>Same as DSTATE</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </table-wrap>
      <table-wrap id="tbl5">
        <label>Table 5</label>
        <caption><title>Cost and Profit Efficiency Values for the Banking Sector (VRS Method)</title></caption>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th></th>
              <th colspan="3">Cost Efficiency</th>
              <th></th>
              <th colspan="2">Profit Efficiency</th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="6">Years Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Geo.Mean Obs. Mean Std. Dev.</th>
              <th>Geo.Mean</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>2006 23 0.94</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>0.93</td>
              <td>20</td>
              <td>0.36</td>
              <td>0.36</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2007 92 0.88</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.87</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>0.24</td>
              <td>0.03</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2008 92 0.88</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>0.87</td>
              <td>91</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.22</td>
              <td>0.03</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2009 92 0.89</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>0.88</td>
              <td>85</td>
              <td>0.22</td>
              <td>0.26</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2010 92 0.87</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.86</td>
              <td>83</td>
              <td>0.2</td>
              <td>0.24</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2011 92 0.85</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.83</td>
              <td>87</td>
              <td>0.22</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.05</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2012 92 0.88</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.87</td>
              <td>88</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2013 92 0.83</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.81</td>
              <td>89</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.08</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2014 92 0.81</td>
              <td>0.17</td>
              <td>0.79</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.28</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2015 92 0.8</td>
              <td>0.19</td>
              <td>0.77</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.25</td>
              <td>0.28</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2016 92 0.83</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.81</td>
              <td>62</td>
              <td>0.26</td>
              <td>0.26</td>
              <td>0.10</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2017 92 0.83</td>
              <td>0.17</td>
              <td>0.81</td>
              <td>76</td>
              <td>0.32</td>
              <td>0.32</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2018 92 0.85</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>0.82</td>
              <td>75</td>
              <td>0.31</td>
              <td>0.33</td>
              <td>0.10</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2019 92 0.81</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.79</td>
              <td>68</td>
              <td>0.32</td>
              <td>0.93</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2020 92 0.77</td>
              <td>0.20</td>
              <td>0.74</td>
              <td>57</td>
              <td>0.28</td>
              <td>0.32</td>
              <td>0.09</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </table-wrap>
      <table-wrap id="tbl6">
        <label>Table 6</label>
        <caption><title>Cost Efficiency Values for the Banking Sector (CRS Method)</title></caption>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th>Years</th>
              <th>Obs.</th>
              <th>Mean</th>
              <th>Std. Dev.</th>
              <th>Geo.Mean</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>2006</td>
              <td>23</td>
              <td>0.81</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.79</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2007</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.72</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.70</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2008</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.78</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.77</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2009</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.80</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.78</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2010</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.75</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.74</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2011</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.60</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.59</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2012</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.78</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.77</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2013</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.58</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.57</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2014</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.44</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.43</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2015</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.43</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.41</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2016</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.60</td>
              <td>0.17</td>
              <td>0.57</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2017</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.58</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.57</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2018</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.78</td>
              <td>0.24</td>
              <td>0.70</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2019</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.76</td>
              <td>0.17</td>
              <td>0.74</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2020</td>
              <td>92</td>
              <td>0.69</td>
              <td>0.19</td>
              <td>0.65</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </table-wrap>
      <table-wrap id="tbl7">
        <label>Table 7</label>
        <caption><title>Cost Efficiency and Ownership (VRS Method)</title></caption>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th></th>
              <th colspan="2">State Banks</th>
              <th>Private Banks</th>
              <th>Foreign Banks</th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="2">Years Obs. Mean Std. Geo.</th>
              <th>Std. Geo.</th>
              <th>Std.</th>
              <th>Geo.</th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th></th>
              <th colspan="2">Dev Mean Mean Dev Mean Mean</th>
              <th>Dev</th>
              <th>Mean</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>2006 23</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.96 0.03 0.96 0.94 0.11 0.93 0.93</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.92</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2007 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.92 0.06 0.92 0.87 0.14 0.86 0.89</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.88</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2008 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.86 0.09 0.86 0.87 0.12 0.86 0.88</td>
              <td>0.1</td>
              <td>0.88</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2009 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.87 0.09 0.87 0.87 0.14 0.86 0.91</td>
              <td>0.08</td>
              <td>0.91</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2010 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.89 0.09 0.89 0.86 0.14 0.85 0.88</td>
              <td>0.1</td>
              <td>0.87</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2011 92</td>
              <td>0.9 0.07 0.9</td>
              <td>0.84 0.17 0.82 0.83</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.82</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2012 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.87 0.11 0.86 0.87 0.14 0.86 0.88</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>0.88</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2013 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.86 0.1 0.86 0.81 0.16 0.79 0.83</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.82</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2014 92</td>
              <td>0.91 0.09 0.9</td>
              <td>0.77 0.19 0.75 0.82</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.8</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2015 92</td>
              <td>0.91 0.09 0.9</td>
              <td>0.75 0.22 0.72 0.80</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.78</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2016 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.91 0.06 0.91 0.77 0.17 0.75 0.84</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.83</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2017 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.96 0.05 0.95 0.76 0.19 0.73 0.85</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.83</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2018 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.96 0.04 0.96 0.78 0.15 0.77 0.86</td>
              <td>0.21</td>
              <td>0.82</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2019 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.96 0.05 0.96 0.78 0.14 0.77 0.79</td>
              <td>0.17</td>
              <td>0.77</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2020 92</td>
              <td></td>
              <td>0.95 0.05 0.95 0.70 0.18 0.68 0.76</td>
              <td>0.20</td>
              <td>0.73</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </table-wrap>
      <p>The Benchmarking package was used in R program to calculate the PE by the DEA method. The VRS method was used to calculate the PE. PE values for the whole sector are as presented in Table 5. As can be seen in Table 8, the PE values of state banks were higher than those of private and foreign banks. In general, it is observed that the PE values of ​​ Private banks were better than that of foreign banks. However, it is observed that foreign banks have performed better in recent years (see Table 8).</p>
      <p>The periods with negative profits were excluded from the data. As the majority share of some private domestic banks was sold to foreign banks during the research period, they were moved from the private banks’ group to the foreign banks’ group. In the present study, the group with the lowest profitability was identified as the group of foreign banks. It is seen that foreign banks have been working with shallow profit margins after 2009, and they had losses in specific periods. Banks with negative profitability were excluded from the average. Even with positive profitability values, they had a very low PE (see Table 8).</p>
      <table-wrap id="tbl8">
        <label>Table 8</label>
        <caption><title>Profit Efficiency and Ownership (VRS Method)</title></caption>
        <table>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th colspan="3">State Banks</th>
              <th></th>
              <th colspan="3">Private Banks</th>
              <th></th>
              <th colspan="3">Foreign Banks</th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th colspan="2">Std. Geo.</th>
              <th></th>
              <th>Std.</th>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th>Geo.</th>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th colspan="2">Std. Geo.</th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="3">Years Obs. Mean</th>
              <th colspan="3">Obs. Mean</th>
              <th colspan="3"></th>
              <th colspan="2">Obs. Mean</th>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th colspan="2">Dev Mean</th>
              <th></th>
              <th>Dev</th>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th>Mean</th>
              <th colspan="2"></th>
              <th colspan="2">Dev Mean</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td>2006</td>
              <td>3</td>
              <td>0.53</td>
              <td>0.26</td>
              <td>0.47</td>
              <td>10</td>
              <td>0.47</td>
              <td>0.42</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>7</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2007</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.34</td>
              <td>0.16</td>
              <td>0.3</td>
              <td>40</td>
              <td>0.25</td>
              <td>0.31</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
              <td>40</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
              <td>0.08</td>
              <td>0.01</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2008</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.31</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.29</td>
              <td>40</td>
              <td>0.24</td>
              <td>0.29</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
              <td>39</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
              <td>0.01</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2009</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.39</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.36</td>
              <td>39</td>
              <td>0.26</td>
              <td>0.31</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
              <td>35</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>0.04</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2010</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.36</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.34</td>
              <td>40</td>
              <td>0.25</td>
              <td>0.3</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
              <td>32</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>0.04</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2011</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.35</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.33</td>
              <td>38</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.32</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
              <td>37</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.03</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2012</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.4</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.37</td>
              <td>38</td>
              <td>0.31</td>
              <td>0.33</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>38</td>
              <td>0.12</td>
              <td>0.2</td>
              <td>0.04</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2013</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.41</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.38</td>
              <td>39</td>
              <td>0.29</td>
              <td>0.33</td>
              <td>0.08</td>
              <td>38</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>0.19</td>
              <td>0.05</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2014</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.4</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.38</td>
              <td>40</td>
              <td>0.28</td>
              <td>0.33</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
              <td>40</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>0.22</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2015</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.49</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.46</td>
              <td>35</td>
              <td>0.30</td>
              <td>0.33</td>
              <td>0.08</td>
              <td>45</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.21</td>
              <td>0.04</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2016</td>
              <td>11</td>
              <td>0.43</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>0.40</td>
              <td>24</td>
              <td>0.29</td>
              <td>0.30</td>
              <td>0.11</td>
              <td>27</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.21</td>
              <td>0.05</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2017</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.60</td>
              <td>0.26</td>
              <td>0.54</td>
              <td>23</td>
              <td>0.32</td>
              <td>0.29</td>
              <td>0.13</td>
              <td>41</td>
              <td>0.24</td>
              <td>0.30</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2018</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.68</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.64</td>
              <td>24</td>
              <td>0.30</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.10</td>
              <td>39</td>
              <td>0.21</td>
              <td>0.30</td>
              <td>0.06</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2019</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.47</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.40</td>
              <td>20</td>
              <td>0.27</td>
              <td>0.21</td>
              <td>0.14</td>
              <td>36</td>
              <td>0.30</td>
              <td>1.25</td>
              <td>0.03</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td>2020</td>
              <td>12</td>
              <td>0.56</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.52</td>
              <td>20</td>
              <td>0.18</td>
              <td>0.15</td>
              <td>0.07</td>
              <td>25</td>
              <td>0.23</td>
              <td>0.37</td>
              <td>0.05</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </table-wrap>
      <sec id="sec4-1">
        <title>Regression Results</title>
        <p>Tobit regression analysis was performed to determine the effects of sixteen independent variables on the PE and CE values. Since collinearity was found between the “CURRENTDEP” and “DFOREIGN” variables, these variables were dropped from the model. Therefore, total independent variables decreased to fourteen. Regression analysis was carried out in R program by using the AER package program. The AER package program is used for the second stage regression analysis of the detected efficiency values.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec4-2">
        <title>Profit Efficiency Tobit Regression</title>
        <p>Tobit regression analysis was performed with four different limitations. Table 9 shows the regression results for each limitation.</p>
        <table-wrap id="tbl9">
          <label>Table 9</label>
          <caption><title>Tobit Regression Results</title></caption>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th colspan="2"></th>
                <th colspan="2">Dependent variables</th>
                <th colspan="2"></th>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <th>Independent variables</th>
                <th>PE</th>
                <th>PE</th>
                <th>PE</th>
                <th>PE</th>
                <th>CE</th>
                <th>CE</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td>-0.38</td>
                <td>-0.66**</td>
                <td>-0.65**</td>
                <td>-0.3884</td>
                <td>0.6571***</td>
                <td>0.4991***</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>Intercept</td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
                <td></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>(-1.25)</td>
                <td>(3.16)</td>
                <td>(-3.24)</td>
                <td>(-1.31)</td>
                <td>(3.786)</td>
                <td>(3.652)</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td>0.004</td>
                <td>0.02***</td>
                <td>0.02***</td>
                <td>0.0047</td>
                <td>0.0117</td>
                <td>0.0169***</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
        </table-wrap>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec5">
      <title>SIZE</title>
      <preformat>                             (0.37)     (3.67)    (3.75)     (0.42)         (1.85)      (3.308)
                            4.47***    3.54***   3.53***   4.4236***     1.4787***     0.9412***
DEP
                             (11.5)   (13.40)   (13.74)    (11.678)        (6.627)      (5.381)
                              -0.10   -0.25***  -0.24***    -0.0867       -0.1389*     -0.1000*</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec6">
      <title>TERMDEP</title>
      <preformat>                            (-1.01)    (-3.64)   (-3.61)   (-0.857)       (-2.316)     (-2.138)
                               0.08      0.08      0.07      0.0578       0.1991**    0.17774**</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec7">
      <title>LOAN</title>
      <preformat>                             (0.59)     (0.89)    (0.82)    (0.438)        (2.602)      (2.912)
                              0.25*    0.35***   0.34***    0.2320*        0.1336*     0.07564</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec8">
      <title>LIQUIDITY</title>
      <preformat>                              (2.2)     (4.58)    (4.59)    (2.062)        (2.055)      (1.456)
                            0.19***       0.06     0.05    0.1928***       -0.0600     -0.0690*
HHI
                             (3.32)     (1.56)    (1.55)      (3.32)        (-1.75)    (-2.575)
                            0.26***    0.30***   0.29***   0.2483***      0.1312***    0.1204***</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec9">
      <title>ASSETGRW</title>
      <preformat>                             (5.32)     (8.58)    (8.51)    (5.084)        (4.562)      (5.342)
                              -0.07   -0.65***  -0.63***    -0.0734      -0.9783***   -0.8822***
NPL
                            (-0.44)    (-4.13)   (-4.15)   (-0.461)      (-10.931)    (-12.009)
                             0.002      0.001     0.001      0.0027       0.0046***    0.0041***</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec10">
      <title>CRAR</title>
      <preformat>                             (1.37)    (1.192) (1.1702)     (1.358)        (3.882)      (4.501)
                               0.08       0.04   0.0449      0.0983      -0.1679***   -0.1208**
RWA
                             (1.06)     (0.72)  (0.817)     (1.216)       (-3.658)     (-3.236)
                               0.01       0.02   0.0210      0.0147        0.0446*     0.0459**</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec11">
      <title>DCRISIS</title>
      <preformat>                             (0.51)     (1.06)  (1.036)       (0.48)       (2.541)      (3.238)
                             -0.08*   -0.10*** -0.1004*** -0.0852*       -0.1216***   -0.0962***</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec12">
      <title>DSTATE</title>
      <preformat>                            (-2.35)    (-4.18) (-4.288)    (-2.391)       (-5.966)     (-5.845)
                               0.01      -0.01  -0.0131      0.0172      -0.0804***   -0.0718***</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec13">
      <title>DPRIVATE</title>
      <preformat>                             (0.85)    (-0.96) (-0.987)     (0.868)         (-7.17)    (-7.845)
                               0.02    0.04*** 0.0470***     0.0276        -0.0050     0.00039</preformat>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec14">
      <title>DPUBLIC</title>
      <preformat>                             (1.30)     (3.39)  (3.491)     (1.354)       (-0.429)      (0.042)
                           -1.25***   -1.68*** -1.7183*** -1.2831***     -1.8747***   -2.0558***
Log(scale)
                           (-63.08)   (-78.63) (-82.144) (-65.704)       (-81.537)    (-105.27)
Observations                  1311       1311      1311        1311          1311        1311
Right-censored=1                35
Left-censored=0                            152
Right-censored=1                            35
Left-censored=0                                   152
Right-censored=1                                                            285
Uncensored Observations 1276            1124      1159       1311          1026         1311
Log-likelihood           -254.2         143.1     245.5      -178          220.7         835
Wald-statistic          877.1***       1981***   2076***    904.4***      550.7***      609***
Scale                     0.28         0.1846    0.1794     0.2772        0.1534        0.128
Values in parentheses are z -statistics.
 *** p &lt; 0.001, ** p &lt; 0.05, * p &lt; 0.1</preformat>
      <p>The left side is uncensored, and the right side is censored with “1”: In this limitation, all negative values of the PE were taken as dependent variables, while the efficiency values with “1” were not taken. Therefore, the total numbers of observations decreased from 1311 to 1276 due to the negative values being uncensored. The left side is censored with 0 and the right side with “1”. In this limitation, the PE values were only accepted when they were between 0 and 1. The total number of observations dropped to 1124.</p>
      <p>The left side was censored with 0, and the right side with “1.1”. Banks with a negative PE were excluded from the observation. Since there was no bank with efficiency values above 1.1, the observation set consisted of 1159 observations. The left-hand was uncensored, and the right-hand side was censored with “1.1”. Here, the aim was to determine the regression result by taking the banks with a “1” total efficiency value into the observations. Since there was no bank with an efficiency value above 1.1, the observation set was analyzed as 1311 without censorship.</p>
      <sec id="sec14-1">
        <title>Cost Efficiency Tobit Regression</title>
        <p>The Tobit regression analysis was similarly iterated with cost efficiencies as the dependent variable. The Tobit regression analysis has been studied with four different limitations. Table 9 shows the results.</p>
        <p>The Left side was uncensored and the Right side censored with “1”. In this limitation, all negative values of ​​ the CE were included in the observation, while efficiency values ​​with a value of 1 were not taken. There were 285 banks with a value of 1 in the data set. As the values of 1 ​​were censored, the observations were reduced from 1311 to 1026.</p>
        <p>The left side is censored with “0,” and the right side is censored with “1”. In this limitation, the CE w ​​ as accepted only between 0 and 1. The total number of observations was reduced to 1026. Tests a and b gave the same result since no banks had negative CE values.</p>
        <p>When censored with “0” on the left and 1.1 on the right, there were no banks with a negative cost-efficiency value. Since there were no banks with an efficiency greater than 1, the entire observation set was included in the analysis.</p>
        <p>When the left side was uncensored, and the right side was censored with 1.1, the aim was to determine the regression result by taking the banks with one total efficiency. Since no banks had more than 1.1 efficiencies, the observation cluster was analyzed as 1311 without censorship.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec15">
      <title>DISCUSSION</title>
      <p>The total data observations covering 57 quarter periods between 2006 and 2020 was 1311. Tobit regression was performed in four different censors. When the data was censored with 0 and 1 in the PE analysis, it decreased to 1124. The censorship of negative efficiency values was widespread in profitability analysis. However, since banks could reach total efficiency value, the values in which the regression analysis was censored with 1.1 on the right side were used. According to the results, the independent variables of SIZE, DEP, TERMDEP, LIQUIDITY, ASSETGRW, NPL, DSTATE and DPUBLIC had significant effects on the PE values.</p>
      <p>Tobit regression analysis was repeated to determine the relationship between cost efficiencies and independent variables. As in the PE analysis, the data was censored from the left and right, and two different regression results were obtained. Since the banks with one efficiency value were excluded from the observation in narrow regression analysis, the number of observations fell from 1311 to 1026. When the banks with one efficiency value were taken into the observation series, 1311 observations could be analyzed. According to the results, independent variables that affected the cost efficiencies were; SIZE, DEP, TERMDEP, LOAN, ASSETGRW, NPL, CRAR, RWA, DSTATE, DCRISIS and DPRIVATE.</p>
      <p>The results show a positive and significant relationship between SIZE and the CPE. Large banks were seen as having the ability to adjust their output scales more optimally, thus increasing their profitability. Larger banks also have the opportunity to diversify their risks. This result supports the efficient structure hypothesis and corroborates the findings of Hauner (2005), Berger et al. (1993), Berger and Hannan (1998), Isik and Hassan (2002), Kasman (2002), and Ozkan and Gunay et al. (2013). Growth in total assets (ASSETGRW) has a positive effect on the CE as well as profit efficiency. The results are consistent with those in previous research, such as in Das and Ghosh (2009), Jackson and Fethi (2000), and Kasman (2002). Furthermore, consistent with the efficient structure hypothesis, the results reveal that the growth rate in a bank’s asset structure enables that bank to offer tools to increase profitability. The results also reveal a positive and statistically significant relationship between a bank’s deposit market share (DEP) and the PE. If it is the case that a market concentration leads to high prices and profitability, the coefficient is expected to be positive—accordingly, the more open the market, the greater the relationship between profitability and market share. According to the results, the share of deposits also has a positive and significant effect on the CE. The market share in deposits also provides banks with the advantage of reducing their deposit costs. These results were also obtained in the studies by Stiroh and Strahan (2003) and Das and Ghosh (2009). The high rate of time deposits in total deposits (TERMDEP) can lead to high costs in an environment where interest rates are falling. Therefore, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. As is consistent with the literature, such as in Das and Ghosh (2009), the results show that the share of time deposits in total deposits negatively affects the PE and CE of the bank.</p>
      <p>According to these results, there is a positive relationship between the bank’s liquidity and PE. The high rate of liquid assets is a sign of bad cash management and leads to low interest-income. It is expected that this variable will harm the PE. The difference between the results obtained from present study and the studies in developed countries can be explained by the fact that banks can even profit from liquid assets because of Turkey’s high cost of short-term funding. Therefore, the banks prefer to hold a certain amount of liquid assets for caution and make a profit from it. The NPL variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the PE and CE. According to the results, there is a significant relationship between the NPL variable and the PE and CE. The results are consistent with the bad management hypothesis introduced by Berger and De Young (1997). Recently Partovi and Matousek (2019) found similar results for the Turkish banking industry. The rise in the loan ratio (LOAN) indicates the high-risk structure of the bank’s statements and the higher market share in the loan market. According to the efficient structure hypothesis adduced by Berger et al. (2008) and Das and Ghosh (2009), banks with higher loan ratios are expected to have higher efficiencies. According to the results, there is a positive relationship between the loan ratio and CE at a high significance level. This result shows that banks with higher loans/assets ratios can better control the costs of banks.</p>
      <p>Empirical studies which included Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Casu and Molyneux (2003). Belas et al. (2019), Isik and Hassan (2003), and Fukuyama and Matousek (2011) showed that well-capitalized banks had higher efficiencies. The results show a positive but shallow relationship between the CE and capital adequacy ratio (CRAR). It is expected that the banks with lower capital funding costs will increase due to the high leverage ratio. In addition, they are expected to be more vulnerable to possible credit risks. According to Berger and Deyoung’s (1997) bad management hypothesis, increasing the riskiness of a bank harms its profitability. The results show a negative relationship between the CE and the risk-weighted assets (RWA) ratio. In the analysis, DSTATE dummy was used for the control variable of bank ownership. The results show that state ownership affects the PE and CE negatively and significantly. This is because the results reflect the market regulator functions of state banks. This result is inconsistent with Zaim (1995) ‘s findings, but supports that of Isik and Hassan (2002b) which found that private banks were more efficient than state banks. This result is obtained because the state banks finance projects that private banks are unwilling to finance due to their market regulatory and social responsibility. The impact of the 2008-2009 mortgage crisis on Turkish banking started to be seen in 2010.</p>
      <p>Therefore, 2010 is included in the model as a crisis dummy variable. According to censored Tobit regression results, positive relation is found between the Crisis dummy and cost efficiencies. This result is not compatible with the research carried out in Ozkan-Gunay et al. (2013) and Aysan and Darendeli (2010), Yilmaz (2013), Gunes and Yildirim (2016) which showed that the global crisis harmed the Turkish economy. This result shows that the regulations after 2002 in the banking system made the banking industry more resistant to crises. The DPRIVATE dummy variable is used to see the effect of private banks on efficiency values. According to the Tobit regression result, private banks harm cost-efficiencies with an 8 percent coefficient. Therefore, the market discipline hypothesis says that private banks have higher efficiencies. However, the results do not support the hypothesis and reveal the opposite results as in Isik and Hassan (2002). Therefore, it can be concluded that intensive banking system regulations negatively affect private banks’ cost efficiency.</p>
      <p>The DPUBLIC is the Dummy variable that measures the effect of being listed on the stock market on the PE and CE. The year in which the bank offers its shares to the public takes the value 1. Publicly traded companies are expected to have higher efficiency. The market discipline hypothesis tested by Berger and Mester (1997) and Das and Ghosh (2009) found that publicly traded banks had higher cost and profit efficiencies. However, Isik and Hassan (2002) found that public offering had a positive effect just on cost efficiency. Similarly, this study has found that if a bank was publicly traded, that bank would have a higher profit efficiency.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec16">
      <title>CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>In this study, the CPE values of 23 commercial and deposit banks operating in the Turkish banking industry were analyzed by the DEA method. Quarterly data between 2006 and 2020 from these banks were collected and analyzed. In addition, Tobit regression analysis was also performed to identify the determinants of the efficiency values obtained. The study aimed to obtain the most recent and long-term results on profit and cost efficiency in the Turkish banking industry.</p>
      <p>The results show that Turkish banks work with relatively higher cost efficiency than profit efficiency. In 2020, it was seen that the COVID-19 pandemic harmed the cost efficiency and profit efficiency of the banks studied. On the cost efficiency side, state banks were the category of banks least affected by the pandemic, while a 10 percent decrease in efficiency was observed in private banks.</p>
      <p>On the other hand, in the first year of the pandemic, there was an average of 25 percent depreciation in private and foreign banks in terms of profit efficiency. In contrast, in the same period an increase was observed in state banks. The study found that during the pandemic period, state banks gained market share on the credit and deposit side and acted as a locomotive in the banking sector. According to multivariate the Tobit regression analysis carried out in this study, Total Assets, Deposit Share, Time Deposits, Liquidity, Asset Growth, NPL, Ownership and Publicly when traded significantly affect profit efficiency. Therefore, the results show that there are some particular implications. One of them is that the ratio of liquid assets to total assets was positively correlated with the efficiency values. This was in contrast to the findings in previous studies. The difference can be explained by the fact that the banks in the study could even get interest income from liquid assets because the short-term funding costs were relatively high in Turkey.</p>
      <p>The second implication is that foreign banks need to perform better in both CPE. This result is in contrast to the findings in Berger et al. (2009) and Catalbas and Atan (2005). As a result of the decrease in PE, it is observed that the interest of foreign financial institutions in the Turkish banking sector in 2011, and in the intense acquisitions and mergers seen in 2002-2007, had decreased significantly. Consequently, some foreign banks have closed down their SME segments because of the high-risk and low profit. In addition, M&amp;A can be seen in the sector because the size and deposit share have both affected PE positively.</p>
      <p>Finally, the downward trend in the PE values in the Turkish banking sector is a warning signal on its financial health and stability. Therefore, to maintain the healthy growth of the banking sector and ensure the continuation of foreign capital inflows to the sector, it is essential to analyze, especially the factors affecting PE. Making new researches on the variables that are determinants in the CPE; detailing the research based on scales, segments and regions will give the parties concerned a broader view and enable a comprehensive analysis of the relevant issues involved.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ack>
      <title>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</title>
      <p>This research did not receive any specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for profit sectors.</p>
    </ack>
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